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Abstract 
The world 1S shaken in recent months by the collapse of the 
soc{ilist states of the Soviet Union. It is abundantly clear that 
the cause of the shattering of the once-powerful empire lies 
primarily in what social scientists call a self-legitimation 
crisis. The one remaining communist giant is not immuned to the 
malady which has infected her sister states. Communist China, 
especially in the post-Mao era, seems to be deeply involved with a 
whole range of crises which together add up to a self-legitimation 
Grisis for China. 
The present study first establishes a framework for examining 
. the crises which currently plague China. The basis for this 
framework is Jurgen Habermas I Legi timation Crisis, which is a 
penetrating study of what Habermas believed to be the fatal crises 
of the advanced capitalist states. Even though the crisis theory 
he developed was applied mainly to capitalist 'states, the carefully 
developed theory was seen by this writer as appropriate for the 
examination of a communist country as well. 
With this framework in hand, the next step was to determine a 
reasonable approach to the evaluation of the depth and breadth of 
crises in post-Mao China. The source of information for the study 
came from the works of selected critical intellectuals whose works 
have spanned the years especially since the death of Mao. Their 
perceptions of econom1C, insti tutional, identi ty, and cuI tural 
crises provide vital clues for determining the complete nature of 
the legitimation crisis in post-Mao China. No one intellectual has 
managed to paint a complete picture of the crises; but using the 
intellectual framework and examining the writings and speeches of 
these intellectuals over a period of several years have allowed 
thii :~esearcher to develop a systematic and a more integrated view 
of this crisis phenomenon. 
In the process of ~nalyzing the self-legitimation crisis ln 
post-Mao China, this writer has also discovered the emergence of 
new and different relationships 'which have developed between 
Chinese intellectuals and the state. At the same time they have 
become more independent, the nature of their critique has changed. 
In the past Chinese intellectuals criticized only the~ corruption of 
government and never the system of government itself. But post-Mao 
intellectuals have thrown off the fetters of their predecessors and 
turned their attacks on the very system of their repressive 
Communist regime. Those who, in an earlier era I were fiercely 
loyal to the Communist ideals now speak only of the myth of a 
Communist utopia. Their cri ticism of the crises ln China have 
spanned the spectrum of the economic, institutional, identity, and 
cultural realms which together contribute the legitimation crisis. 
The most significant finding of the present research is the 
fact that the legitimation crisis in post-Mao China arises not from 
the economic crisis as propounded by Habermas but from ideological 
retrogression. Once the people have lost their fai th ln the 
Communist ideals, all attempts of the regime to legitimize their 
rule were futile. Most of the dissident intellectuals now predict 
the imminent demise of Communism and the rise of democracy ln 
China. 
Introduction 
..... : . ..:. .. 
In recent years, the crisis of socialism has become a topic of 
contention among the scholars and intellectuals in both mainland 
China and East European countries. The ideological disintegration 
of Communism has become a common phenomenon throughout the 
social~st states since the majority of the people seems to have 
lost their faith in the practice of Communist ideals. 
The People's Republic of China is clearly caught in the same 
predica~ent, especially after the death of Mao. In Mao's era, 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought were used to serve as 
foundation for the rule of Communism in China. According to David 
Kelly, the rule of Communist China has long been self-legi timatized 
by Marxian ideology and Maoism.! Hence, political legitimacy is 
rationalized on ideological ground, which.Ambrose King depicted as 
"ideological poli tics" . 2 This kind of legi timacy is always 
vulnerable to any cri tiques and dissidences from the people 
especially when the state fails to justify its rule by the official 
ideology. In post-Mao China, however, the Communists have failed 
to maintain the people's sense of belonging to the regime. As 
Lucian Pye and John Herz observed, there is a close linkage between 
lDavid Kelly, "Chinese Marxism since Tiananmen: Between 
Eyaporation and Dismemberment If, in David Goodman and George Segal 
(eds), China in the Nineties: Crisis Management and Beyond, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 
2Ambrose King,· The Development and Dilemmas of Chinese 
Democracy, ' (Taipei: Shi Bao Cultural Press, 1984), p.162 
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the problem of identi ty and the problem of legi timacy. 3 The 
failure to ~stablish such an identity and the imminent difficulties 
in ec;~omic reforms have already shaken the rule of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC). Hence, a legitimation crisis may be seen as 
being intensified. 
CRISIS PHENOMENA IN POST-MAO CHINA 
The past three decades of the 'socialist experiment' in 
mainland China have demonstrated clearly the problems in the praxis 
of Communist ideals. People living ln the mainland have 
encountered endless social upheavals. The agony of .~he Cultural 
Revolution and the growing awareness of the failure in praxis of 
Communist ideals in the past two decades have caused the people of 
China to lose faith in Communism. Predicaments and difficul ties 
have been experienced not only by the general public but also by 
the educated people like the university students and the 
intellectuals. It was reported that both the public and the 
official elites openly acknowledged the crises of faith, trust and 
confidence in the post-Mao era. 4 The Communist leaders attempted 
3Lucian pye "The Legitimation Crisis", Levnand Binder et al. 
Crises and Sequences in Poli tical Development, (Princeton: N. J . : 
Princeton University), pp.135, 137, 153 and John Herz, "Legitimacy: 
Can We Retrieve It?", Comparative Politics, (10, no.3 April 1978), 
p .13.8 
4Li Honglin, "What Does 'Crisis of Fai th' Signify", Renmin 
ribao, (November 11,1980), p.5; Lei Zheng, "Confidence and Trust", 
Renmin ribao, (March 13, 1980), p.5; Commentator, "Improve Party 
Style of Work is a Fundamental Requirement for the Party to Lead 
the People to Realize Four Modernization", Renmin ribao, (july 1, 
1979), p.1; and Alan Liu, "Political Decay on mainland China: On 
Crises of Fai th, Confidence and Trust", Issuess and Studies, 
(Vol.XVIII No.8, 1982), p.25 
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to restore the confidence of the people toward the regime by 
lanuching the Four Modernizations with the principal goal to 
, ... .. ..... 
quicken the economic development and to improve the life of people. 
However, predicaments in economic and political reform have brought 
about discontent and outburst. As Na than observed, though the 
reforms have the principal goal to redeem the Party's legitimacy by 
radically improving the economy, the inflation and devolution of 
power brought by the success of reform have contributed to a 
decline in the regime's authority and given rise to a wave of 
profound questioning about the rule of Communist China. 5 The June 
4th Incident demonstrated fully the antagonism and anger from the 
public. They not only pointed out sharply the problems in 
leadership but also attacked subtly the system. 
The straining sense of crisis is shared not only among the 
public but also by the university students and the intellectuals. 
They criticize the over-dominating and ultra-authoritarian nature 
of the Communist Party. Besides, they also find faults with the 
and malfunctions J.n the bureaucracy, especially the inept and 
corrupt practice among the party bureaucrats. 6 The all-
encompassing crisis phenomenon as expounded by the intellectuals 
includes ecological, social, economic, poli tical, spiri tual and 
cultural dimensions. Hence, the crises as perceived and spelled 
out by the intellectuals in post-Mao China are multi-dimensional. 
5Andrew Nathan, op. cit., pp.108-109 
6"Anti-Party Writings in a Party Document", Dong xiang, (H.K.: 
Sep. 1988), pp.8-9 
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The failure of the , existing authority to cope with these pressing 
problems indicates the weakness and vulnerability of the ruling 
party~ The internal weakness and vulnerability of the Communist 
authority finally . has brought about the crisis of legitimation. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The aforegoing discussion has presented the predicaments and 
crJ.ses c'ommonly shared and experienced by the public and the 
intellectuals in post-Mao China. The principal goal of the present 
study is to investigate the crisis of legitimation in post-Mao 
China perceived by the intellectuals and to depict a clear 
conception of that crisis, depending J.n part on how the 
intellectuals diagnose the legi timation crisis J.n China. The 
intellectuals have suggested different types of impending 
predicaments and crises in post-Mao China. 
The present study will concentrate on the ideas of selected 
intellectuals particularly as they refer to legitimation crisis. 
The intellectuals are regarded as the gatekeepers and sources of 
ideas and ideologies. They always engage in scrutinizing the 
received ideas and assumptions of their milieu. It is under this 
circumstance that tension between the poli tical power and the 
intellectuals is often severe. On the one hand, the state needs 
the support from the intellectuals to legitimatize its rule. On 
the other hand, the state is susceptible to the challenges a'nd 
cri tiques from the intellectuals. This situation maps out the 
ambiguous relationship between the state and the intellectuals. As 
Stalin said, "no poli ti'cal power can exist wi thout the support of 
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intellectuals".7 Denitch and Gramsci also conceive that the 
poli tical authori ty must have the support of the intellectuals 
beca{£'se the intellectuals have great influence to shape public 
opinion, and they, act as the spokesmen for the official ideology.8 
With this reasoning, we can conclude that the critiques and 
dissidences from the critical intellectuals may well undermine the 
rule of the state. 
In the post-Mao era, the intellectuals have uncovered many 
kinds of crises in China that reflect the internal weaknesses and 
the problems confronting the present regime. It is ?the intention 
- , 
of the present study to scrutinize how these critical 
intellectuals, who mainly come from the field of the social 
science, and the humanities have diagnosed the present crises in 
China. Through such an analysis, we hope to understand the 
legitimation crisis perceived by the intellectuals in post-Mao 
China. 
In our opinion, the treatment of these mul ti-dimensional 
crises by the mainland intellectuals are, often fragmented and 
insufficient. They may point out the various impending 
predicaments, but there 1S no unifying and coherent framework in 
their understanding of the crisis of legi timation 1n Communist 
China. It is against such an intellectual background that a study 
of this kind becomes important. Our intention is to conceptualize 
7Ambrose King, Modernization and Chinese 
(Taipei: Zi Bao Press, 1977), p.70 
Intellectuals, 
3Deutch, The Nerves of Government, (New York: The Free Press, 
1963) I chapter ' 7 
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these crises preceived by the intellectuals as specific problems of 
socio-political development and as final cUlmination in a 
legitimation crisis, and to develop a more analytical and 
.. . , .... 
systematic framework in discussing the crisis in post-Mao China. 
In discussing different types of crises in post-Mao China, the 
present study will employ the analytic device as propounded by 
Habermas in his work, Legitimation Crisis. Habermas developed a 
comprehensive conceptual framework in understanding the crisis of 
legitimation in the advanced capitalist states. He has presented 
a clearer picture of the legitimation crisis arising not only from 
system_. crisis but also from identity crisis. The major 
contribution of Habermas is his central idea of motivational crisis 
in the socio-cultural realm. 9 The discussion on the legitimation 
crisis of Habermas stimulates ' us to investigate the crisis 
situation focusing not only in the system realm but also in the 
socio-cultural realm. Habermas' very comprehensive analysis of 
crises helps us to understand not only the relationship of the 
crisis to the problems arising from the infrastructure but also the 
root of the crisis in both the social and political realms as well. 
Though Habermas' formulation of crisis was intended as an analysis 
of capitalist states, it nevertheless is a relevant framework for 
understanding the case of China. 
There are two reasons for using Habermas' framework in this 
present study. First, his framework of analysis is comprehensive 
9Jurgen Habermas, Legi timation Crisis, (Boston: Beason Press, 
1.975) 
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and coherent. Employing his analytic tool in describing crisis 
situations, we may better ' understand the crisis of legitimation in 
the Chinese context. Thus we can conceptualize the crisis 
phenomenon in post-Mao China in a more comprehensive way. Second, 
we also share the central notiori of Habermas that the legitimation 
crisis in modern states has to do with the socio-cultural realm. 
In our investigation, we find that the main feature of legitimation 
crisis is closely related to the self-legitimation crisis, arising 
from the socio-cultural realm. The ideological · decay in the 
Communist ideal has brought about the crisis of leq~timation in 
post-Mao China. It is for these reasons that we employ Habermas' 
analytic framework to examine the crisis in the Chinese context. 
In a more specific sense, we intend to present a coherent 
description of the crisis situation ln China through a more 
coherent and comprehensive conceptualization. It is neither our 
intention to evaluate the framework of Habermas nor to prove or 
disprove his theory. We intend only to employ Habermas' framework 
of analysis to conceptualize systematically and comprehensively the 
.crisis situation in post-Mao China. 
Furthermore, the present study will also investigate and 
discuss the meanings and implications of different types of crisis 
to Chinese politics. The conceptualization of different themes of 
crisis, when put together, demonstrate the specific nature of 
legitimation crisis in the Chinese context. More importantly, this 
study will reconstruct a clearer scenario of the crisis phenomena, 
their intensi ty, and their implications and significance to the 
7 
poli tics of China. , In addi tion, this study also attempts to define 
a more cohesive and conceptual understanding of the relationship 
between Chinese intellectuals and the state. In the comlng 
chapters, we intend to investigate the following questions: What 
are the crises as perceived ,by the intellectuals? How do the 
iritellectuals diagnose the crisis situatioti? In what way do they ' 
pose the question of legitimation crisis? What are the 
implications of the multi-dimensional crises to the politics 6f 
China? What would be the significant impact of the crisis 
phenomenon on the rule of Communist China? How _.,:s::an we get a 
cohesive and conce~tual understanding of the relationship between 
the Chinese intellectuals and the state? The present study would 
hopefully have far-reaching significance with special reference to 
the political sociology of intellectuals in post-Mao China. 
It is also our intention to understand the different roles and 
social positions of the intellectuals as compared with the past, 
reflecting their influence on the politics of China. 
INTELLECTUAL DISSIDENCE IN CHINESE HISTORY 
Repression and dissidence have been inherent in the 
relationship between the state and the intellectuals since the 
establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The 
intellectuals have upheld both the Confucian tradition of literati 
and the spirit of the May-Fourth era. They have been expected to 
be standard-bearers of morality, preserving traditional ethical 
8 
val ues . 10 Grieder and Cheng also argue that contemporary 
intellectuals have the Confucian inheritance as they also uphold 
the v~~ue of being critical to maladministration and act as moral 
standard bearers. ll Vera Schwarcz argues in a similar way that 
the contemporary Chinese intellectuals have become more critical, 
reflecting both the Confucian tradition of literati and the May 
Fourth spirit. 12 Accordingly, the intellectuals in post-Mao China 
have 'learnt to be more critical and vocal. 
Central to the different stances of dissidence is the May 
Fourth spirit, characterized by the intellectuals' deeply thought-
... :-:- .-
out so-lutions to China I s political, social and economic plight by 
means of cultural reforms. As Cheng observed, intellectual 
dissidence is not new to China. A long heritage of student and 
intellectual dissent has been recorded in Chinese history.13 
Earlier in the Later Han period (25-200), 30,000 students once 
gathered at the Imperial College to lodge their complaints against 
government corruption. 14 In the Northern Song Dynasty, a student 
leader Chen Dong began in 1125 to send petitions to the emperor 
10These three functions are adopted from Y. C. 
Intellectuals and the West 1872-1949, (Chapel 
University of north Carolina Press, 1966), part 1 
Yang, Chinese 
Hill, N.C.: 
llJerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern 
China, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1981), pp.1-23 
12Vera Schwarcz, JI Afterword JI, Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy 
Cheek (eds), China's Establishment Intellectuals, (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc. 1986), pp.247-256 
13cheng, op.cit., pp.70-71 
14Wen Hankiang, The ·Chinese Student Movement, (New York: King IS 
'Crown ~ress, 1948), p.8 
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against some corrupted bureaucrats where the action was supported 
by the public .15 Besides, for almost half a century during the 
Ming ' :·-Dynasty, the Dong Lin scholars, a group of powerful 
intellectuals who advocated morality, led a movement of political 
criticism of the imperial couit. The aforegoing discussion has 
shown that intellectual dissent in China has a long history. 
However, the intellectual dissent in post-Mao China differs from 
the past in terms of intensi ty and level. The new dissidents 
attack not only the maladministration and malpractice of the 
bureaucracy but also the very structural problems o~~ the state. 
~ike the traditional literati, their loyalty to the regime is 
expressed by voicing their opinions in the hope of directing the 
state to a correct path. The intellectuals in the 50's and 60's, 
using the traditional literati as models, use indirect means deftly 
to reflect the problems and crises in the present state. Their 
messages tend to be general rather than specific in order not to 
antagonize the rulers .16 Their main thrust boldly touched on 
policies and leadership, especially pinpointing the 
maladministration and irrationality of the government. ..~lthough 
they enunciated their subtle attack and oblique doubts of the 
leadership, they did not level attacks on the system and socialism. 
The intellectuals in post-Mao China, unlike their forerunners, not 
15Gong Wei Ai, "Government Policy of Accomodation and Decline 
in Students' Morale During Southern Sung China 1127-1279", ln 
Chinese Culture, (18 No.2 June 1977), pp.46-69 
16Merle Goldman, China's Intellectulas Advice 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1981) I pp.3-4 
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and Dissent, 
only have retained the literati tradition but also have intensified 
their critique. In particular, they confront the structural crisis 
and eJ~n question the socialist system. In this present study, we 
have conceptualized the range of crises perceived by the 
intellectuals from social to political levels. They no longer 
bring forth the questions of corrupt acts by individual 
bureaucrats. Instead, they have ostracized the despotic rule of 
the . Communists, attacking the socialist system directly. 
CRITICAL INTELLECTUALS AND THE STATE 
In this study, our interest is to unravell ho~ the Chinese 
intellectuals perceived and grappled wi th the legi timation in 
China. The intellectuals have always felt the need to go beyond 
the immediate facade of phenomena, and to penetrate into a more 
general realm of meanings and values. Max Weber declares that the 
fundamental function of the Chinese literati is culturally-
oriented; what they undertake is concerned with value, belief, 
ideology and symbols within the boundary of cUlture. 17 In response 
to the external challenge, this group of intellectuals not only 
seek to analyze, but also seek to interpret in a more cri tical 
light. As Chomsky and Terlinghetti observed, the greatest 
contribution of the intellectuals is their critical stand and their 
mission to tell the truth. IS More importantly, they are eager to 
l7 Max Weber, "The Chinese Li tera ti", in H. H. Gerth and C. Wrigh t 
Mills (eds), From Max Weber 
l8 The intellectuals adopt a cri tical stance in the analysis and 
interpretation of the external world. They not only point out the 
problems in our present life but also try to offer solutions to 
them. - For details, please read John Madge, The Origins of 
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provide moral stan~ards and to maintain general symbols, which they 
feel can "elici t, guide and form the expressive disposi tions wi thin 
a so(£fety .... 19 Following Seymour Lipset and Robert Brym, we define 
the critical intellectuals as those who are independent of their 
social attachments and ideological proclivities: they are involved 
chiefly in the production of ideas. 20 
Underlined by these same characteristics, many of the Chinese 
intellectuals have acted as dedicated critics to the state, as the 
social conscience and spokesman of the public in post-Mao China. 
These critical intellectual shoulder the oblig~~ion of the 
~ 
traditional literati as moral-standard bearers to remonstrate with 
tyrannical, arbitrary rules. Besides, they also share the May 
Fourth spiri t, being cri tical and emancipa ti ve. 21 They perceive 
themsel ves as censora te and "doctors to society". 22 Simply put, 
Scientific Sociology, (New York: The Free Press, 1962) and 
Tortured Role of the Intellectuals in America", Time Magazine, 
9, 1969), pp.48-49 
"The 
(May 
19Edward Shihs, "The Intellectuals and the Powers", Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, (October, 1958), p.5 
20 For greater detail, please consul t Robert Brym, Intellectuals 
and Politics, (London: George AlIen & Unwin, 1980) and Seymour 
Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, (Garden City: 
Anchor, 1959) 
21I follow the definition of critical intellectuals of Merle 
Goldman, etal. Intellectuals and the State,. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), pp.6-10; The definition of critical 
intellectuals is suggested also by Gouldner, "whose · interests are 
primarily cri tical, emancipatory, hermeneutic and hence poli tical" , 
see A. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of New 
Class, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
22Joanna Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thouqht: The 
- Reorientation of Lu Kun and Other Scholar-Officials, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), p.103 
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their conviction is to speak on behalf of the people. One example 
is Fang Liz_hi, who believes that the role of the intellectuals not 
only should concentrate on their professional matters but also 
should be devoted . to national affairs and the future of mankind. 
In a similar veln, Liu Binyan and Li Ming also believe 
intellectuals should speak for the people and openly proclaim the 
problems that the people encounter. 23 They have a strong mission 
to pinpoint the existing problems and crises in the country and to 
advocate changes to improve the situations. They also begin to 
pursue the new role of being a critical investigator ~nd agent for 
advocating changes. With their critical and proactive stand, the 
intellectuals have much influence on the public. Their critiques 
and dissendences have greatly threatened the authoritarian rule of 
the Communists. 
• The present study concentrates on examining the "cri tical 
intellectuals" because they are more vocal and observant of the 
crlsls situation in China. They have direct confrontation with the 
crisis situation and openly proclaim the crisis in post-Mao China. 
·Not only do they point out the predicaments but also they suggest 
ways for improvements. They are different from the so-called 
"establishment intellectuals,,24 who just play a subordinate role 
23 Fang Lizhi, Selected Speeches and Wri tings by Fang Lizhi 
vol. 2, (Singapore: World Scientific Chinese Books Series, 1989), 
pp.53-86; Li Ming, op.cit., pp.3-8 and M. Goldman, op.cit., pp.183-
232 
24I borrow this term from Timothy Cheek, for detail please 
consul t Carol Lee Harmin, Timothy Cheek {eds} , China's 
Establishment Intellectuals, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1986), 
pp.xvi-xvii, pp.212-246 
13 
to the state administration and as technocrats in the state 
apparatus. Besides, the establishment intellectuals just work and 
speak ~~ithin the allowed boundary set by the state. The "critical 
intellectuals", mainly come from the field of social science and 
humanities, representing the group of intellectuals who are more, 
emancipative and hence more cri tical of the poli tics of China. 
Unlike the establishment intellectuals, they have sought to serve 
the state with their critical loyalty, to speak for the people and 
to act as the scout of socialist society. They have played the 
role as gatek~epers of ideas and fountainheads ot:.~,. ideologies. 
Al though the Communist state has relied on their support to 
legitimatize its rule, the critiques and dissidences from the 
critical intellectuals may well undermine the legitimacy of the 
Communist rule 1.n post-Mao China. In this study, we hope to 
develop a more conceptual understanding of the relationship between 
the critical intellectuals and the state and of the nature of the 
legitimation crisis in post-Mao China. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The present study 1.S based on the writings and speeches of the , 
more prominent representatives of intellectuals. Much of this 
material comes from Chinese periodicals, Party and non-Party 
new~papers and the books written by them. The main focus of our 
study will be the speeches and wri tings of these intellectuals 
particularly as they refer to the the legitimation crisis in post-
Mao China. We would like to examine their ideas on crisis 
phenomena particularly a's they refer to the legitimation crisis in 
14 
China. The present, study is a qualitative research based upon the 
scrutiny of the books, articles, and speeches wri t ten by these 
selecf~d intellectuals. The selected intellectuals are prominent 
and hence they ar~ more representative. Their ideas and mentality 
of crisis are more influe~cial to the politics of China. It is for 
this reason that we choose them as the targets for the present 
study. Owing to time constraints and resource limitations, we 
confine the present study basically to li terature reVl.ew and 
library research. 
With these consideration in mind, in the forthc~ming chapter, 
we are going to review the crisis theory of Habermas, borrowing his 
analysis of crisis in qeveloping our analytic framework to 
conceptualize types of perceived crisis in post-Mao China. In 
chapter two to chapter five, we are going to examine different 
types of crisis perceived by the intellectuals, which contribute to 
the legitimation crisis in post-Mao China. In chapter two, we will 
first look into the economic crisis, discussing how the economic 
crisis rela tes to the crisis of legi tima tion. In the third 
. chapter, our attention will be devoted to the study of the 
institutional crisis which signifies the fundamental crisis in the 
structral realm. The fourth chapter will focus on the identity 
crisis arising from the socio-cultural realm, and bringing forth 
the question of ideological retrogression. The fifth chapter will 
discuss the cultural crisis. The cultural crisis highlights the 
discrepancy between the value and system, which marks the rift 
between theory and prac'tice. The conclusion will synthesize and 
15 
generalize the find~ngs of the previous chapters. We hope that the 
present study will enhance our understanding not only the crisis of 
legitimation in post-Mao China but also the relationship between 
the intellectuals and the state. Hopefully, the contribution of 
this study will be a clearer picture of the role and the impact of 
. . 
these critical intellectuals to the politics of China. 
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Chapter ,One. The Theory of Legitimation Crisis 
... . t.. 
In this chapter, we attempt to define the types of crises and 
to delineate the theories of crisis with special reference to the 
legitimation crisis in post-Mao China. The main object of this 
chapter is to examine the concept of legitimation crisis as 
propounded by Habermas, scrutinizing closely how he diagnoses 
crises arising from capitalist states. The intention here is to 
make sense of crisis theory as applied to our understanding of the 
case of China. .':.-
The introduction has suggested the wide range of crises as 
perceived by the Chinese intellectuals and the general public. 
Against the background of their impressionative and fragmented 
description of crises, we try to derive our analytical framework 
from Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis to conceptualize the 
recent crises in China. Through this conceptual framework, we hope 
to understand the legitimation crisis with particular reference to 
post-Mao China. 
HABERMAS' LEGITIMATION CRISIS 
Habermas' comprehensive analysis of crises in the advanced 
capi talist states stemes from a Neo-Marxist view. The basic 
position of Neo-Marxism builds on the assummed contradiction 
between the means of production and relationship of production. 
This makes for a contradictory order among both social and 
political forces. In this reasoning, crisis not only relates to 
problems arising from the infrastructure but also has its root 1n 
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the social and political realms as well. Thus, Habermas feels that 
it is natural to conclude that total crises can easily arise from 
... .. .. 
the capitalist states, which could culminate in the collapse of the 
capitalist order. 
Habermas believes th,at the advanced capitalist states are 
approaching this point. In Habermas's notion, the most significant 
problems are closely related with values and motivations. He not 
only supplements the ideas of Offe and O'Connor but also highlights 
the central' problem of crisis confronting the advanced capitalist 
states. 1 Habermas argues that the advanced capitalis~: states were 
faced with the discrepancy between the motives and values required 
by the political and economic systems and those produced by the 
socio-cultural system, a confrontation that causes a "motivational 
crisis".2 This kind of crisis, partly caused by rigidity in the 
socio-cultural system, is responsible for the "sharpening of 
legitimation difficulties into a legitimation crisis.,,3 Habermas 
discerns that the root of crisis lies not only in economic and 
political systems alone (system crisis) but also in the socio-
lO'Connor and Offe have suggested the notion that the 
legitimation crisis of the advanced capitalist states is related to 
the inherent contradiction between accumulation and legitimation. 
What they focus on is the system crisis. For detail, please refer 
to James OlConnor,The Fiscal Crisis of the State, (New York: St. 
Martin I s Press, 1973), p. 6 and Claus Offe, "Poli tical Authori ty and 
Class _ Structure --- An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies", 
International Journal of Sociology, (Vol. 11, pp. 73-108, 1972), p. 81 
2Jurgen Habermas , 
Legitimation Problems 
(Vol.XL, 1973), p.660 
"What Does a Crisis Mean Today ? 
'i n La t e Cap ita 1 ism 11 , _S_O_C;....;l~· ..;;,.;.a.,;;;;;l_....;R:..;;...,::.e.,;;;;;s....::e::....::a:::.:r=--=:c-=..::h , 
3Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1975), p.74 
18 
cultural realm (identity crisis).4 In short, it is the result of 
the inconsistency between value and system. The resulting identity 
crisi~ · ' hence endangers the state and the state legi timacy. 
Habermas also . asserts the inherent contradiction between the 
logic of accumulation anq demand for legitimation. Like Offe, 
Habermas also predicts the excessive expenditure of the state in 
the public realm. For this reason, the state is dependent for its 
revenues on taxes that are levied from the private sector, what he 
calls "the -fiscal skim off". On the other side, the state has to 
maiptain popular assent and mass loyalty. In this xespect, the 
state must use its fiscal revenues to provide social, educational 
and welfare services and to support the ideology that legitimizes 
the whole system. Up to ' this point, we can see the buil t-in 
conflict between two opposing mechanisms. When the state taxes the 
capitalists to subvent the disadvanged groups in order to gain 
their support, it may well upset the interests of capital 
accumulation. It is clear, Habermas agrees, that this internal 
contradiction makes it impossible for the state to meet both ends 
' satisfactorily and makes the state vulnerable to pressures from 
both sides. Thus, the advanced capitalist state continually faces 
a dilemma. Habermas contends that although the crisis arises from 
the . economic system, the inherent contradictions are transformed 
and displaced into other systems, namely, politico-administrative 
and sociocultural systems. As Ronge has suggested, "the question 
4M i ch a e 1 Pus e y , _J~u;.;:;r;.....;g",-e.;:...n::..::.--_-=H~a=..::::b..:::e:..=r:-=m..:..:..a=...::::.s , 
Publications, 1987), pp.87-113 
(London: Tavistock 
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might emerge which .side --- accumulation (economy) or legitimacy 
(demands of the social system) --- is the driving force ... (in the 
devel~~ment of crisis).5 
In Habermas' ,theories of legitimation, motivation crisis is 
most detrimental and threatening to the state authority.6 Habermas 
concedes that a legitimation crisis would ensue from a failure of 
"action-motivating meanings" --- namely a motivation crisis. To 
make it more specific, the crises in the advanced capitalist states 
are embedded in the inherent contradictions among different logics 
of , each sub-system. The state, thus, becomes ~~ handicapped 
especially when the "hand of the state" is more visible and 
intelligible than lithe invisible hand" of liberal capitalism. More 
and more areas of life become politicized, stimulating more 
pressing demands on the state, for public participation and 
consultation over decisions. All these make the state unable to 
respond wi thin the confine of limi ted resources. The inherent 
conflict of class interests is clearly revealed to the public when 
the general public found that the state has catered to partial 
'interests rather than to collective needs. · The consequence is the 
withdrawal of mass loyalty, which tremendously undermines the state 
legi timacy. 7 
5Volker Ronge, "The 'Poli ticization of Administration in 
Advanced Capitalist Societies ", Poli tical Studies, (Vol. 22, . March 
1974) 
6In Habermas' reply to his cri tics in John B. Thompson and 
David Held (ed.), Habermas: Critical Debates, (London: Macmillan, 
1982), pp.280-281 
7Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p.69 
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The concept of ,crises, in the eyes of Habermas, becomes mul ti-
dimensional and multi-leveled. The crises of modern states have 
ariseri · ~ from a new and close articulation between the economy, the 
state, and the ide~logy. 
THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK OF OUR STUDY 
Though Habermas' formulation of crisis was intended as an 
analysis of capi talist states, it is nevertheless a relevant 
framework for understanding the case of China because his analytic 
framework of crisis is comprehensive and coherent. Habermas has 
sU~gested that the crisis of legitimation has its root~ in both the 
~ 
system realm and the socio-cul tural realm. He supplements the 
structural explanations as relating closely to the system crisis 
propounded by other scholars. 8 The major contribution of Habermas 
is his analysis of crisis in the socio-cul tural realm. His 
discussion on the legitimation crisis stimulates us to look into 
the crisis situations in China from the perspective not only of the 
system crisis but also of the identity crisis. In this study, we 
employ the analytic tool of Habermas to conceptualize the crisis 
-phenomena in post-Mao China because his comprehensive and 
analytical framework can help us better understand the crisis of 
legi timation ln China. Besides, his analysis of legi tirnation 
8The Neo-Conservatives and the Economists have suggested only 
a structural explanation for the legitimation crisis. Some Neo-
Marxists, like James O'Connor and Claus Offe, have the opinion that 
the crisis of legitimation is closely related to the system crisis 
in the economic system and the political system. Habermas 
highlights the notion of motivational crisis that is related to the 
socio-cultural realm. This is the major contribution of Habermas, 
which broadens our v'iew in understanding the crisis of 
legitimation. 
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crisis is the most r~presentative scholarly work in the discussion 
of the crisis of legitimation. Though Communist Chinese society is 
organi~~d along socialist lines, we can see that the state has 
assumed a dominant role in the public realm, nearly a hegemonic 
role in managing all aspects of life for people. This has already 
over-burdened the state. 
As Barrett McCormick observed, the Leninist state of 
Communist China has attempted to dominate the society.9 First, the 
state organization thoroughly penetrates society, extending its 
party organizations, unions, professional association~~ firms, and 
service organizations from the top down. In turn, the society is 
greatly restricted. Second, the state occupies a hegemonic role in 
the economy through central planning and state ownership. To 
McCormick, Communist China's adoption of "market socialism" resul ts 
only ~n political domination of economics since the social 
stratification is based more on political status than economic 
class. 10 Third, public speech is extensively supervised while the 
state propagates a formal ideology to justify its rule. Finally, 
the state employs an extensive system of secret police to control 
11 
the people .... 1 The penetration of the state into the society is 
complete. In Vogel's words , it ~s a "poli tical conquest of 
9Barrett L.McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao China, 




society" .12 Such an , unlimi ted extension of state function over the 
civil society and economy has created a condition of dependency of 
, .... .. ..: .. 
the society on the state. 
The post-Mao Communist state has tried to justify its rule by 
its self-proclaimed glorious official ideology and goal-rational 
mode of legitimacy. In practice, the Party's comprehensive 
penetration of society has created problems for the state. 
According to McCormick, the party-state penetration of society has 
created an extehsive system of patron-client networks, or 
patrimonial rulership. This, to McCormick, has undermined the 
state's ideological legitimacy and economic efficiency.13 
Post-Mao China has been kept in a dilemma which is the 
inherent contradiction between ideology and market socialism. In 
the reforming era, the social issues and public affairs have become 
politicized. People will probably blame the state for any 
unsatisfactory conditions encountered and for any difficulties 
arising from the economic reforms. The Communist state, in this 
way, has become over-poli ticized and faces potential financial 
crisis in sustaining the ideal picture of socialism. 
Given the terrifying experiences ln the past decades l.n 
addition to presently confronting the failure of economic reforms, 
people have become suspicious of the goulash promises in socialist 
transformation, and they question the validity of socialism. 
12 Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Communism 1949-68, (NY: Harper 
Torchbook, 1969), pp.350-356 
UBarrett L.McCormick, op.cit., p.7 
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Upon the introduction of reforms, the people began to 
experience better material well-being; consequently they have also 
become more pragmatic. These instrumental and pragmatic views 
toward authority in post-Mao China have greatly shaken the hegemony 
of the regime. According to Rigby and Christel Lame, the Communist 
government claims that compliance is based on a rational 
relationship between the ultimate goal of communism and 
socioeconomic performance .14 This basis of legitimation is too 
fluid and -unstable since it rests solely on a calculative and 
pragmatic ground. When people find that the perfo~mance of the 
state is less than satisfactory, they tend to withdraw their 
support and loyalty from the state. Legitimation crisis is the 
inevitable result, and ideological politics in Communist China is 
greatly shaken. , Merquior makes it plain that such a legitimation 
based solely on ideological ground is a "manipulation of bias", in 
which the legitimation of the state is only a 'veil' rather than a 
'mask,~15 This deepens the original flaw of the failure to restore 
the people's confidence by economic performance, intensifying 
' legitimation crisis. 
Gramsci has also suggested that the crisis of hegemony is not 
simply the result of economic crisis; rather, economic crisis only 
14Rigby and Feher (eds), Political Legitimation in Communist 
States, (HK: The Macmilliam Press Ltd, 1982), pp.9-13 and Stephen 
Whi te, "Economic Performance and Communist Legi timacy", World 
Politics, (Vol.3, 1986), p.463 
15 J . G. Merquior, The Veil and the Mask, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1979), pp.1-38 
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creates the pre-condi tion for a crisis of hegemony.16 Following 
Gramsci, we also hold that the crises in post-Mao China are not 
, .... ,. , .. 
merely economic in nature but they also affect other spheres. And 
from Habermas' analysis, we diagnose the fundamental crisis of 
China as one which has to do with ideological retrogression, or 
simply put, a self-legitimation crisis. The basic problem is that 
people have lost their faith in Communism which legitimatized the 
authority in the past. As Nathan observed, with Mao's death, the 
Party's source of legitimacy has shifted from serving as 
revolutionary vanguard to serving as a technocratic ~lite forging 
the way to moderniza tion. 17 In the CPC Eleventh Party Congress, 
the Party advocated the Four Modernizations with special emphasis 
on economic development and deemphasized the importance of class 
contradiction and conflict. In addition, in the CPC Thirteenth 
Party Congress, it adpoted a Party line: 'One Central Task' which 
referred to economic construction .18 It is the intention of the 
. post-Mao leaders to legitimatize its rule by the economic reforms 
and improvement of living conditions. 
Nathan argues in the same vein that Deng won the mandate to 
rule on the basis of competent management and economic reform ~n 
place of Mao's revolutionary utopianism. Today, when the economy 
16A t · . G . . n on10 ' ramSC1, Pr1son Notebooks, (New York: International 
Publishers, 1971), pp.25-26 
17Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990), chapter 6 
18 Cl?-u -yuan 
Westview Press, 




is in trouble and reform appears to be blocked, the Chinese people 
seem no longer to accept Deng's authoritarian-technocratic mandate 
to rui~ .19 The internal contradiction between the ostensible 
practice of commodity economics and the tenacious orthodox ideology 
further deepens the flaw. , In ' the opinion of many young Chinese, 
the Four Cardinal Principles have been a built-in obstacle, which 
greatly negates the reform program. 20 Therefore, people in 
mainland China have lost their faith in the official ideology for 
they have attempted to pursue material goods rather than any 
revolutionary deeds in the reform era. The ideologic-al decay, in 
short, has threatened the legitimacy of the Communist rule. In 
other words, the mirror reflecting a blissful socialist society and 
a promising future life as created by the post-Mao leaders is 
broken. The utopian notion of Communism is but a broken mirror 
which reflects both the discredited ideology and the unsuccessful 
praxis of Communism. 21 A self-legitimation crisis is a con~omitant 
consequence. 
In addition, the difficulties and failures in economic reforms 
"extend the tension to the rationality of the administrative realm. 
Furthermore, and following Habermas, we maintain that Communist 
China has also suffered from a crisis of a sociocultural character. 
The "whole social orientation of values after the introduction of 
19Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis, (New York: Columbia Universi ty 
Press, 1990), p.116 
20cheng, op.cit., p.28 
21George Hicks (eds), The Broken Mirrors, (U. K.: Longman Group 
Lt d., 1 9" 9 0 ) 
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reforms has shifteq from utopian and idealistic socialism into 
calculative materialism. The Communist authority has failed to 
create"or sustain new "meanings" for justifying its rule. Thus the 
examination of the .legitimation crisis in post-Mao China should not 
only look into the crisis ,derived from the system world but also 
examine the effects · of such crisis on the everyday life of the 
people, including how they react to authority and how they perceive 
the .predicaments and turmoils they encounter in their daily life. 
To recapitulate, we have so far developed an analytic 
fra~ework based upon the postulation that the most c~ucial crisis 
-. 
in China is related to a self-legitimation crisis in the socio-
cultural realm. With additional crisis propensities in the 
economic and political systems, the overall legitimation crisis is 
then intensified and deepened. In conceptualizing the crises ~n 
China, we should then examine both the system crisis and identity 
crisis. Up to this point, we can conclude that the legitimation 
crisis in post-Mao China is multi-dimensional and multi-leveled. 
THE EXPERIENCE OF CRISIS 
According to Habermas, legitimation crisis happens whenever 
people feel there is a crisis. 
22 
A crisis cannot · be separated from the victim' s ~nner 
view. He experiences his impotence toward the 
objectivity of his illness only because he is a subject 
doomed to be passivity and temporarily unable to subject 
in full possession of his strength. Crisis ' suggests the 
notion of an objective power depriving a subject of part 
of his normal sovereignty ... 2I 
Habermas, "What Does a Crisis Mean Today?", p.39 
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In this respect, we note that the state of crisis exists 
largely because the people feel it to be so. In post-Mao China, 
many ihtellectuals and other people have suggested that crises 
exist in China and .that they encompass different spheres of life. 
Predicaments Perceived by the General Public 
The discontent of the public ranges over both the social and 
the political realms. In the social realm, the public is bitter 
about the Party's failure to solve the country's social and 
educational problems. Workers in state and collective enterprises 
see . their profits greatly threatened by inflation and economic 
reforms. In the political realm, the party members and state 
functionaries are increasingly disillusioned by bureaucratic-
profi teering and poor performance of reforms. Against such a 
background, many youth are thoroughly disenchanted with the 
Communist Party. Contact with the outside world led to further 
frustration of the people because they found themselves relatively 
deprived. They were able to see how far China has fallen behind 
other countries. With this discovery, people quite naturally have 
lost their fai th in Communist ideals. According to the first 
"Survey of the Poli tical Psychology of Ci tizens of China" as 
conducted by a private research team in 1987, only about 50% of the 
respondents are proud of socialism (among them, most are cadres). 
The survey also reports that more than 50% of the respondents have 
an unfavourable image of the Communist Party. Among intellectuals 
28 
' . 70% 23 the percentage is even higher, reach~ng almost . It seems 
then reasonable to conclude that the Communist Party does not 
present :'~uch attraction to the citizens now. Some surveys testing 
the values of youths in China , also show the loss of trust in 
Communism. Economic reforms have led people, especially the youth, 
to become more concerned with obtaining money and material wel1-
being. 
These surveys have indicated that the youth are sceptical ' 
toward the official ideology.24 As Timothy Cheek and David Ownby 
observed, the Chinese youth have faced a value vacuum ~~ecause the 
most eloquent spokesman for noble values (Mao) is dead and the 
Communist Party is ideologically bankrupt. Failing to address the 
spiritual needs of the youth, the Party members have sought to 
pacify them with material rewards. Ownby contends that the Party 
still demands unquestioning obedience from the youth, which seems 
to be outda~ed and irrelevant to their needs. In the end, not only 
do the youth suffer from a value vacuum but also they have begun to 
question the rule of the CPC. 25 Alongside this disillusionment 
looms the menacing shadow of ideological retrogression. 
23" bl . .. . Pu ~c Op~n~on Survey Reveals D~ssent", Paishing Semi-
monthly, (H.K.: March 16, 1989, No. 188), pp.9-10 and please read 
Min Qi, The Political Culture of China, (Yunnam: Renmin Press 1989) 
,24stanley Rosen, "The 
Attitides", Deborah Davis & 
on the Eve of Tiananmen, 
chapter 12 
Impact of Reform Policies on Youth 
Ezra F. Vogel, (eds), Chinese Society 
(London: Harvard University, 1990), 
25Carol Lee Hamrin, Timothy Cheek (eds), China's Establishment 
Intellectuals (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1986), pp.xvi-xvii, 
pp.212-246 
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People in post~Mao China have experienced a spiritual and 
cultural frustration as a result of a strong feeling of desolation 
, ... . .. ;. 
emptiness and confusion. 26 stemming from an immense sense of 
Jurgen Domes thinks that the June-Fourth Incident of 1989 has 
further weakened the Marxist-Leninist single-party rule in China 
since the incident has deepened and sharpened the contradictions 
between the state and the people. For Domes, the gap is 
unbridgeable and the political crisis existing in Communist China 
is undeniable. It is therefore natural · that the people have 
questioned the legitimacy of the Communist Party. 
Predicaments Perceived bt the University Students 
The straining sense of crisis is shared not only among the 
general public but also by the university students. In 1988, the 
Party Bureau Office of Beijing University collected some 
"blacklisted" wall posters displayed in the university area, which 
carried some "threatening and dangerous" messages to the Communist 
rule. The Party Bureau Office criticized these wall posters as 
anti-revolutionary and threatening to the Party's rule. These 
posters elucidated the crises of contemporary China in general. One 
of the posters entitled "Crises and Impediments" spelled out 
clearly that the organization of the Communist Party was 
disintegrating because of corruption and intense internal power 
struggles. 27 Another poster cri ticized harshly the over-dominating 
26Ramon H.Myers, "Tbe Next Power Struggle", George Hicks, 
(eds) , The Broken Mirror, (UK: Longman Group Ltd, 1990), pp.460-462 
27"Anti-Party Writings in a Party Document", Dong xiang, (H.K.: 
Sep. 1988), pp.6-7 
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and ultra-authoritarian nature of the Communist Party. 
Furthermore, the other posters found faults with malfunctions in 
the bure"aucracy especially the inept and corrupt practice among the 
Party bureaucrats. 28 Another article illuminated the roots of the 
existing crises: the unhealthy and authoritarian political system; 
the malfunction and unhealthy operation of the political economy; 
the short-sightedness is inadequate investment in education; and 
the mal treatment of intellectuals. Even more seriously, some 
posters openly pronounced the death of Marxism-Leninism. Up to 
this point, the s1gns of the legitimation crisis in Communist China 
are unmistakable. 
Predicaments Perceived by the Intellectuals 
This intense sense of crisis was not felt only by the public 
and students. In particular, the intellectuals have immensed in a 
deeper sense of crisis and mission. Their comments and criticisms 
range from social criticism to literature, and have proved 
threatening to the authoritarian state of Communist China. 29 The 
intellectuals have played a fundamental and crucial role in 
exposing the various problems and forms of crises in China through 
different intellectual media and trajectories. The all-
encompassing crisis phenemonon as expounded by these intellectuals 
includes ecological, social, economic, poli tical, spiri tual and 









The Thoughts on Crises in China, 
He Pochuan, China on the Cliff, 





cultural dimensions. , Hence, the crises as perceived and spelled 
out by the ~ntellectuals in post-Mao China are multi-dimensional. 
Denitch:' argues that the legitimation of the state is greatly 
influenced by intellectuals for they have played the role as 
spokesman for official ide,ology. 30 The critiques and dissidence 
from the intellectuals to an authoritarian regime like that of 
Communist China presumably undermines the legitimation of the 
existing authority. 
In post-Mao China, the intellectuals have fOund the most 
problematic issue is a general distrust of Communism. pIn order to 
save the regime, economic reforms have been launched but yielded a 
poor performance, further intensifying the legitimation crisis. 
The crisis taking place in the economic realm has not only 
demonstrated the inefficiency of economic development but also 
shown clearly the problems in the government institutions. The 
most important cause of the legitimation crisis is in ideological 
retrogression, which results in self-legitimation crisis. Facing 
up with such an identity crisis, the intellectuals have begun to 
~crutinize the socio-cultural realm in order to find a new meaning 
of life. Finding that crisis tendancy is also deeply embedded in 
culture, they then turn their attention to the cultural crisis. 
These, together with crises in the economic and political systems 
constitute the system crisis of China. Thus, in a nutshell, the 
crises of post-Mao China perceived by the intellectuals can be 
30BOgdan Denitch (ed.), Legitimation of Reqimes, 
Publications Ltd., 1979), p.21 
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(Sage 
grouped into four different types; namely, economic crisis, 
institutional crisis, identity crisis and cultural crisis. 
, .... .. ". 
TYPOLOGY OF CRISIS 
Economic Crisis 
Some of the critical intellectuals state clearly that the 
economic development of mainland China has fallen behind that of 
their neighbouring countries, even the four developing regions of 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, whose economic performance 
is amazing. 31 The book called China on the Cliff (Shan Yao Shang 
De Zhongguo) suggests the "earthquake of economy" i on mainland 
China. 32 Another scholar, Li Honglin comparing the GNP of China 
with that of other states in order to illustrate the backwardness 
of economic growth; and he strongly urged reform. 33 Some 
intellectuals even question the inability of reforms and directly 
attack the communist rule, demonstrating the existence of a 
legitimation crisis. 34 
Institutional Crisis 
Some scholars express their condemnation of the inefficiency 
and oppressl.on of bureaucracy. They have suggested an 
institutional crisis in China. Among those who have mentioned the 
31Li Ming, The Thoughts on Crises l.n China, (Tiensin: Renmin 
Press·, 1989), chapter 6 
32He Pochuan, China on the Cliff, CQuizhou: Renmin Press, 
1989), chapter 1 
33Li Honglin, Crisis 'and Reforms, (Hu nan: Education Press), 
pp.37-57 
34 Li Xiaobin, "The Rationali ty Crisis of The Social Reforms in 
China", Li Ming (ed.), op. cit., pp.320-328 
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corruption of the bureaucrats and the Communist Party, Liu Binyan 
is most prominent. Liu revealed that the party cadres themselves 
were i~~ olved in corruption which devoured the people I s flesh and 
blood. 35 What Liu wanted to reveal here was not merely a 
particular case but a common practice in China for years and years 
without any sign of improvement. Confronting such an evil, Liu 
criticized thus, "the Communist Party regulated everything, but it 
would not regulate the Communist Party ... 36 
Identity Crisis 
Another group of intellectuals highlight problem-s concerning 
human right and the suppression of intellectuals. Fang Lizhi 
believes scientists must express their feelings on all aspects of 
life. The concern and interest of the intellectuals should not be 
limited to technical matters but they must shoulder the 
responsibility of contributing to the improvement of the society. 
More significantly, he believes that people have the natural rights 
to freedom for he holds that democracy is not granted by government 
but naturally belongs to man. In his mind, the Four Cardinal 
'Principles should be "science, democracy, creativity and 
independence" .3i In a similar vein, Wang Ruoshui defines that the 
human right problems in China in terms of the fact that the state 
has taken control over society. This necessarily implies the 
350rville Schell, Discos and Democracy, (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1988) I pp.149-150 
36 Ibid , p.150 
370rville Schell, op cit, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 
p.131 
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alienation of man. He urges the emancipation of man, such that man 
can exercise his own autonomy and regain his essence. 
Intel1~ctuals of this inclination have illuminated particularly the 
identity crisis confronting the people in post-Mao China. 
Cultural Crisis 
Some intellectuals have directed their attention to culture as 
a primary source of new meaning for Chinese people. From their 
examination, they have however found numerous cultural problems 
which led to a recogni tion of cuI tural crisis in China. The 
television ser~es "Hexiang" is indicative of the thoughts of these 
intellectuals on Chinese history. This series proposes that 
modernization and an open door to the outside world are beneficial 
to the whole nation. The series announces that the central crisis 
of China today is a "crisis in the history of the Chinese race as 
a whole" and the modernization of China is severely hindered by its 
cultural values. The series debunks many of the assumptions that 
Chinese have been encouraged to make about their own heri tage. 
References to the glories of China's ancient civilization are so 
"much a part of the Communist party's claim to national leadership 
that the series was seen as literally blasphemous. "Hexiang" uses 
an analogy to show that the Communist party is unable to break with 
the " traditional policy of the empire and even questions the 
ideology of communist rule. 
35 
Chapter Two. On Economic Crisis 
, .......... 
In the last chapter, we have suggested var10US types of crisis 
as envisaged by the Chinese intellectuals in contemporary China. 
In this chapter, we are going to investigate the economic crisis in 
China. As diagnosed by the intellectuals, the economic crisis 1n 
post-Mao China goes beyond system crisis to its roots in the SOC10-
cultural realm. The inherent contradiction deep down in market 
socialism expresses the problem between practice and~theory. The 
inconsistency between the socialist ideology and market reforms has 
given rise to structural crisis. The Chinese people have begun to 
question the rationali ty of the reforms as well as the rule of 
Communist China. It is in this context that the crises of China 
are deepened and intensified. 
LEGITIMACY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
The reformists of Communist China have attempted to ga1n the 
support of the people in the post-Mao era by their modernization 
program and attempted improvement in the life of the people. In 
the earlier phase of development , especially in the agricultural 
reform, genuine improvement was achieved. Terry Sicular notes that 
increased regional specialization and exchange account for a 
substantial part of the recent growth in productivity.! Along with 
ITerry Sicular, "Rural Marketing and Exchange in the Wake of 
Recent Reforms", Elizab~th J. Perry and Christine Wong (eds.), The 
Political Economy in Post-Mao China, (London: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), pp.83-1i0 
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this development, the living standard of the peasants has become 
progressive~y improved, a fact also identified by Lee Travers who 
attri~Jtes much of the improvement to such as the liberalization of 
sideline productio~ and rural marketing. 2 
Based on the success of agricultural reform, the reformers 
extends their modernization program to the urban area. The reforms 
in the industrial sector have been less radical than the 
agricultural ones, but they nevertheless yielded a sweeping result 
that brought significant changes to the planning and organization 
of _~roduction and investment as well as substantial improvement in 
both worker remuneration and welfare. Communist China has adopted 
different policies to encourage trade as well as industrial 
production. Besides, the -state has also implemented socialist 
market to boost the economic development. 3 With the implementation 
of these reforms, they announced a substantial increase in wages in 
three rounds during 1978-80 as well as the reinstated bonuses in 
1978-79. From 1977 to 1986, export trade increased 18% annually, 
outperforming all other socialist countries. 4 The average . -lncome 
of workers grew 116% from 1978 to 1986, with an average per capita 
savings of 211 yuan in 1984 compared with 22 yuan in 1978, all are 
2Lee Travers, "Getting Rich through Diligence: Peasant Income 
after the Reforms", Ibid, pp.111-130 
3Elizabeth Perry and Christine Wong, "The Poli tical Economy of 
Reform in Post-Mao China: Causes, Content and Consequences", In 
Perry and Wong, op. cit., p.12 
4Zhang Jiu, op. cit., p.112 
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signs indicative of improvement l.n the life of the people. 5 Such 
success in economic reforms, which resulted in consolidating the 
rule of~ Communist China. 
FAILURE OF REFORMS AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
However, the episode of success was temporary. The economic 
reforms in post-Mao China failed to solve some pressing deadlocks 
and setbacks. There has been a number of related problems 
confronting the Chinese people, deriving from economic reforms like 
overheating and short supplies, agriculture stagnation, wild 
buying, costs and subsidies, bureaucratic profiteering!~ stagnation 
and inff~tion, all of which have posed obstruction and predicaments 
to economic reforms in the mainland. 6 
Some intellectuals like Li Qing, Liu Zengqiang and Zeng Peng 
unanimously stress the crisis of economic problems in China. They 
share the same belief that the Chinese economy has lagged behind 
those of other countries. Even the four small dragons have run in 
front of China in terms of economic development. They argue that 
the increase in GNP cannot keep pace with the unceasing growth of 
population which has hindered the proper development'of the Chinese 
economy. Aggregate statistics hide the fact that China's fast 
population growth has canceled out much of the increased economic 
output when food or other output figures are calculated on a per-
5chiang Chenchang, "The Social Aftermath of Mainland China's 
Economic Reform", Issues and Studies, (Feb. 1989), p.31 
6"A Close Look at the Economic Crisis", Life overseas Monthly, 
(Jan, 1989), p.37 in Inside China Mainland, (Taipei: April, 1989), 
pp.25-27 
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capita basis. He Pochuan points out the fact that China is ranked 
among the last 20 countries in terms of GNP in the whole world. In 
comparison wi th other countries, it is obvious that China has 
fallen behind. Taiwan's GNP is 69 times that of China; South 
Korea's GNP is 29 times; and· Thailand's GNP is 28 times that of 
China. In terms of GDP, Hong Kong 1S 145 times that of China; 
Taiwan 1S 29 times; and South Korea 1S 14 times that of China. 7 
According to the statistics released by the World Bank, the 
difference of GDP between the USA and China extended up to 118% in 
1984, with an average 5.7% enlargement annually. Furthermore, the 
.:"=' #' 
gap is predicted to double in a decade. 8 It seems clear that China 
is really facing an impending economic catastrophe. 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ITS STRUCTURAL DIFFICULTIES 
He Pochuan, after a close inspection of the economic crisis in 
China, no longer simply feels sad or melancholy. The feeling is 
rather one of desolation and helplessness. He denounces China's 
lagging behind the four small dragons as well as Japan by a ratio 
of 1/10 to 1/30 respectively. 9 He rhetorically questions the 
validity of the old thoughts in economic development, maintaining 
that the "welfare" concept of the 1950' s through the 1980' s has 
made people lost their incentive and even conditioned them to wait 
7Li Qing et al., "The Economic Problems in China", Li Ming 
(eds.), The Thought of China' sCrisis, (Tianjin: Renmin Press I 
1989), p.119 
8Jbid , p. 20 
9He Pochuan, China .on the Cliff, (gui zhou: Renmin Press I 
1989), p.3 
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for the support from the state rather than to become actively 
involved in improving their own living standards and finding a 
remedy : :for the backwardness of the economy. He suggests that the 
leaders should change and revolutionize the stubbornly sustaining, 
. . 
almost out-dated, tradi tional way of dealing wi th economic matters. 
He himself strongly believes the subsidy system has probably 
encouraged laziness and led to to the stagnation of econom~c 
development, which has forced China into an impasse. 10 He uses a 
parable to show that Chinese people have been too dependent on the 
injection of blood to sustain their lives; but th"~_y dare not 
-. 
attempt to create their own blood to transform themselves, thus 
propelling the state to an overloaded and overburdened condition. 
Confronted with such a background, He alludes to the importance of 
political reform, saying that the economic issues have to be 
tackled together with other related areas. In He's eyes, economic 
problems, which are structurally constructed, require a structural 
reform. 11 C.Y. Cheng also observed that the basic contradiction 
in the economic realm has connected with the inconsistency between 
the old ideas and system and the new initiatives for reforms. To 
Cheng, people have been indulged in the equali tarian system of 
"ea ting from the same big pot". Cheng conceives that the 
fundamental organizing principles of post-Mao China remain the same 
in both agricultural and industrial reforms. Basically, the state 
empolys the 'big pot' policy to subsidize inefficienct enterprises. 
lOIbid, pp. 5-7 
llIbid, pp.l0-17 
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Thus, many people still see the "big pot" as providing a safety net 
for their lives .12 
.- .. .. 
DIFFICULTIES IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Another intellectual, Ren Haijing has suggested the 
unprecedented growth in agr,icultural production leading up to 1984 
did not last long. Grain production for that year stood at 800 
billion jin (400 billion kilograms), breaking all historical 
records. Cotton output rose from 40 billion dan to 110 billion, a 
scope of growth hitherto unheard of. Then, after four years of 
fluc.tuation, grain production began to fall. The harvest record of 
1984 was never surpressed l.n the four following years .13 Ren 
points out however, the skyrocketing population has not only 
cancelled out the growth of agriculture but also undermined the 
agricultural reform, casting a shadow on the government's efforts 
to improve the people's lives. Grain, oil, sugar and other staples 
are in pressing shortages, concomi tantly bringing about an increase 
in prices, thus aggravating inflation. According to Ren, the price 
t 
rise is really grea ter than the 7.3% reported by the official 
source. Consumer goods like watches, radios and related goods rose 
in price from 40% to more than 100%. Among them, the most severe 
price l.ncrease has taken place l.n subsidiary food like pork and 
eggs, etc .14 
12Chu-yuan 
Westview Press, 
Ch e n g , ::;;:.B.....:e~h.::.:l=.;· n:..::..-=d=--.....::t=-=h~e=--=.T...:=:i~a=.!n~a.!.!:m:....:::e::...:.n.!...-....!M:.:!..::::=.e~s:.::s~a:!...:c~r.::::..e , 
1990), p~27 
IJInside Mainland China, (A . I 1989) 26 prl , , p. 
14Zhang, 't 260 0p.Cl ., p. 
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(Boulder: 
Though the ref,orms ln agricul ture have brought wi th them 
substantial growth in production, the growth is only an illusion. 
Ren be'i'ieves that the stagnation of agricul tural growth is due 
chiefly to the rel.uctant atti tude of the government. In early 
1978, the state laid down the principle that investment in 
agricultural development could rise from 11% to 18%. However, the 
policy was actually implemented in a half-hearted manner. With the 
contracting out of cultivated lands, the investment from the state 
into agriculture dropped substantially to 5% by the end of 1984. 15 
More fundamentally, there is an internal contradiction between 
, 
contracting-out of cultivated lands and investment in development 
of land. It is reported that the peasants have tried to maximize 
their profits from cultivation but they are reluctant to reinvest 
much in their contracted land since it is not their property. To 
aggravate the condition, the peasants have preferred to produce 
commercial crops and consumer goods rather than grains because they 
can make quicker returns, resulting in a shortage of grains in 
China. Ren also agonizes over the fact that some peasants' having 
even shifted their capital to other industries to make money, which 
has intensified the imbalance in the agricul tural development .15 
Some agricultural land has been left uncultivated. The loss 15 
finally shouldered by the state. To Ren, the intense sense of 
crisis among the people in the mainland is basically a crisis 1n 
agrarian economy. More than 80% of the people are still engaged ln 
15 Ibid , p.113 
16 Ibid , pp. 262-262 
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agriculture. The stagnation in agricultural development deals a 
big blow both to the people and to the Chinese economy as a whole. 
, ~ ~ ." THE PROBLEMS OF THE SMALL-SCALE ARGICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
In a closely argued examination of the problems in 
agriculture, Ren suggested , that the most fundamental problem ~n 
agricultural development has to do with "small-scale production ~n 
cultivation" (Xiaolong jingji). Argues Ren, the demarcation of 
lands alone prevents peasants from organizing large scale 
production, thus reducing the scale of production. Ren says that 
the _solution of the agricultural crisis is another land reform in 
which the peasants can have more autonomy in using the land and 
retain a proper scale of land for cuI tivation .17 Al though more 
autonomy to the peasants may presumably yield a better result in 
agricultural growth, it viqlates the notion of central planning and 
public ownership as upheld in socialist states. In this light, the 
land reform as proposed by Ren, has an internal contradiction 
between the ideological ground of socialism and the pragmatic view 
of market economics. This unresolved dilemma further handicaps the 
Communist state. If the state cannot resolve the difficulties, the 
criticism of economic reforms will be sharply exacerbated. 
We can see that the economic reforms in China have continued 
to be successful. The fundamental flaw of the system ~s 
ideological rather than economic. Socialism has created an 
inconsistent dogma to constrain its own development. As Cheng 
conceived, the chief victim of economic reforms has been the 
17 Ibid , pp. 265-266 
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official ideology, ~anglng from Marxist tenets to Mao's thought, 
which has suffered general repudiation. In the past decades, the 
Party has consistently inculcated upon its people "the superiority 
of the socialist system", but the open door has revealed the 
internal flaws and weakness of the official ideology. Becoming 
aware of the general economic prosperi ty in small dragons as 
compared to their own primitive and impoverished conditions, the 
people have begun to distrust socialism and the leadership of the 
CPC. 18 A legitimation crisis seems to become inevitable. 
DIFFICULTIES IN THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
The structural disequilibrium and overheated industry have 
intensified the chaotic condi tion in the economic realm. The 
spread of excessive investment in capital construction has become 
the most decisive factor in pulling inflation back up .19 Apart 
from that, galloping price rises have also resul ted in panl.C 
purchasing, which has brought about small perplexing problems as 
shortages of commodities, inflation and financial deficits. 
Furthermore, uncontrolled investment has caused excessive growth in 
the money supply. According to official figures, total industrial 
output for the first half of the year 1988 reached 577.3 billion 
yuan, an increase over the same period the year before of 17.2%. 
The ~umulative total industrial output exceeded one trillion yuan, 
17.1% higher than that for the preceding year. 
18 C.Y. Cheng, OPe cit. p.25 
'~I . d . . 
., nSl e Chlna Malnland, (April, 1989), p.26 
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Such tremendous 
20 industrial growth set a new record. 
At the same time, it has seemed to cause economic development 
to fal{ '~ar short of required levels. 21 The structure of industry 
has fallen out of . equilibrium, triggering failures of basic 
industries vi tal to total . output such as the shortge of raw 
materials, transportation, and energy. To aggravate the case, the 
structural disequilibrium and overheated industry exacerbate 
present raw materials restrictions, obstructing more speedy 
development of industries. The shortage of raw materials increases 
the .cost of production and causes a shortage in supply, both of 
which stimulate inflation. In addition, it is also reported that 
the slow-moving of energy growth hinders the development of 
industries. The loss in industrial output in 1988 was estimated at 
more than 100 billion yuan. In 1989, Beijing suffered a 24 percent 
shortage of electricity, while the shortfall in electricity supply 
in the southern province of Guangdong was about 50 percent. This 
is among the most severe hindrance in industrial development. 22 
OVERHEATING CONSUMPTION AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
In this circumstance price reform becomes essential. However, 
the readjustment of prices has created a tension in production, 
distribution, exchange, and consumption, which common people find 
21 Ibid , p. 25 
22C. Y. Cheng has depicted a clear picture and collected some 
good data to demonstrate the shortfall in electricity supply In 
China. Cheng also states .the industrial development is hindered by 
such a reason. For detail, please refer to "From Econmic Reform to 
Social Unrest", in Cheng, OPe cit., pp.13-37 
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intolerable. In other words, supplies cannot meet the demands of 
society,23 while purchasing power continues to expand, reaching 
55.3 bi"ilion yuan in 1987 alone, twice that of 1983. 24 Official 
data from the National Bureau of . Statistics reported that 
purchasing power among a~l social groups 1n the first three 
quarters of 1988 amounted to 48.7 billion yuan, 21 percent more 
than two years earlier. Recent data also reflect that spending has 
reached 5.6 billion yuan, an increase of 20%. The growth in 
purchasing power has created over-consumption while production 
can~9t possibly catch up. 
An investigation conducted by the Ministry of Commerce 
provides data on 428 industrial products, 30% of which were in 
short supply; of 138 agricultural non-staple products, 39% failed 
to meet demand. 25 Under such a circumstance, these pressing 
shortages precipitate price rises and panic consumption. As Nathan 
observed, the failure in pr1ce reform in 1988 accelerated the 
radical decline in the regime's authority. Nathan suggests that 
anti-Deng sentiment is openly expressed among a broad spectrum of 
Chinese because they blame the Party for failures that led to 
. 23 0 MO 1 0 "Th fl 0 uyang 1ng 1ng, e In at10n that Has Troubled the Chinese 
Communists", Cheng Ming Monthly, (H.K.: July, 1988), pp.20-23; Jou 
Ke, "Whether the Chinese Communists Can Overcome the 'Barriers in 
Price Reform'?" Hsin Bao, (September 6, 1988), p.10 Da gongbao, 
(September 21, 1988), p.2 
24Chiang Ch hOt 35 enc ang, 0p.C1 ., p. 
25Inside China Mainland, (April, 1989), p.26 
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· f l' d t . 26 ln atl0n an corrup 10n. 
STUBBORN TRADITIONAL PRACTICE AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
" " t" 
Wen Tiejun has pointed out the structural crisis in the 
economic realm. 27 He says that what is most unfortunate is the 
reform measures of "delegating power downward and letting people 
make a profit" as adopted by the Chinese government. In practice 
it has not produced any improvement ln the eff~ciency of 
production. The central problem lies in the fact that the people 
have not changed their traditional way of management, especially 
the .dependence on' welfare support and guaranteed emplbyment from 
the government. According to a recent study, people have become 
more conSC10US about job security and reliable income since the 
enforcement of contract and leasing systems. More importantly, 
over 70% of the respondents reported that they favored the job 
securi ty as offered in the old economic structure, 28 indicating 
that though people have hoped for better reforms, they are still 
reluctant to change their old way of life. As a result, reform 
still faces formidable obstacles ' in society. The root of the 
problem is related to the mentality of the people. 
The new measures initiated by the Communist Party In commodity 
economics and a free market 'system are inconsistent with the old 
26Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990), p.98 and Anne F. Thurston, "Year of the Dragon Ends 
on Note of Malaise", Christian Science Monitor, (Feb. 3, 1989), 
p.19 
27 L·· . 1 Mlng, Op.Clt., p'.35 
28 ch . h ~ lnag C enchang, op.cit., p.1lS 
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way of management and ,contradictory to central planning in economy. 
According to Qi Wuguan, the industrial loss is immense. Excessive 
invest~~ht and blind importation have made the loss irretrievable. 
The fundamental cause, to Qi, is the mismanagement of the 
enterprises. With the sho~tage of raw materials and increasing 
cost of production, 
predicamen ts . 29 
the enterprises inevitably encountered 
According to a survey conducted in 18 big cities, among 18,000 
enterprises, the average loss rate of profit-making enterprises was 
33% bringing the total loss of profi t-making entE;!rprises to 
approximately 299 billion yuan. The general loss rate jumped to 
18%. Another set of data reflected that the loss or industries 1n 
1986 was 78.7% (74.42 billion yuan). Compared with the loss rate 
of 1978, 18.3% (40.52 billion yuan), the loss rate grew about 2.5 
times. The collectives and publicly-owned enterprises suffer much 
greater losses than those of individually-owned enterprises. 30 
Therefore the state must subsidize heavily the loss of the 
enterprises, exerting a tremendous burden on the state. The fiscal 
crisis of the state is an indication that the old way of 'big pot l 
policy has not been corrected. 
Close scrutiny of the industrial and commercial reforms yields 
a simple and sweeplng conclusion that the crlses ln economic 
reforms are systemic in nature as suggested by Wen Tiejun, Zeng 
Shuji, etc. The fundamental flaw lies in the fact that there is an 
29·· . Ll Mlng, Op.Clt., pp.111-113 
JO Li Ming, op.cit., p.114 
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inherent contradiction between the central plan and market economy 
and between economic structural change and political structural 
change .. ' ~ ." Echoed Jrybyla, '''China has a system that fails to generate 
and apply technological innova tion to growth It • 31 In other words, 
the system is against the logic of the economic growth. Zeng Shuji 
concludes that the only way to resolve the predicaments 1S to make 
fundamental changes 1n the structure and sys tern. 32 The 
incompatability b~tween the ideology and the system has created an 
unresolved problem for the CPC. The loss of confidence in their 
own political and economic system and a loss of cultural self-
esteem underlined the impending social and economic crisis. 
By the middle of 1988, Deng's reform programs encountered 
tremendous difficulties. Foremost of them was skyrocketing 
inflation. After a long period of price stability for the past 
decades, inflation began to affect the whole population. According 
to the government statistics, the average inflation rate in the 
first semester of 1988 was 13% and the real rate of inflation in 
June was 19% when projected over the year 1988. It is clear that 
the rate of increase of the composite index of staff and worker's 
living expenses (using 1978 prices as a base rate) from the 1984 
rate of 19.9% suddenly jumped to the 1987 rate of 56.2%, a rise of 
36 percentage points in three years. Moreover, the rate of 
increase of the composite index of general ~etail sales quickly 
rose from the 1984 rate of 17.7% to the 1987 rate of 45.7%. The 
'1 
·"'George Hicks, op.cit., p.184 
32 . . ' Zhang J1U, Op.Clt., pp.96-98 
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b t t · 1 rl'se was 28% l'ncludl'ng the cost of food which rose su s an la " 
51%.33 Inflation has made the life of the people more difficult 
and ca~~ed them to lose faith in economic reforms by the Communist 
government. 
PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS 
In a survey conducted in Tianjin to determine the respondents' 
willingness to tolerate price reform, 68% said that the price hike 
had an adverse effect on their enthusiasm for work. More than 56% 
reported that the "superiority of socialism" is apparent only when 
comm~dity prices are stable. Many people even question~d the price 
reforms, maintained that it would be better to leave both wages and 
prices as they were. 34 Price rises have already seriously affected 
people's livelihood. According to a sample survey by the State 
Statistics Bureau, about 20% of the urban population experienced a 
decline in their real incomes in 1986. According to Chou Minghui, 
the proportion rose to 40% and about half of the urban population 
were unable to make ends meet. It was also reported that 36.7% oOf 
Shanghai residents and 50% of the population of Guangdong Province 
suggested declines in their real income. 35 The unceasing increase 
in prices leads to open dissatisfaction and antagonism among the 
Chinese people. According to recently published surveys I the 
33 Ming Bao Monthly, (Hong Kong: December, 1988), pp.17-21 
34 Chia Chi, "An Investigation of Residents' 
Toleration of the Price Reform", Guangming Ribao, 
21, 1987), p.2 
Psychological 
(Beijing: March 
35 Chou Minghui, "The Key to the Success or Failure of the Ten-
Year Reform", Ming Bao !-tonthly, (Hong Kong: October, 1988), p.19 
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percentage of people dissatisfied with the pr1ce hikes rose from 
73.8% in November 1986 to 79.9% in May 1987. In late October 1987, 
the dis 'satisfaction rate rose to 84%. The trend of popular 
discontent over rising commodity prices continued into 1988. 36 The 
price hikes have made more and more people question the rationality 
and the necessity of economic reform. 
An article in Outlook Weekly entitled "The Current Reform on 
the Mainland: The Psychological Impediments 1n Society" closely 
examined the root of the problem. It claimed that mainland people 
have been expecting too much of the eocnomic reform, b~t have made 
no personal efforts to improve. They have maintained their old way 
of life and dare not change their out-dated methods of production. 
Thus, the reforms seem doomed to failure. Some people feel that 
their vested interests have come under threat in the process of 
reforms. Therefore, they have begun to lose their enthusiasm for 
the reform and have started to boycott it. Wishing to turn the 
clock back, more people in China just think that the state should 
satisfy their growing desire for consumption. 37 Sharing this point 
of view, the people have become more dissatified with the economic 
reforms. When the rationality of economic reforms is questioned, 
the legitimacy of the state is hence undermined. 
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The current inflation encountered by the Chinese people 1S 
36Chang Chih "The Way to Price Reform as Viewed from Social 
Forbearance" I World Economic Herald I (Shanghai: August 15, 1988), 
p.1 
J70utlook Weekly, (August 1, 1988), p.8 
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based not only upon the exceSSlve demand in society and flaws in 
macroscopic policies and decision-making, but also upon a whole 
series ~ ~f objective and historical causes. The first cause has 
special relation to the structural element: it is the unequal 
development among the vari~us departments and imbalances in the 
economlc development of the various provinces and localities. The 
economlc reform of the past few years has produced a number of 
priyileged groups. The Communist government has stated publicly 
their intention of letting some people become rich first, a process 
which gradually widens the gap between the rich and the poor, and 
gives rise to jealousy among various prOVlnces and localities. 38 
The popular dissatisfaction with the lncome gap 1S immediately 
apparent. Some popular rhymes denounce the inequali ty among 
different sectors. The rhymes claim that "the reform has made 
peddlers and those that live on the coast rich, but has 
impoverished and deceived those who live on salaries; has flattered 
intellectuals, allowed young people to be promoted, enriched 
peasants, and benefited senior cadres, while causing workers to be 
more strictly' controlled". 39 A survey conducted by the State 
statistics Bureau also revealed the widened gap of income ln urban 
areas. The maJor reason for this 1S that households running 
38 Fu Chihli, "How to Treat Millionaries", Peasants I Daily, 
(Beijing, July 7, 1988), p.2; Wen Jehsin, "Why Millionaire Sun' 
Discharged His Bodyguard", Ren hui Bao, (October 16,1988), p.3 and 
Commentator's article, "Public Prosperi ty Can Be Attained Only When 
Some Become Rich First", People's Daily, (Beijing: July 9, 1987), 
p.1 
39 Ch ' Ch h . . lang enc ang, Op.Clt., p.39 and Hu Ti, "A Discussion of 
Doggerel", People's Daily, (Beijing: September 18, 1984), p.l 
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industrial and commercial businesses have enjoyed enormous 
increases in their incomes. 40 
? 
The workers, intellectuals and others on fixed salaries, 
having encountered .such an income dispari ty, responded sharply. 
The preferential treatment .to the coastal areas has created 10000 
yuan families (wanyuan hu). A 1988 official survey revealed that 
the monthly income of an independent businessman in the Beijing 
area was about seven times that of a typical middle schooL teacher; 
and many owners of private enterprises had incomes more than ten 
times tha t of college prof essors. 41 Having confron'"ted such a 
discrepancy, the people felt that inequality among different 
sectors of people was incompatible with the egalitarian essence of 
socialism. According to one well-known mainland Chinese reformist, 
Wen Yuankai, 20% more people feel they have lost out as a result of 
the reform than those who have benefited from it. 42 Against such 
a background, people have grown discontent and began to subtly 
attack the state. The utopia of socialism is proven false through 
their actual experience, and the reintroduction of "ism" not only 
proves to be a failure but also ridicules the state itself. 
Furthermore, income differentials have also increased among 
rural households. According to a report published in April 1986, 
the income gap grew wider by 23% between 1979, shortly before the 
40United Daily News, (Taipei: June 28, 1988), p.9 
41Jingli Ribao, (Beijing Feb. 22, 1988) 
42Liang 
Obstacles", 
Tung, "Economic Reform Has Met 
Hsin Bao, (August 19,1988), p.21 
53 
with Political 
initiation of the reform, and 1986. 43 To drive home the point, the 
report notes tha t al though the reform policy has produced some 
"ten-thousand-yuan households" in the rural areas, there are still 
quite a few peasant. families facing difficulties. Indeed, more 
than 11.3% of rural households have income of less than 200 yuan. 
In other words, there are still about 90 million peasants living on 
the brink of mere subsistence. 44 
Moreover, the economic reform has widened the gap between the 
eastern and western provinces. The average income difference per 
capita between the west and the east was 72 yuan in 1981~ rising to 
170 yuan in 1985 . In addition, the gap in per capita consumption 
. also rose from 67 yuan in 1981 to 137 yuan in 1985. There are also 
unbridgable gaps in such matters as urbanization, gross industrial 
output agricultural production, and higher education. 45 He Pochuan 
believes that the unfair distribution and unequal opportunity in 
China will result in economic turmoil. He further believes that 
the gap between the individual households and the collectives would 
probably cause antagonism. 46 Thus the income gap has intensified 
the feeling of frustration among many people and provided them with 
a ground for questioning the reliablity of the socialist 
ideological system. 
43people'SDaily, (Beijing, April 11, 1986), p.5 
44K Ch . t "A D·· . ung 1 ao, lSCUSS10n of the Chlnese Communists' Efforts 
to Improve Mainland People's Livelihood", Weekly of Materials on 
Chinese Communis t Aff airs " (Taipei, No. 298, January 11, 1988), p. 33 
4 5M i n g Ba 0 , ( Se pt emb er, 1 9 8 7), p. 6 
46 He Pochuan, OPe cit., pp.22-23 
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BUREAUCRATIC-PROFITEERING AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
In recent years, another structural imbalance which has made 
its appearance in the Chinese economy since the central government 
began its program of decentralization. "Independent feudal 
kingdoms" in the localities, based on special economic interests, 
have formed. 47 Different provincial governments have implemented 
protectionist policies to safeguard their own local interests. The 
prime objective of the decentralization policy was to motivate the 
local enterprises to be more dynamic and creative ln their 
development. However, the real power has fallen ~?t to the 
enterprises but to the local authorities, creating the problem of 
"posi tional economy" wi th a rela ted series of corruption. 48 
Official trading, profiteering and unfair distribution have become 
central problems for the people. Under the existing multilevel 
price system, those with special connections could buy one ton of 
steel at the official price of 700 yuan and immediately resell it 
at the market price of 2100. Most of the government officials, 
retired government empolyees, or their offsprings have become 
instant millionaries. According to Cheng, 11 the prevalence of 
'official profiteering' has significantly raised the price of raw 
materials and thereby injected an element of 'cost-push' into the 
rampant inflation". 49 It is clear then the gap between the rich 
47Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong 
Introduction 
( eds) , op.cit. , 
48 Hua Sheng, et al., The Ten Years Reform ln China: A Review, 
Evaluation and Forecasting, pp.1-20 
49 Ch . ' eng, OPe clt., p.24 
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and the poor is further widened. 
Hua Sheng explains the idea of positional economy as practised 
, ... .. ... 
in China where there 1S supposedly no private ownership of 
property. Hua says - that many government officials have relied on 
their position and executive privilege to engage in the trade of 
scarce, highly-valued goods to reap enormous profits. For example, 
Hua claims that some scarce commodities have pass~d through 
officials' hands several times before even leaving the warehouse, 
with the price jumping several times. This practice has created a 
'second market' in which executive authority becomes the~ commodity, 
signatures, permits, account numbers and licenses items of barter. 
This official profiteering demonstrates the structural risks of 
economlc reforms and signifies the present chaos in the economic 
realm. 50 Against such a background, the mood among people has 
reached a point of pessimism and despair. 
Though the promotion of a commodity economy in recent years 
has awakened public enthusiasm for commercial activities and 
revitalized the economy to some degree, it also created what has 
come to be known as the "commerce craze". This demand has produced 
a monopoly of cadres over commodities and commercial activities, 
causing galloping price rises. Some people claim that "the key to 
a successful commercial transaction depends on three things: 
approval of official departments, offering bribes, and good 
relations with the departments or officials concerned." There is 
a saying that "power equals so many tons of steel, so many 
50 Zh . . . ang ]lU, Op.Clt., p.90 
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kilograms of chemical fertilizer and certain foreign exchange 
quotas".51 One report revealed that at the end of 1987, there were 
: . . ... 
about 250,000 out of a total of 360,000 companies, comprising the 
Party and goverhment organs relating to the economic affairs as 
well as the judicial and legislative departments on mainland were 
engaged in the reselling of materials. 52 Huntington has suggested 
that in developing countries, corruption may be one way. of getting 
around traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations which probably 
hamper economl.C expansion. In Huntington's opinion, "corruption is 
one . , measure of the absence effective ~ ~ political 
institutionalization. Public officials lack autonomy and 
coherence, and subordinate their institutional roles to exogenous 
demands. Corruption may be more prevalent in some cultures than in 
others, but in most cUltutes it seems to be most prevalent during 
the most intense phases of modernization". 53 
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGY AND THE ECONOMIC REFORMS 
Modernization has changed the basic values of the society, 
and at the same time, has created some wealthy people who 
m~nipulate the allocation of resources, resulting in inequality and 
uneven distribution of wealth. The economic modernization in post-
Mao China advocated by the Communist Party has resulted in the kind 
51Chiang Chenchang, op. ci t., p. 43 and Wu Yen and Chang Hsuehhu, 
"A Question Mark on the Road Sign When We Are Changing Tracks ---
A Study of the Phenomenon of Cadres Reselling Materials", Workers' 
Daily, (Beijing: August 2~, 1988); Ming Bao, (August 22, 1988), p.6 
52Ming Bao, (August 1, 1988), p.9 
53Samuel P.Huntington ', Political Order in Changing Societies, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp.66 / 68 
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of situation described by Huntington. Corruption is a the common 
experience not only of the people but also of the party leaders. 
Many cadres have exploited the urban dwellers as well as the rural 
peasants. Hu Qili, . the senior official in charge of ideological 
matters boldly confessed that the current level of corruption is 
unprecedented. 54 The extensive level of corruption and inflation 
have threatened to erode the successes of the economic reforms. 
Many Chinese have become wealthy with a rising living standard, 
although the recent setback and curtailment caused by stagflation 
have ,made people discontented. System reforms are bei'ng whi ttled 
away and the old system is starting to make a comeback. The free 
market has been weakened as tightened control from the central 
level is reimposed. This tightening process both endangers the 
economic reforms and shakes the political stability. 
The present predicaments and crises arising from the economic 
realm are similar to the experiences in the Eastern European 
socialist countries. Ivan Szelenyi, in his examination of the case 
of Hungarian economy, observes: "the current crlS1S in Eastern 
E'urope is not limi ted to the economy, it 1.S simul taneously a 
poli tical, a legi timation crisis", 55 particularly when the 
superimposed ideological hegemony of socialism and Marxism has 
undergone a crisis of confidence and fai th. Szelenyi claims, 
"during the last decade this hegemony wi thered away, Marxism ceased 
54people's Da1.·1y, (J '1 ' 10 1988) 1 
_ _ u y, , p. 
55 I SI·" van ze eny1., Ea~tern Europe in an Epoch of Transition: 
Between Socialism and Capi talism", (HK: Centre of Urban Studies & 
Urban Planning, University of Hong Kong, 1988), p.7 
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to be the normal social science discourse, and even the word 
d 1 ·· t . bl 56 socialism was devalued" which has le to egltJ.ma J.on pro ems. 
According to Szelenyi, the fundamental flaw in the economic realm 
of the Eastern European countries is related bascially to the 
vulnerability in state socialism for it has exhausted its growth 
potentials and lost its legitimacy. Similar to the case of China, 
state socialism has failed to transform the old way of economic 
dev~lopment. Though the state has struggled to bring about 
economJ.c reforms through the introduction of free market and 
commodity economics, these measures have failed to inspire people's 
incentives in production. The socialist states have confronted the 
transitional problems resulting from the changes in market economy, 
what Szelenyi calls, a "theory of crisis of transtion". 57 
The central problems have to do with the inconsistency between 
the mode of economic development and official ideology in 
socialism. Though the state has attempted to grapple with dynamic 
market mechanisms in the economic realm, the people refuse to 
change their way of management. Nei ther have there been any 
changes in the political system or legal system. As observed by 
Cheng, the basic contradiction of the economic reforms in post-Mao 
China is the lack of an overall blueprint for reform strategies, 
the lack of consensus among leaders, the absense of a legal 
framework, the influence of the old ideas and old system and the 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid, p. 11 
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low quali ty of personnel. 58 Szelenyi concludes "it was a 
structural crisis, the crisis of transition from extensive to 
, . " 
" 59 intensive stage. 
Like the case . of Eastern Europe, China has struggled for 
economic reforms hoping to establish the , second economy' . In the 
process of reform however, the reformists have encountered vehement 
and unceasing resistance from various sectors, who believe that the 
reforms have threatened their vested interests. The inconsistency 
and incongruence between the old way of central planning and 
market economy give rise not only to economic turmoil but also to 
sceptism of ideology and faith in Communism. Similar to Szelenyi's 
description of Eastern Europe, the whole secondary economy of China 
is segmented by the bureaucratic-redistributive sector and cannot 
form a system of its own".60 
Samuel P.Huntington points out that there are people who 
maintain that rapid economic growth can also be a highly 
destabilizing process and that "the very changes which are needed 
to satisfy aspirations in fact tend to exacerbate those 
aspira tions If • 61 Huntington is also of the opinion that modernity 
breeds stability but modernization breeds instability. He 
apparently means that while economic growth enhances people's 
material well-being, at the same time it exacerbates feelings of 
58 Ch . eng, OPe Clt., pp.25-29 
59Syelenyi, op.cit. 
60 Ibid , p.31 
61Huntington, op. ci t., pp. 49-50 
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frustration. Echoed Ivo K.Feierabend, "the behavior and 
organizations developed in the process of modernization have 
provided "backward countries with a target for emulation. There is 
always a gap between aspirations and achievements, and the more 
underdeveloped a country 1S" the larger the gap, and consequently 
the greater the feeling of frustration". 62 The wider the gap 
between the expectation and the reality is the more likely it is 
that the people will express frustration. ' 
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS 
,Post-Mao China is precisely in such a posi tion, ",'" ,-since the 
orientation of the communist command-structure is toward goal-
achievement, based on with a multiplicity of promises to improve 
the quality of life and economic growth. Li Xiaobin denounces the 
rationality of the economic ,reforms and the legitimacy of the 
Communi s t rul e . 63 Thi s 1 ine of reasoning expl ains the 1 egi tima tion 
crisis as derived from the economic crisis which extends to the 
crisis of the institutional and administrative system. From this 
perspective, the case of China serves as another demonstration 
that this pragmatic basis of legitimation is fluid, temporary and 
cr1s1s-prone. 
The crisis 1S not only 1n the economic realm. Behind the 
facade of 'economic' policies lie great political difficulties. In 
the case of China, inconsistencies can be found not only among the 
62Peng 
Stability, 
Chin-peng, Huntington: The Designer of 
(Taipei: Yunchen Company, 1982), pp.186-187 
Political 
63 Li Xiaobin, "The Legitimation Crisis of China's Reforms", Li 
Ming, op.cit., pp.320-327 
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economic reforms but also between these economlC programs and other 
social and political innovations. One of the most important areas 
of poteritial conflict with the economic reforms is in the political 
arena. Many of the economic strategies have undercut the authority 
and allegiance of Party members. Richard Latham states that "the 
reforms in agricultural responsibility tend to undermine the 
prestige and political advantages of grassroots Party leadership, 
and leave rural cadres at an economlC disadvantage as well". 64 
Therefore the rural cadres have leveled a barrage of criticism on 
grounds of ideology I social welfare implications I an~l practical 
management considerations. In general, the decline in cadre 
political commitment seems to be an inevitable consequence. 
Weakened cadre allegiance to state initiative, according to 
Elizabeth Perry, is a key ingredient in the recent upsurge of 
collective violence and "feudal supersitition" in the countryside. 
The rural cadres have identified more closely with their kinsmen 
and neighbors than with central directives in order to formulate a 
stronger local political basis to counteract central control. This 
si tuation confirms McCormick' s idea that the extensive patron-
client networks in the mainland further undermine the state's 
ideological legi timacy and economic efficiency. 65 The state's 
confrontation with resistance from the localities necessarily upset 
64Richard J. La tham, "The Implica tions 
Grass-Roots Cadres", Elizabeth J.Perry, 
op.cit., pp.157-174 and 15-16 
of Rural Reforms for 
and Christine Wong, 
65Barrett L.McCormick ', Political Reform in Post-Mao 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.7 
China, 
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d . 66 the relationship between the state an soclety. 
This awkward situation occurs not only in the agricultural 
field b~i also in the industrial sector. The stategies taken in 
streamlining factory management and upgrading level of technical 
competence have threatened many older, less qualified cadres. In 
a society where lifetime tenure has been the norm for cadres, 
change poses more difficulties for the state. Susan Shirk suggests 
that the central problem for the Communist Party is how to deal 
with these resistant groups: these losers ln the industrial 
refor~s, like the people ln heavy industry, inland "-,-provinces, 
central planning agencies, and industrial ministries. 67 This line 
of reasoning leads to the conclusion that economic crisis has 
deepened structural crisis which in turn, calls for structural 
transformation. 
Li Honglin has expounded on both the problem and the solution 
of economic crisis in China. In his article "Crisis and Reform", 
Li provides a dazzling series of ideas that orthodox Marxism-
Leninism is in crisis. In the late 70's, Li highlighted the crisis 
of confidence, trust and faith, related fundamentally to the crlSlS 
in official ideology. In 1988, Li reiterated his conception of the 
national crisis of the Chinese people,68 namely, their scepticism 
66Elizabeth J. Perry, "Rural Collective Violence: The Frui ts of 
Recent Reforms", Ibid, pp.175-194 
67 Susan L. Shirk, 
pp.195-222 
"The - Politics of Industrial Reform", Ibid, 




of the validity of Ma~xism-Leninism. Li criticizes the direction 
of Stalin and Lenin, calling for reforms and for learning from the 
capitali~t system. Li rejects official condemnation and 
underestimation of dynamic capitalism and subtly attacks the 
traditional interpretation of Marxism. Li has asserted that 
traditional Marxism, that is the Soviet model, is not only outdated 
h . f . d d f . h' . 69 but also drove people to lose t elr con 1 ence an alt ln It. 
Li obliquely questions the past policies and denounces the ultra-
leftist tendency toward abrupt oscillations in policy in Mao's era, 
which have concomitantly brought social instability and impending 
.... ";. , . 
economic catastrophe. Li questions why the state has rejected 
commodi ty economy and relied only on tradi tional, small-scale, 
self-contained, self-sufficient agricul tural production., This 
reflects the backward, neither progressively active nor innovative 
nature of China's economy. 70 Li concludes that only reforms can 
restore and transform the present state as he excoriates the 
corruption, wastefulness and backwardness in the mentality of the 
cadres. In Li' s eyes, all these suffocate the dynamicsm of 
economic reforms required in all related systems, political, social 
and ideological. With this line of argument, Li concludes that the 
success of commodity and free market economy lies with the 
deepening of reforms into the socio-poli tical and the socio-
cuI tural arenas. 71 
59 Ibid , pp.41-42 
70 Ibid , pp. 43-47 
71 Ibid , pp.46-57 
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Like Li, He Pochuan also believes that the only solution to 
the economic woes of China is to lanuch reforms in the political 
realm, a '-'view shared by Yan Jiaqi. 72 Peter Nolan also states that 
the transformation to market economy cannot be separated from 
individual freedoms and poli,tical rights. 73 Mil ton Friedman told 
the former General Secertary of the Communist Party of China, Zhao 
Ziyang, during his earlier visit to China, that. the only solution 
to China's economlc predicaments was political reform and 
democratization of the government. Friedman urged the Chinese 
state to strengthen the market economy by allowin.,_g private 
ownership, declaring that such a measure can strengthen economic 
growth and enhance the incenti ves of people in production. In 
essence, Friedman asked the Communist Chinese government to glve 
more freedom to the people. Only political reform can save China 
from economic collapse. 74 It is clear that both the cri tical 
Chinese intellectuals and the Western intellectuals have concluded 
that the fundamental problems of economic development involve the 
political system. As Jan S. Prybyla points out "the most important 
source of economic problems is the system", the solution of such 
problem requires a "fundamental restructuring of the system's 
institutions and a concurrent revolutionary transformation of 
72 He Pochuan, op. cit., pp.10-17 and Yang Dali (eds.), Essays 
on Chinese Politics by Yan Jiaqi, (Teaneck: Global Publishing Co. 
Inc., 1990), pp.195-214 
73peter Nolan, "History, Democracy and Economic Change", China 
Now, (no.131), pp.13-14 
74"Friedman Says Mainland Needs Freedom", Cheng Ming Monthly, 
(H.K.: February, 1989), p.42 
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ideas. ,,75 Prybyla's ,position is consistent with Li Honglin's. 
Thus, we may conclude that the economic crisis in post-Mao China is 
a contr'a-diction between ideology and the poli tical system in 
contemporary China. 
CONCLUSION 
This author considers that the root of the crisis rests not on 
economic crisis but more fundamentally on the crisis in ideology. 
According to Cheng, many young Chinese regard the Four Cardinal 
Principles as a built-in obstacle, negating the implementation of 
the reform program. 76 Many people have even questioned the 
rationality of the state and its justification of economic reforms. 
Merquior says that if the legitimation of the regime 1S based 
merely on ideological ground, the regime could not be long-lasting 
since ideology can never obtain full consensus. According to 
Merquior, ideology becomes not a power but a "force" or "coercion" 
to make people conform. This basis of legitimation is vulnerable 
to any crisis whenever people lose their faith. In post-Mao China 
both the officials and the common people have fel t the self-
legitimation crisis and questioned the validity of Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism, yet the new intended mode of command as resting on 
goal-rational ground and socio-economic performance has also failed 
to get the support of the public. As a result of unacceptable 
experiences in the economic reforms, the people express scepticism 
75Jan S. Prybyla, "China's Socialist Economy: A Broken Sya tern" , 
George Hicks (eds.) I The Broken Mirror, (UK: Longman Group Ltd., 
1991), p. 181 
i6 C "J Ch . • .1. ' eng, op.Cl.t., chapter 2 
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on the reforms. The rule of the Communist government is thus 
shaken, loosening its hitherto the hegemonic control in post-Mao 
China. ~ ~ To Gramsci, such crisis of hegemony is not the result of 
economic crisis; but rather the economic crisis only paves the way 
for a crisis of hegemony. Although the Communist state can still 
retain its rule by force and coercion in China, it has failed to 
get the consent of the subordinate classes. Communist China. is now 
facing the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born. 
Following this line of reasoning, if the ruling class has lost its 
consensus and is no longer 'leading', but merely 'domin~,.nt' though 
exercising coerci ve force, this means precisely tha t the grea t 
masses have become detached from the traditional ideologies and no 
longer believe what they used to believe in. In sum, this basis of 
legitimation is prone to crisis and is inherently unable. 
Orthodox Marxist theorists believed that crisis in society is 
the direct result only of economic crisis. 77 The intellectuals in 
the post-Mao era have conceived of the crisis in society as having 
a broader base. A new and close articulation between the economy, 
the state, and ideology, as well as the interpenetration between 
economlc, political, and social norms ln effect abolish any 
autonomous "economic laws" as defined in Neo-Marxist terms. 78 Like 
Habermas, the intellectuals in post-Mao China have found the root 
of the present crisis not only in the economic realm but also in 
77James O'Connor, The Meaninq of Crisis, (New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987), pp.111-124 
78 Ibid , p.133 
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relation to the political, social and cultural realms. The failure 
ln economlC reforms reflects the deep-seated problems in ideology 
as well -··as in the authori tarian poli tical structure. The system 
crisis in the economic system has extended to the rationality 
crisis of the administrative apparatus. It also sets the stage for 
problems in socio-cultural ground, namely, for the emergence of the 
identity crisis and cultural crisis. In the forthcoming chapters, 
the study will focus on the insti tutional crisis, the identi ty 
crisis and the cultural crisis. 
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Chapter 3. On Institutional Crisis 
..... .. "" 
In the preceding chapter, we have examined the economlC crisis 
in post-Mao China. We concluded that the crisis arising from the 
economic realm in general and the failure in economic reforms in 
particular have prompted the attention of intellectuals towards the 
administrative apparatus of the state. It is the aim of this 
chapter to examlne the more fundamental institutional crisis 
involved. In this study, we define institutional crisis in terms 
of the problems arising from the Party bureaucracy~ and the 
political system itself. We intend to examine how the critical 
intellectuals diagnose the misconduct of the cadre-bureaucrats and 
the malpractice resulting from the inadequate management in the 
administrative system. 
On close inspection, the intellectuals have found the central 
problem to be related closely to the authori tarian poli tical 
structure. The prevailing systems and institutions in the Party 
and state are plagued by problems which seriously impede the full 
realization of modernization in post-Mao China. These problems are 
perceived not only by the intellectuals and the public but also by 
the Party leaders themselves. In the early 80's, Deng Xiaoping 
pointed out that "as . far as the leadership and cadre systems of our 
Party and state are concerned, the major problems are bureaucracy, 
over-concentration of power, patriarchal methods, life tenure in 
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leadership posts and privileges of various kinds. ,,1 Bureaucracy 
remains a major and widespread problem in the political life of the 
Party an~ of the state. 
The origin of the problems arises from the highly centralized 
management in the economic, political, cultural and social fields 
as characterized by the mode of authoritarian rule in a Leninist 
state.& It is therefore natural to conclude that the party-state 
penetration into society has created the phenomenon which Vogel 
calls the "political conquest of society. ,,3 This unlimited 
extension of state function over the civil society has created the 
pre-condi~ions for the autocratic rule of the bureaucracy. It is 
under such circumstances that the institutional crisis emerges, 
which not only hinders the economic modernization but also poses 
structural risks to the system. The unresolved problems embedded 
in the bureaucracy have interrupted the proceeding of the economic 
reforms, thereby calling attention to the inherent contradictions 
in the system and leading the intellectuals to perceive an 
institutional cr1S1S. 
In this chapter, we are going to study the insti tutional 
crisis as perceived and diagnosed by the intellectuals. We will 
exam1ne their critiques and criticisms of bureaucratic problems 
related both to the personnel and to the structure of the post-Mao 
1 •• 
-Deng X1aop1ng, Selected Works of Deng Xi~oping (1975-1982), 
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), p.309 
2Ibid , pp.309-410 
3Ezra Vogel, ~anton Under Communism 1949-68, (N. Y.: Harper 
Torchbook, 1969), pp.350-356 
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period, as well as the 'insti tutional crisis which characterizes the 
"system crisis" in contemporary China. 
HE POCHUAN AND HIS INTENSE SENSE OF CRISIS 
In recent years ,; there have been many intellectuals pointing 
out different types of crises in China. He Pochuan, one of the 
most prominent intellectuals, has suggested that China is facing 
different types of crises in his book, China On the Cliff. In his 
book, he declares that an institutional crisis is arising from the 
malpractice and poor administration of the bureaucracy. This 
impending crisis of the bureaucracy spans from the central features 
of bureaucratic problems, and into its relationship to the 
institutional crisis. 
Impending Crisis of Bureaucracy 
He Pochuan has suggested that the fundamental cause of the 
present tribulations 1n China is the bureaucracy with its 
malpractice. In his book China on the Cliff, He describes the 
institutional crisis in post-Mao China. In his close scrutiny of 
history, he finds that bureaucratic problems have been a common 
phenomenon in Chinese history. He quotes one scholar in the Yuan 
dynasty who stated that "bureaucratic problems are the most 
difficult" unresolved predicaments 1n Chinese politics. 4 The 
central problem arising from the bureaucracy, according to He, is 
closely connected with feudalistic rule which rests upon a network 
system, manifesting 'such problems as standing high above the 
4He Pochuan, China on the Cliff, (Quizhou: Renmin Press, 
1989), p.339 
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masses, abusing power" being hidebound by convention; overstaffing 
administrative organs, inefficient and irresponsible; failing to 
keep one1 "s word, deceiving superviors and subordinates, practising 
favouritism, offering bribes, participating in corrupt practices in 
violation of the law, etc. 5 These common flaws, in short, are the 
result of over-centralization of power and feudalistic rule 
characterized as rule by man rather than rule by law. 
The institutional crisis in modern China has its root ln the 
interaction between the feudal bureaucratic system and the kinship 
system. 6 To substantiate his ideas, He points out the Eremendous 
rise J.n the number of bureaucrats, the current ratio between 
bureaucrats or cadres and common people being about 1:37. China's 
ratio is 2.8 times that of Japan. 7 Such a rise in number does not 
inevitably become a problem provided that the bureaucrats can work 
effectively within the administrative apparatus. However, He 
claims that the quality of bureaucracy in Communist China is far 
from satisfactory, he further declares that the poor quality of the 
bureaucracy is inherent within the mentality of the Chinese people. 
Of _the 47 million Party members, millions of whom are government 
bureaucrats, fewer than 2 % received a college education. Although 
many top leaders and intellectuals consider the reform movement as 
the only hope for China, a lot of middle-echelon bureaucrats just 
believe it directly threatens their authority. 
5Ibid , pp.337-344 
°Ibid, p.334 
, 
' Ibid, p.346 
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Some of them are 
incompetent or lack the willpower to persevere with the reform. 3 
As Deng Xiaoping observed, "our weaknesses and difficul ties ln 
. ~ ~ ... 
carrying out the Four Modernizations are mainly the result of the 
lack of knowledge and qualified personnel". 9 According to He, the 
common practice of the superlor officials is to hire some 
subordinates who are not knowledgeable and have only average 
ability because the superio~s are afraid of the threat to their 
position from the subordinates. The subordinates are shaped to be 
blindly obedient f spending their time and effort to put up an 
impr.essive front, even assumlng the of 
reprimanding other people at every turn, but having no good 
performance in their administration .10 In this way, the 
bureaucrats have become too static and unconscious of their 
performance. 
Central Features of Bureaucratic Problems 
To expound his ideas, He has suggested several characteristics 
of the Chinese bureaucracy, the first of which is the corrupt 
activities of the bureaucrats. He glves evidence that many of the 
bureaucrats have made use of the public revenue to have big feasts 
and private trips, often rationalizing their expenses with official 
reasons. He claims that the annual increase in such expenses has 
averaged 14% from 1984 to 1989. The growth ln entertainment 
SC.Y. Cheng, Behind the Tianamen Massacre, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1990), p.28 
Q • 
'Tal Kung Bao, (H.K.: . April 20, 1986), p.1 
i Ii • 
-"Ibld, p.347 
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expenses is more than 2% higher than the average growth of GDP. 
He says that this abuse of power has put the public ln a more 
disadva~iaged position because public revenue is abused. 11 
Secondly, expansion of the relentless and complicated 
bureaucratic procedures has ,become so serious that the efficiency 
of administration is greatly reduced. He cites as an example a 
simple matter which had to run through more than 270 rubber stamps 
before it was settled. The bureaucracy has developed excessively 
compl ica ted steps and overlapping structure in adminis tra tion. 12 
He points out the fact that the extensive expansion of bureaucracy 
has resulted in poorer, not better administration. For instance, 
from only 16 units in the Economic Department in 1949 the number 
has risen to 68 units in the Department in the present state. The 
expansion does not show any improvement ln administration but 
obviously reflects poorer performance and efficiency.13 He claims 
that the bureaucrats can only keep busy all day long making reports 
to higher levels, seeking instructions from them, and writing 
comments on documents and passing them around. They are always 
ducking responsibili ty, jockeying for power and wrangling wi th 
others just to seek power interests of their own. Public awareness 
of such bureaucratic failure is the essence of what we have called 
institutional crisis. 
Third, He offers the opinion that the extensive personal 
l1 Ibid , p.351 
12 Ibid , p.315 
13 Ibid , p.355 
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network system has precipitated the bureaucratic problems. Even 
now, He points out that the practice of appointing people through 
favouri 'tism and factionalism has continued unchecked ln China. 
There are many instances in which cadres abuse their power so as 
to enable their friends and , relatives to move to the cities or to 
obtain jobs or promotions. He also reports that medical welfare 
has been widely shared by the relatives and friends of cadres, a 
benefit supposedly restricted to the cadres only.14 
According to Cheng also" a new class has emerged, consisting 
mostly of high , government officials and their child:r;,en. This 
blatant nepotism has not been limited to government administration 
but spread especially to upper-echelon positions J.n state 
corporations, banking, and trading companies. Being the members J.n 
the "crown prince party", these people have engaged in all sorts of 
underhanded practices to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
public .15 To He it is thus clear that the residual influences of 
clan culture must not be underestimated. He Pochuan argues that 
the Chinese people t s rigid thinking and lack of ' innovation and 
creativity in responding to changes ln society have allowed the 
cadres to revert to patriarchal ways wi thin the revolutionary 
ranks to place individuals above the organization. He believes 
that such patriarchal ways are an antiquated social phenomenon 
which has existed and caused damage to the state for centuries, 
destroying the incentive and dynamic of the state organization. 
14 Ibid , p.320 
15 Ch ' . eng, OPe clt., p.23 
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As an example of the p~or managerial style of the bureaucrats, He 
describes the case of a new hotel, well-designed and established in 
Beijing / c.cnamed Xiang Shan. After about a year, a broken wall went 
unrepaired, the carpet became dirty, the cleaning system of the 
toilets was out of order because of poor management. When asked to 
look into the situation, the managers gave a surprising answer that 
the management of the hotel was satisfactory. He Pochuan concludes 
that the fundamental flaw lies with the mentality of ihe people. 
The people in mainland China, said He, have been socialized with 
the "revolutionary tradi tion" , calling for the en4~'l)rance of 
poverty, an attitude of tolerance, and a sense of self-contentment. 
Having such a value system, people have become easily contented 
with their present state rather than seeking for any breakthrough 
or improvement. As a natural result China has lagged behind and 
inefficiency in administration abounds. 
Fourth, He Pochuan points out the poor knowledge level of the 
bureaucracy. According to He, among the managerial cadres, most 
are under junior secondary level, and only about 16% attained 
tertiary education. With such a low standard of education, the 
cadres do not know how to master the newly developed technology, 
nor do they attempt to learn. The result is predictable --- poor 
management with lower technological advancement and production. 
The obvious example 1S the incident of the "the number 2 of 
Bohai. ,,16 In order to consolidate their position, these poorly 
16 I bid , p . 3 5 9; i t is a typical 
malpractice of the Chinese bureaucrats. 
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case to demonstrate the 
educated cadres have tried to employ subordinates with lower 
standards, at the same time reprimanding other people at every 
turn, vindictively attacking others, suppressing democracy, being 
arbitrary and despotic.!7 A survey conducted by the Chinese Youth, 
on the relationship between the cadres and the specialists revealed 
that more than 42.34% of cadres treat the specialists as 
instruments who do not deserve their respect, while 15.26% do not 
trust the specialists. Some cadres (25.5%) feel that the 
specialists 
. 18 
are too dependent and not trustworthy. Unless the 
importance of professional qualification and eXB~rtise 1S 
recogniz~d, the development of China is doomed to failure, 
according to He. 
Bureaucractic Problems and the Institutional Crisis 
The foregoing analysis of He Pochuan has gJ.ven us a clear 
picture of the problems in Chinese bureaucracy. In He's critiques 
of the bureaucrats, he denounces the structural risks of post-Mao 
administration. His analysis deepens our understanding of the 
impending institutional crisis in China. 
Liu Binyan is another of the most prominent intellectuals who 
has unbendingly exposed the problems of Chinese bureaucracy. 
Undoubtedly mainland China's most outstanding exponent of 
reportage literature, Liu Binyan has some keen observations on the 
labyrinth of institutional crisis. Through his writings, he has 
attempted to expose the contradictions and conflicts in mainland 
l: Ibid , pp. 330-336 
13 Ibid , p.335 
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Chinese society, from ,the vantage point of insti tutional crisis. 
LIU BINYAN AND HIS REPORTAGE LITERATURE 
By the early 1950's when Liu began his reportage writings, he 
already understood the real threat that bureaucracy, the 
personali ty cul t, and hidebound thinking posed to the socialist 
cause. 19 The examination of the reportage writings of Liu Binyan 
can enhance our understanding of the institutional crisis in China 
because Liu' s works have revealed many insti tutional problems 
resulting from bureaucratic malpractice. 
The earlier writings of Liu have as a central char~cteristic 
in his exposure of bureaucratism and malpractice in the Party and 
state, though he did not touch on the state structure and system 
directly. Unlike his early writings, his later reportage 
literature has tried not only to evaluate the style of any 
individual cadres but also to have a close inspection on the 
structure itself. In his post-Mao writings, Liu has found the root 
of the problems in the socialist system as the source of the 
institutional crisis. Let us examine the difference between his 
earlier and later work in the following discussion. 
Early Writings - The Attack on the Communist Bureaucracy 
In his early years, Liu wrote journalistic reports to expose 
unhealthy tendencies among Chinese Communist bureaucrats. In 1956, 
he criticized the CPC for its poor work style after the 
establishment of the reg1me. In his "On the Bridge · Construction 
Site", Liu described the wastefulness and inefficiency he witnessed 
19Cheng m.!QQ, (Hong Kong: March 1987), pp.79-81 
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during the construction of a bridge across the Yellow River. The 
waste, according to Liu's investigation, was caused mainly by the 
inefficient administration of the bureaucrats. Argued Liu, "less 
than 60 percent of the machinery was being used. Each year at 
least 30 percent of the IDanpower was wasted due to lack of 
o • • f k ,,20 preparatl.on or poor organl.zatJ.on 0 wor ers. Liu also found 
that individual intiative was completely stifled. One of the 
characters in this reportage, Lo Lizheng, the head of the 
construction brigade, changed from a dynamic youth to a 
conservative leader. Liu describes Lo as enthusi~astic and 
idealistic when he was young. Lo could "shoulder a heavy burden of 
luggage as I day and night, he trudged along the Beijing-Hankow 
railway line. ,,21 Nevertheless, when he was promoted, he became 
excessively conservative and inflexible. He could not recognize 
precise decision, instructions, regulations and systems issued by 
the Bureau. He would not accept other's opinions. Lo began to see 
himself as standing high above the masses, divorcing himself from 
reality and from the masses. Liu argued that a dozen or so years 
in the Party had turned an idealistic revolutionary into a passive, 
unadventurous yes-man. Though Liu did blame explicitly the Party 
structure and system, his condemnation on the bureaucratic acts of 
Lo was a veiled criticism of the system. 
Liu also spent time in recounting the conflict between Lo, the 
20 L i uBi n y an, P e o.~p:-::l..;....e-=-..;....o-:r=--~M=-:o:.-:n~s~t-=e:.-:r~s~,_S=--=e-=l::...:e=-c=--=t-=i:.....::o::...:n~s~o::..:f~-=L~l.=-o u~~B~i.:...:.n~y~a~n:.-.-'~s 
Reportage Literature Vol. 2, (Ta.ipei: Jen Chien Publl.° shl.° n C go. I 
1987), pp.3-43 
21 Ibid , p.26 
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conservative and Cheng Gong, the innovative and dynamic worker. 
According to Liu's description, Cheng did everything according to 
scientific calculations and experience, favored technical 
innovation and demanded that the construction material quotas be 
reduced. 22 It is therefore natural that Cheng and Lo would end in 
a conflict, especially when Cheng is "daring", which to Lo means 
rash, arrogant and irresponsible. Cheng's reward for risking his 
life to save state property is to be transferred off the site. To 
Lo, Cheng' s penal ty 1S justified because of his pride, self-
satisfaction, and insubordination to his superiors. 
that the victory of Lo represents the triumph of conservatism and 
bureaucratism in the Communist Party. It is clear that the hidden 
message of Liu is to expose not only the misconduct of individual 
cadres but more significantly to highlight the fact that the system 
itself deters innovative people from developing good performance 
while safeguarding the position of the conservatives. Liu's 
critiques on bureaucratism are consistent with those of He Pochuan. 
For Liu, Lo represents the common type of bureaucrats; he is 
conservative, indulging in empty talk, sticking to a rigid way of 
thinking, being hidebound by convention, being irresponsible and 
dilatory, vindictively attacking others. 
"Our Paper's Inside Story" also told a similar message that 
bureaucratism and conservative culture In the Party and state 
apparatus have suffocated the creative incentives of dynamic and 
energetic people. The two young reporters in "Our Paper's Inside 
22 Ibid , p.9 
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Story" represents the . journalistic ideal of Liu. To Liu, news 
reporters need to have special quali ties, the most important of 
which is a strong feeling. Liu said, "when they see the dark side 
of things, they should feel angry, and should brace themselves and 
speak out. When they come ~cross a good person, they should be 
enthusiastic and praise them to the skies. ,,23 Liu upholds the idea 
of "Qin Wen", the undifferentiated masses of the people, for whom 
and. to whom the 'scout' or patriotic intellectual must speak. To 
Liu, the news reporters should listen to the voice of the people 
because they act as the social conscience and mou~h of the 
people. 24 The two young reporters in "Our Paper's Inside Story" 
demonstrated their enthusiastic and energetic working attitude, yet 
did not rely on these qualities alone in their work. They also 
tried to find out the reasons behind the news stories. They 
represent what is the ideal news reporter for Liu,the journalist 
whose role ~s that of a social investigator and spokesman of 
popular grievances. However, in the story, Liu showed us that the 
independent journalist's attitude was in conflict with the 
conservative one in the older generation. As expected, the two 
generations of reporters finally came into sharp conflict. 
Consequently, a conservative, arbitrary leadership dominated a 
23 Yeh Chihying and Chou Yusun, "The Locus of Social Change in 
Mainland China as Reflected in the Reportage Literature of Liu 
Binyan", Issues and Studies, (Vol. 25, No. 8, ) 
24Rudolf Wagner, "The Chinese Wri ter in His Own Mirror: Wri ter, 
S tat e and So c i e t y - - - The Lit era ryE vi den c e", Mer 1 eGo 1 d m a n ,e tal . 
(eds), China I s Intellectuals and the State, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), pp.197-220 
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younger generation full of initiative and enthusiasm. This story, 
depi~ts the inevitable and unresolved conflict between these 
dedicate~journalists and the conservative bureaucrats of the CPC. 
Liu envisages th~ old generation as too rigid in its thinking 
and patriarchal in its way ~f dealing wi th its work. The news 
reporters should break through such a rigid and bureaucratic style 
of work. According to Liu, the journalist should become 
independent and gain the trust from the people through honesty and 
courage. Moreover, writers should assume the role of a moral and 
socialist scout of the people. 25 The early wri tings of Liu 
directed his sharp criticism to the bureaucratic practice of the 
Party, its subjectivism, factionalism and dogmatism. Though he did 
not explici tly point out that the crisis has its origin in the 
socialist system, such a message ~s implicit in his reportage 
literature. 
We shall thus turn to analyze Liu's work on the institutional 
crisis in Mao's era, bearing in mind that in his early years Liu 
had a strong faith in Communism. In his reportage literature, he 
ostracized vehemently the malpractice and maladministration of 
bureaucrats but he still held a steadfast trust in the Communist 
system. In other words I his early works reveal a wri ter who, 
despite his attacks on the Party's bureaucratic work style, still 
ardently believed in the ideals of Chinese Communism and the Party 
system. According to Schell, "Liu's heros might struggle against 
shortcomings in the system, but they never struggled against the 
25 Ibid , pp. 215-21 7 
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system itself".26 It is mainly because Liu was unable to imagine 
China without the leadership of the Communist Party at that time. 
To Schell~ Liu has a natural inclination to believe rather than to 
doubt the rule of Communist China. 
Later Writings - The Attack on the Socialist System 
Having experienced the Anti-Rightist Movement and the CuI tural 
Revolution, Liu formulated a question in his mind, 'why can such 
bureaucratic acts emerge in a socialist sys tern? r • His 
confrontation with dreadful and desolate reality in these social 
movements caused Liu to become alert to and conscious of the root 
of the crisis, concluding that it lies within the socialist system 
itself. For such heresy Liu was subjected to rehabilitation, 
after which he resumed the role of a socialist scout. 
In "A Second Kind of Loyalty", Liu claimed that he had exposed 
the Party r s dark side mainly because of his "cri tical loyal ty" . 
Liu is ready to pay a high price, such as his freedom, happiness 
and even his very life, in order that the Party may become better. 
What he tries to do is to correct the malpractice and to realize 
his faith in socialism. According to Schell, "in spi te of the 
travails that were to follow in his life, Liu never completely lost 
either his faith or his desire, first seen in these early works of 
his, to believe ~n the basic goodness of the Revolution and the 
Party. ,,27 In his later work however, we can see that Liu himself 
260rville Schell, Discos and Democracy, (London: Anchor Books, 
Doubleday, 1988), p.144 
2: Ibid , p.145 
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has begun to criticiz~ the system and pointed out the structural 
risks it posed to the people. We can detect in Liu' s work an 
intensifl~d sense of crisis and deepening criticisms of the system. 
It seems that Liu has changed his earlier view that the socialist 
system is essentially good, ~rompting Liu to direct his evaluation 
to the Communist rule. Liu found himself in an unresolved dilemma 
when he encountered two sets of truth in socialist China. Having 
been sent down to the villages, Liu was directly exposed to the 
grievances of the peasants. The actuality shocked Liu immensely, 
all that he saw was vastly different from the officia~ .- reports. 
Liu asked pertinently whom should he believe when he was confronted 
with two truths. Said Liu I " ••• a struggle began to rage deep 
inside his mind. How can two opposing truth coexist ln the world? 
The longings of the peasants were one truth, and the policies of 
the higher-ups and the propaganda ln the newspaper were qui te 
another. Which should I follow?,,28 From this time onward, Liu 
decided to follow the interests and demands of the people. 
Having endured so much suffering and persecution, Liu 
conceded that "there was no way back." He was determined to speak 
out against political injustice. Being a journalist, he still 
insisted that literature is a mirror. He reminded the delegates at 
the Fourth National Congress of Literary and Art Workers organized 
in 1979 at Beijing that "when the mirror shows us things in life 
that are not very pretty or fall short of our ideals, it is wrong 
to blame the mirror." Instead, "we should root out and destroy 
~ Q f.VIbid, p.147 
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those condi tions that disappoint us. ,,29 Making up his mind, Liu 
began his investigation of the malpractice among the Communist 
,' . :" 
cadres and the crisis arising from the institution. 
In "People or Mon'sters", Liu reveals how a single Party-branch 
secretary came to power in Bin County and fashioned an illegal 
empire through influence, bribery, and corruption. The character 
Wang Shouxin rode roughshod over the people. Wang, who had started 
off as a low-ranking cashier in a fuel company, had been promoted 
during the Cultural Revolution to be the company's manager. After 
.;:- .-
that, Wang became the Party branch secretary and then the deputy 
chairman of Bin County Commercial Revolutionary Committee. From 
then on, Wang became involved in illegal exchanges of goods and 
favours with superior officials up to provincial level. To Liu, it 
was one of the most notorious corruption cases of its time, with 
over 500,000 yuan changing hands. In the end, ten people were 
arrested, all of them members of the Communist Party. As Liu wrote 
in "People or Monsters", "Party cadres themselves gradually became 
transformed into parasi tes who devoured the people's flesh and 
blood and who blighted the socialist system like an infestation of 
cankerworms. ,,30 This reportage shocked the readers in general not 
only because of the serious crime of corruption discovered in Bin 
County, but also because of his revelation that such activities 
were practised for years, wi thout anyone ~n the Party paying 
attention to them. Liu boldly claimed that the Party had regulated 
29 Ibid, p. 149 
30 Ibid , p. 150 
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and intervened ln every aspect of life, including military 
conscription, family planning, criminal sentences, and sowing 
: .. .... 
plans. It should be noted that hardly any mention is made of the 
problems of the Party ,itself. In Liu's words, "the Communist Party 
regulated everything, but it would not regulate the Communist 
Party. ,,31 After closing the case of Wang Shouxin, Liu wonders how 
many of the social condi tions that gave rise to this case have 
really changed, concluding that the corruption of Wang is not an 
isolated case. This case reveals the fact that the socialist 
system has its internal weaknesses and flaws, allowing for the 
possibili ty that many si tuations similar to that of Wang might 
exist in China. Liu questions why the ideal socialist state has 
allowed such malpractice to exist for years. 
The Social Conscience of Intellectuals 
After the publication of "People or Monsters", Liu received 
many letters asking for help in investigation of maladministration 
in other regions. In an interview, Liu said that "sackfuls of 
letters began to pour into his office at the People's Daily and 
into his home. Most detailed similar cases of corruption elsewhere 
in China that the supplicants desperately hoped Liu, 'the good 
official', would help rectify wi th the power of his pen." Liu 
continued, "often they [the letters] are about the dark side and 
negative things. ,,32 One reader wrote to Liu and said, "I read your 
'People or Monsters' to the fourteen workers on our shift wi th 
31 1bid , p.150 
32 Ibid , p.151 
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feelings of enormous excitment. Among them were women who were 
exhausted and should have been resting. But not one of them got up 
and left 'during the entire three-hour reading .. In fact, they 
called other people ~o come over and join us. That is how much 
they wanted to listen". This reader not only described the 
enthusiastic responses from the listeners but also expressed the 
hope "that our comrade Liu Binyan will continue to speak the truth 
on our behalf. We do not wish to hear any more lies and 
deception. ,,33 
A~ter receiving the warm support and care from the people, Liu 
replied that "for me the message from this experience was that what 
I was doing was needed by the Party and the people. ,,34 Therefore, 
Liu was determined to speak out for the people, to act as the 
conscience of society, to answer the people's questions. Amidst an 
age of general disillusionment, Liu stressed the urgency to 
supervise the Communist system, saying, "without the supervision of 
the people, a good person will turn bad and an honest official will 
turn corrupt ... 35 Based upon Liu' s comments, we can conclude that 
Liu discovered the root of the problems to be the feudal, 
patriarchal style of leadership, characteristic of the 
authoritarian rule of Communist China and that a sense of 
institutional crisis existed also within the general pUblic. 
Critical Loyalty and Sense of Mission 
33 Ibid , p.152 




· Having internaliz .ed his role as the social conscience, Liu 
criticizes the rule of Communism with his critically loyal 
attitude~· · ·· In itA Second Kind of Loyalty", Liu has suggested three 
kinds of loyalty. The first kind of loyalty requires that people 
should be diligent and consci~ntious, work hard without complaint, 
taking orders obediently and never disagreeing with the superiors 
just like the glorious model set forth by the Communist Party in 
the . case of Lei Feng. The second kind of loyalty is typified by Ni 
Yuxian and Chen Shizhong in "A Second Kind of Loyalty". They even 
risked their lives to speak out for people, to expose the Party's 
dark side. Both Ni and Chen were ready to pay a high price, 
including their own freedom, happiness and even life for correcting 
the faul ts of the CPC. Liu realized that this second kind of 
loyalty, critical loyalty, 1S opposed by the CPC. It 1S 
nevertheless significant to note that Liu put emphasis on the 
second kind of loyalty. The third kind of loyalty, argued Liu, 
requires that people should flatter and heap praises on the Party. 
In the mind of Liu, the CPC only accepts the first and third kind 
of 'loyalty but abandons the second kind. 
In itA Second Kind of Loyalty", both Chen and Ni had 
consistently admonished the Party's Central Committee at the risk 
of their lives for more than 20 years. 
Party intellectual. After his return 
Chen was an ordinary non-
to China from studying 
mechnical engineering 1n the Soviet Union, he became so 
disillusioned with what he encountered in his country. Chen wrote 
to Mao and requested that he' quickly rectify his previous mistakes. 
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Chen also asked Mao to change the domestic and foreign policies. 
By doing so, Chen broke the taboo against criticizing the Chinese 
Communis~~' foreign policy.36 A second letter of this kind earned 
Chen a jail sentence as a counter-revolutionary. Chen deeply 
believed that his move to offer Mao such advice was motivated by 
his devotion to Chairman Mao and to the Party. His deep regard for 
the Party and his patriotism induced him to give frank expression 
to his political opinions. After his jail term, Chen never changed 
his attitude, continuing to criticize Lei Feng's first kind of 
loyalty. He called upon Mao to reconsider the so-call'"ed "anti-
Party acts" as the most genuine expressions of love for the 
Party.37 What appealed to Liu was not just Chen' s willingness to 
point up Party errors wi thout regard to personal risks but "his 
concern with the integrity of the Party itself, whose leading role 
he was cri ticizing. ,,38 Perhaps Liu saw Ch en as a man like himself, 
having a second kind of loyalty. 
Another protagonist is Ni Yuxian, a PLA soldier, who not only 
dared to question the disastrous leftist agricultural policies of 
the Party in 1950's and 1960's but also risked writing to Mao. The 
more he read selected works of Marx, Lenin, Engels, Stalin and Mao, 
the more he began to realize that the Marxism in the books was not 
36 Ni YUhsien, "The Shock of 'The Second Kind of Loyal ty' 
The Inside Story of Liu Binyan' s Suppression", China Spring, (New 
York: April, 1986), p.23 and Liu Binyan, Liu Binyan, His Favorite 
Works, (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenlian Press, 1988), pp.113-127 
J7 Liu Binyan, Ibid 
JaOrville Schell, OPe cit., p.156 
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consistent with the real practice in mainland China. The natural 
disasters and economic failure in the 50's and 60's had aroused 
, .... ~ , '" 
He finally concluded that the fault was related to Ni's concern. 
the extreme leftist. agricul tural policies wi th their high 
production quotas, excessive crop regulations and over-
collectivization which turned a prosperous farming area into a 
wilderness of starvation. As a result, people's incentive to work 
was . destroyed and agricultural and industrial production 
plummeted. 39 According to the State Statistics Bureau, the three 
years . of 1958, 1959 and 1960, . drought affected 24%, 31.% and 43% 
respectively of mainland China's arable land. 40 This brought 
agriculture to the brink of collapse. In order to conceal the real 
state of affairs from their superiors, rural cadres resorted to 
reporting inflated production figures. 41 Ni mentioned similar 
figures in the case of his studies. In the Cultural Revolution, 
the fanatical move of the Gang of Four, a full-scale movement to 
cleanse class ranks swept through mainland China. To Ni, this kind 
of movement was not compatible with the ideas of Lenin and Marx, 
works with which he was familiar. Thereafter, Ni eventually stood 
on the side of the people who were being persecuted. He even wrote 
a 100,000-word letter to the Party's Central Committee and Chairman 
Mao urging them to correct their erroneous policies and save the 
39·· . L1U B1nyan, OPe c1t., pp.127-137 
40State Statistics Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China, (HR: 
Economic Information and Agency, 1981), p.18 
41Wei Wou, A Discussion 'of Communist China's Economy, (Taipei: 
Central Publication Supply Co., 1984), p.110 
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country from danger. However, the critical loyalty of Ni did not 
appeal to the Party. 
In 'this piece of work, Liu describes more than two young 
protagonists who suffered because of the first kind and third kind 
of loyalty. To Liu, the loyal ty of Lei Feng has serious, even 
fatal defects because he only knows how to follow orders from above 
and he does not know how to make decisions on his own that would 
enable him to resist the mistakes of the authorities. The second 
kind of loyalty as demonstrated by both Ch en and Ni is scientific, 
correct and cri tical enough to help the leaders to have bet ter 
administration. The second kind of loyalty, said Liu, is not very 
popular, 'and you may have to pay for it with your freedom, your 
happiness, or even your life. 42 
The Institutional Crisis and the Legitimation Crisis 
In essence, Liu has attempted not only to grapple with the 
idea of insti tutional crisis in China, but also to implici tly 
declare an open criticism on all Party mistakes and leaders, not 
just the dead Mao and his policies. The scope of Liu's later work, 
unlike the earlier work, calls attention to the fundamental flaws 
and weaknesses of the socialist system. Thus Liu urges a critical 
loyalty rather than blind obedience to the Party. 
Public Reactions to Liu's Works 
After publishing the "Second Kind of Loyalty", Liu received 
both praises and attacks. The Guangxi Daily spoke reverently about 
the way Chen's loyalty was "characterized by independent thinking, 
42· .. L1U Blnyan, op. clt., p.156 
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a sense of social responsibility, and a sense of the responsibility 
of the individual to society and history. ,,43 The article went on, 
"as we re~form our political system, build a democratic society, and 
create a harmonious social atmosphere, we must not ignore or 
abandon the concept of a 'second kind of loyal ty' . ,,44 The Party's 
liberal reform-minded Vice-Premier Wan Li also praised such a kind 
of loyalty. Speaking at the National Symposium of Soft Science 
Research J.n the summer 1986, Wan Li said that "the reforms 
currently under way J.n China required not only the first kind of 
loyal ty epi tomized by Lei Feng, but also the 'SeCOIlQ kind of 
loyal ty' - demonstrated by Ch en Shizhong. ,,45 Having received such 
comments, Liu became more confident to speak out for the people. 
With a strong sense of mission, Liu boldly proclaims that critical 
loyalty to the Party and state does more good than harm. For Liu, 
it is a wonderful means to help the Party see its mistakes while 
there is room for improvement. Liu also enourages people "to take 
a look, let everyone get a li ttle nervous, get a li ttle more 
active, and have a li ttle more sense of urgency,,46 to point out the 
impending crisis of the state. The reason behind Liu's move is to 
correct the stubborn tradi tion of the Communist state which 1S 
fearful of admitting difficulties. In Liu's eyes, such fears are 
unhealthy. Through a critical discourse and comments to the state 
°Schell, OPe cit., p.159 
44 Ibid , 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid , p.160 
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administration, Liu hopes to help the Party correct its mistakes. 
It is in this way that Liu has hit officialdom's tenderest nerve. 
Al fh'ough Liu himself has not explici tly attacked the socialist 
system, the above examination of his works indicate clearly that 
Liu really touched on the structural crisis in socialist China. 
Liu, after the June-Fourth Incident, declared that the leadership 
of the CPC would collapse wi thin two years. It reflects his 
decline of faith in the present regime. Liu Binyan also boldly 
declared the socialist experiment in China had failed because the 
persistent poverty of the people and their helplessnes~ ~ vis-a-vis 
bureaucratic power had been reportedly shown.. Liu doubts why these 
conditions can be allowed in socialism. After a deeper inspection, 
Liu has begun to find the root in the feudal-fascist dictatorial 
rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Like Liu Binyan, Wang Ruowang is a writer who has a similar 
capacity for outrage at injustice. By the mid-eighties an 
expression, "Nanwang Beiliu" was used to associate two socialist 
scouts, Liu Binyan in the north andWang Ruowang in the south.47 
Through investigations, interviews, examination of evidence, and 
reports of his findings,Wang boldly reports the cases of 
injustice. He has vigorously opposed both the subordination of 
li terature to poli tics and the use of art for poli tical ends. 
Unlike Liu's keen sense and loyal attitude to Marxist ideology, 
Wang's sense of outrage over injustice ultimately overpowered his 
47Schell, OPe cit., p.162 
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Marxist convictions, , leaving him a far less obedient Party 
member. 48 Wang not only attacks the bureaucracy, but also seeks 
for the i 'estoration of capitalism. Wang argued that "over the past 
few decades we have h~d one political mass movement after another. 
The goal of these movements w~s always to criticize capitalism. We 
have run capitalist theory right into the ground." Wang concedes 
that the Chinese people should learn the meri ts in Capi talism 
rather than adopting the orthodox socialism. 49 The foregoing 
discussion has demonstrated how deep the argument of Wang is. His 
critique openly touches on the taboo by ' directly attacking the 
socialist system. 
The insti tutional crisis percei ved and experienced by the 
intellectuals and the people has already precipitated the crisis of 
legitimation. A general loss of faith in Communism has appeared. 
The next logical step is to extend the crisis to the question of 
the ideal notion of socialism itself. The discrepancy between the 
socialist ideal and the actual turmoils as directly experienced by 
them have forced the intellectuals to face the ideological 
retrogression, creating for them an identity crisis for they can no 
longer identify with Communism. In the next chapter, we are going 
to discuss the identity crisis in post-Mao China. 
48 Ibid , p.163 
49 Ibid 
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Chapter .Four. On Identity Crisis 
The 1986-87 campaign against bourgeois liberalism was sparked 
off by the maSSl.ve student demonstrations throughout China l.n 
December 1986. Political ,reform and demands for democracy 
constituted the central theme of the demonstrations. Some 
intellectuals, most notably the physicist Fang Lizhi, argued that 
the ,problem lay l.n a combination of China' s Marxist~Leninist 
ideology and its feudal political traditions. Marxism, to Fang, l.S 
an empty dogma, at least in the form in which it was promu~gated by 
party officials. Fang denounced the praxis of Communism. Fang 
conceived that democratization of the government and respect of 
human rights are important to the further development of China. 1 
Advocacy for democracy and protection of human rights is far 
from a newly aroused agenda in contemporary Chinese society. In 
the late 70's, Wei Jingsheng demanded freedom, democracy and human 
rights, arguing that human rights were basic demands of all human 
beings. 2 The intellectuals Wang Ruoshui and Zhou Yang, questioned 
the ' praxis of Communism for they believed alienation still exists 
in socialism. Wang identified the nature of alienation in 
socialism and sought the emancipation of mind and respect for human 
rights. Most intellectuals in post-Mao China have stressed the 
IFang Lizhi, Selected Speeches and Wri tings by Fang Lizhi, 
(Singapore: World Scentific ' .Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 1989), pp. 
15-22 
2Chang Chenpang, ItDemocracy and Human Righ ts The Fi f th 
Hodernization lt , Issues and Studies, (Taipei: May 1979), p.3 
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importance of democra~y and human rights. Pondering the present 
predicaments of China, these intellectuals have determined that the 
central problem is to correct the authoritarian and autocratic rule 
by the Communist state. Further, the intellectuals question the 
very meaning of Communism. It is in this context that the 
intellectuals have felt the value vacuum and an identity crisis has 
emerged in post-Mao China. 
In this study, we refer indenti ty crisis to the crisis of 
faith and trust of official ideology. No longer do the 
intellectuals identify with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. I "t ~s clear 
-' 
that they have attempted to find a new identity for ensuring their 
existence. Thus, they seek democracy and uphold the value of human 
right in order to encertain the value of individuality. 
VALUE VACUUM AND IDENTITY CRISIS 
Having endured experiences in the Cultural Revolution, most 
intellectuals have begun to question the ideal of Communism, in 
which the Communist state of China has been characterized by its 
ideological politics. 3 The credibility of the offical ideology has 
become the object of derision. Paul Sweezy identified a "Crisis in 
Marxism", saying that the people in post-Mao China have even lost 
I 
their faith in Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. q 
Confronting the disintegration of the offical ideology, the 
intellectuals have suffered from a "spiritual crisis" for they had 
3Ambrose King, The Development and Dilemmas of Chinese 
Democracy, (Taipei: Shi Bao Cultural Press, 1984), p.162 
4Ibid , pp.168-169 
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identified faithfully with Communism. In the past decades, these 
intellectuals had hopes 1n Communism for they believed the 
:... ~ ... 
socialist regime could help them transform and strengthen China. 
It was for that reason that the intellectuals had identified with 
the Communist ideals. Be~ng attacked in the earlier anti-
intellectual mdvements like the Anti-Rightists Movement and the 
Cultural Revolution, ·the intellectuals discovered the darkness of 
the Communist rule. Then, the intellectuals became conscious of 
their identity crisis because of the spiritual vacuum resulting 
from the ideological decay. They have directed their attention not 
to rethinking Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, but to 
pouring their energies into mapping out the future of China through 
the establishment of democratic government and cultivation of a 
sense of respect for human dignity. To those intellectuals then, 
the fundamental overwhelming tidings of crisis and catastrophe 
signal the "identity crisis" of the Chinese people derived from 
ideological retrogression in post-Mao China. 5 
In the remainder of this chapter, we are going to discuss the 
identity crisis as experienced by the intellectuals in post-Mao 
China, especially highlighting the following prominent 
intellectuals who have struggled for democracy and protection of 
human rights: Wei Jingsheng, Wang Ruoshui, and Fang Lizhi. Through 
an in-depth examination of their ideas, we hope to understand the 
identity crisis as experienced by the Chinese people. 
5Richard Madsen, "The Spiri tual Crisis of China's 
Intellectuals", Deborah Davls & Ezra F. Vogel (eds), Chinese Society 
on the Eve of Tiananmen, (London: Harvard University JPress, 1990) 
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WEI JINGSHENG AND HIS ADVOCACY OF DEMOCRACY 
In the early post-Mao China, Wei Jingsheng pointed out the 
..... .. .... 
deprivation of human right and the autocratic rule of the CPC. He 
advocated the fifth modernization --- the democratization of the 
government, and condemned the · dictatorial rule. 
The Fifth Modernization 
Wei Jingsheng, the edi tor-in-chief of Exploration, having 
faced the horrors of the Cultural Revolution, denounced the 
dictatorial Communist state and suggested "Democracy and Human 
Rights--- The Fifth Modernization". 6 Wei not only exposed the 
dark side of Chinese Communist rule but also op~nly opposed the 
kind of dictatorial rule of Mao Zedong. He demanded that people 
should have full rights to enjoy freedom and democracy. In his 
arti cl e en ti tl ed "Human Righ ts , Equal i ty and Democracy --- More 
About the Fifth Modernization" Wei asked, "what are human rights, 
equality and democracy?" He continued, 
, 
Human rights are the rights of all human beings. A 
person's birthright is the right to live and the right to 
seek better living standards. For the right to live, 
everyone should have the right to engage in political 
activities. In other words, he should have the basic 
poli tical rights to speak, hold meetings, form 
associations, publish, believe in whatever religion he 
prefers, move from one place to another, and strike for 
better conditions. In order to protect the basic 
political rights of every human being, the democratic 
system, a social system in which thf people are masters 
of the nation, must be established. 
cXie Dinghua (eds), The Implications of Wei Jingsheng, (HK: 




Wei contended that the mask of the Communist Party's 
monolithic rule and monopolistically dominating mode of authority 
suffocat~~ the development of democracy.8 Wei stated that the so-
called dictatorship . of the proletariat was incompatible with 
democracy. He went on to say that "if we don't want to be further 
enslaved, if we want our living standards to lmprove ln accordance 
with the progress of modernization, we must first have democratic 
politics --- a prerequisite in the struggle for all other rights; 
we must reform our political system and practice real democracy 
If this prerequisite is not obtained, all other problems that 
have to be dealt with will never be solved.,,9 Wei concluded that 
the basic flaw lay with the dictatorial system practiced by the 
Chinese Communists which obstructed the concomitant development of 
China in every direction. 
In another article, "Democracy or New Dictatorship" I Wei 
stated that the fundamental fault had to do with Mao Zedong's 
proletarian dictatorship; and Wei not only rejected this kind of 
authority but also urged the abolition of the dictatorship and a 
search for a system of checks and balances of the leadership by the 
people. Like Lord Acton, Wei understood that "power tends to 
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely", and he decided he 
must make the effort to reveal the central problem arlslng from 
communist rule and to put up the agenda of democracy and protection 
of human rights. 
8Ibid , p. 50 
9Ibid , pp.59-60 
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Unlike other democrats in his time, Wei advocated a somewhat 
a western kind of democracy in the Chinese society. In Andrew 
Nathan t s ' :Words, "Wei Jingsheng t s [notion of democracy] was the only 
extended statement of a position close to the liberal Western 
• . tt 1 0 
ma1nstream - since Wei highlighted the fundamental sense of the 
"human essence", human rights. In the tradition of China, there 
has never been a notion of "individual human right"ll since the 
Chinese have long regarded the rights of individuals to be 
subordinate to the collective rights. Not only has the traditional 
Chinese society upheld such a notion, but also the Comrn~nist rule 
has also adopted such a stance. · 
While the Western liberal tradition recogn1zes that the 
individual possesses certain . fundamental, inalienable rights by 
virtue of the simple fact that he lS a member of mankind, for 
Marxist-Leninists there is no place for individuals. Echoed Louis 
Henkin, "to Marxists, in building socialism, individualism is an 
obstacle to be overcome. Freedom as commonly understood 1n 
bourgeois societies is negative, destructive, Man can achieve 
true freedom only in communi ty. ,,12 In keeping wlth this line of 
reasoning, human rights have been neglected in China. For instance, 
the rights listed in Article 51 in the 1982 Constitution include 
lOAndrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy, {Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985}, p.104 
l1Andrew Nathan, op.cit., pp.104-106 and 
12R.Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin, and Andrew J.Nathan, Human 
Riohts in Contemporary China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), p.23 
100 
the idea that "the .citizens of the People's Republic, when 
exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the 
: .. .. .. , 
interests of the state, of society, or of the collective".!) In 
such a context, it 1S therefore natural to propound that 
individuals are expected to make all kinds of sacrifices, including 
the sacrifice of their rights, to serve the interests of the 
socialist state. 
The Attack on Dictatorial Rule 
In response to such a notion of human rights and his own 
experience in authoritarian and autocratic rule by the ~~ommunist 
State, Wei openly condemned · the dictators. Wei wrote, 
Autocratic rulers have invariably taught people that 
since men are social beings, social interests ·should 
predominate; that since social interests are common to 
all people, centralized management or administration is 
necessary; that since rule by a minority, or even by a 
single pers~r' is most centralized, autocracy is the most 
ideal form. 
This was the very notion held by the authorities and by most 
of the democrats in China, for they feared that liberalization and 
democratization of politics would concomitantly result in chaos and 
cause impending crisis to the regime. IS The more 'liberal' ideas 
of Wei Jingsheng on human rights were too isolated from the central 
tradition of Chinese democratic thought to get much support in the 
earlier post-Mao era. Wei's notion of democracy in which all men 
UChang King yuh, "Human Rights in China and Its International 
I m pI i cat ion s ", I s sue s & Stud i e s, ( Ta i pe i: M arc h 1 9 8 8) I p. 27 ' 
14Andrew Nathan, op.cit., p.104 
1 :; • . ~ . 
·"Ib1d, pp.87-106 
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have an equal political right to fight for the rights of [material 
and cultural] existence was not consistent with the strong Chinese 
: . ... .... 
thinking. 16 Some democrats even tradition of natural-rights 
rejected Wei's theories and criticized them as "opposed to Marxism 
and in vi 0 I a t ion 0 f 0 u ~ con s ,t i tu t ion" , 17 since most democrats in 
the time of Wei still believed the individual rights should be 
sacrified to those of the collective. Nathan has said that "Wei 
was ·admired by many in China for his courage but by few for what he 
said. ,,18 The demonstrations for democracy and advocacy of human 
rights . were finally accused of inci ting "anarchism an"d extreme 
individualism" and fomenting a "new rebellion" in the earlier 80's. 
Though Wei was prosecuted and imprisoned, his call for democracy 
and urge for protecting human rights have far-reaching significance 
not only in inspiring the later democrats but also in laying the 
foundation for future movements for democracy. Wei's advocacy for 
democracy also hides the fact that both the intellectuals and 
ordinary people have suffered from an identity crisis which is 
basically related to ideological retrogression. They have 
confronted the identi ty crisis as they begin to loosen their 
affiliation with the orthodox Marxist and socialist ideas. 
16 b· d I 1 , p.l05 and Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990) , p.174 
17 Ibid , p.106 
18 Ibid 
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WANG RUOSHUI AND HIS IDEA OF EMANCIPATION 
Having experienced the Cultural Revolution, Wang Ruoshui 
, ~ .. ... 
promised by the discovered the myth of emancipation of man as 
socialist ideal. Wang found that many people were alienated 
because of the dictatorial , leadership of the CPC. He openly 
declared alienation under socialism, and sought for the 
intellectual emancipation and the emancipation of man. 
Socialist Alienation 
In a similar veln, Wang Ruoshui sharply criticized the 
superstition toward Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Wang 
propounded the "emancipation-of-the-mind" movement to liberate 
people from excessive and extra-ordinary control by official 
ideology. Like Weir Wang also confronted the cold reality of the 
identity crisis, embarking upon the "emancipation-of-the-mind" 
movement which aimed at reexamining the truth of Mao Zedong Thought 
and of Marxism-Leninism by their success or failure in practice so 
that their true colors could be revealed. 19 In the first phase of 
the cri ticize-Mao campaign, practical cri teria were employed ln 
evaluating Mao's thought and Marxism-Leninism were regarded as the 
"product of the ordained, self-evident, close, mystical and 
. . ')(\ 
splrl tual. ",-,. In the preceding decades, the people in the mainland 
had treated the official ideology as infallible truths. In Chiang 
19Deng Xiaoping, "Report on the Current Situation and Tasks", 
Zheng Ming (No.29 March 1,1980). 
20Chiang Hsinli, "Aliena,tion and the' Emancipation-of-the-mind' 
Movement in Communist China" I Issues and Studies I (Taipei: March 
1981), p.23 
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Hsinli's words, people 1n mainland China treated the official 
ideology as an institution of modern superstition. The 
: ... -... 
catastrophes and crises in the past decades taught people in the 
mainland an unforgettable lesson. The "emancipation-of-the-mind" 
campaign was launched initially to subtly attack the dictatorial 
rule and obliquely question the validity of the ideology. Clearly 
then, the gravi ty of the identi ty crisis 1S its negation of 
Communism which requires a maSS1ve adjustment in the ideological, 
political and economic sectors. 
Wang Ruoshui pointed out sharply the existence of alienation 
in socialist China. The three alienations enunciated 1n his 
article "Talks on the Problems of Alienation" were ideological, 
political and economic. Though Marx conceived the Communist system 
as a society devoid of exploitation and alienation, Wang rejected 
this by pointing to the fact that alienation had not been 
eliminated in socialist society. In Wang' s view all types of 
alienation were a slgn of alienation in ideology. His view of 
dogmatism as alienated ideology was strongly developed 1n the 
celebrated "Discussing the Alienation Question". Wang illustrated 
alienation with a parable of a mother and her renegade son. After 
growing up, the son will not accept the mother's supervision, but 
instead exercises control over his mother as his adversary. 
Consequenctly, the mother treats the son not as a son but as an 
alien element. 21 Through this parable, Wang illustrated the 
'1 
"-Wang Ruoshui, "On the Human Nature and the social Relations" 
The Crisis and the Reform', (New Enlightenment Series 2, Wuna~ 
Educational Press, 1988), pp.1-21. 
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existence of alienation in every sector of Chinese life. 
Intellectual Emancipation 
.' .. ... 
In his article "Marxism and Intellectual Emancipation", Wang 
intended to resist the re-imposition of dogmatic limits on Marxist 
interpretation. To Wang, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought 
were no longer infallible; but they should be subject to 
reformulation and correction. Expressing his idea of intellectual 
emanicipation, Wang wrote, 
Marxism must constantly be supplemented, revised, 
developed through testing practice; as soon as it comes 
to a stop, its life is over; it will be Marxism--o--no longer 
-but dogmatism. Not only is dogma not Marxism, it is the 
antithesis of Marxism. Originally, Marxism was 
intellectually emancipated, but in its developmental 
process it was susceptible to dogmatization at the hands 
of ~ome22 people... this 1.S the "aliena tion" of 
MarXlsm. 
Su Shaozhi also argued that the theories that advanced the 
notion of Marxism I s obsolescence were Ita punishment for having 
treated Marxism ln a dogmatic fashion... Only by creatively 
developing Marxism can we truly uphold it. ,,23 In alluding to the 
futility of a dogmatic reassertion of Marxism, Su challenged the 
Chinese Marxists to address the vital theoretical problems 
confronting Marxism. 24 Andrew Nathan also argues in the same line 
22David Kelly, "The Emergence of Humanism: Wang Ruoshui and the 
Critique of Socialist Alienation", Merle Goldman, et al., (eds), 
China's Intellectuals and the State, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), p.166 
23Stuart R. Schram, "Economic in Command? Ideology and Policy 
since the Third Plenum, 1978-1984", China Quarterly, (No.99 Sep. 
1984), pp. 417-461 
24 Jbid , p.435 
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that the contemporary intellectuals ln post-Mao China have 
reconsidered the theory of Marxism. Besides, they adhere to a more 
flexible interpretation of Marxism to justify their advocacy for 
reforms. 25 Thus, the · intellectuals have treated ideology as a tool 
rather than as unchallengeable truth. 
Economic Alienation 
This line of reasoning was not put down as mere assertions 
because Wang examlne ln detail the concomi tant poli tical and 
economic alienation, what he termed new socialist alienations. 
Wang . first attacked the cult of personality, criticizing Mao by 
pointing out that the personality cult was dogmatism at its apogee. 
Wang thought that Chairman Mao should obey the Party like anyone 
else; however history indicated Mao was over the state apparatus 
and party organization. Because Mao was above all people, he 
dissociated himself from the people and eventually became a god. 
Argued Wang, there was an extensively publicized idea in a Cultural 
Revolutionary slogan, "we should think the thoughts of Chairman 
Mao, do everything for Chairman Mao, obey all that Chairman Mao 
says, and forever follow Chairman Mao". 26 Once the personality 
cult was developed, it was out of the control of the people. Thus, 
we conclude that political bureaucracy and feudalism emerged 
because the dictatorship of the proletariat was transformed into a 
Party dictatorship through the process of alienation; socialist 
'l::; 
t."'Nathan, op. cit., pp.178-189 
" , 
LCWang Ruoshui, "Talks ' on the Problem of Alienation", New China 
l1onthlY, (digested edition, October, 1980) 
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democracy became socialist fascism; the people's servants bec ame 
the people's masters. As a result, in Wang's words, "the servant 
of the ~~ople becomes a venerable sir, lording over the people. 
This l.S like a mother who patiently raises a son against the 
insecurity of old age and regrettably the son becomes 
irresponsible." It is by following this line of reasonl.ng that 
Wang proclaimed the political alienation. 
The utopian ideal of socialism holds the proml.se of "kingdom 
of freedom", with socialism's abolition of private ownership and 
the problems of exploitation. To Wang, this notion was only an 
-
assertion without any substance. Wang criticized economl.C 
alienation in Communist China, argulng that alienation stemmed from 
neglect of objective economic rules. In the same vein, Zhou Yang 
maintained, "there can still be alienation, because man may still 
have imperfect knowledge of the laws of social development". 27 
Wang listed some typical examples to demonstrate the neglect of 
economic rules such as the excessive encouragement of the Communist 
wind, the Great Leap Forward, all-out efforts to build up Dazhai 
and Daqing, the project to divert water from the west to the east, 
et c . 28 In a similar line of reasoning, Zhou Yang indicated that 
under socialism there was evidence of alienated "human effort 
rebounding out of control, in the forms of bureaucratic bungles, 
environmental spoilage, and massive waste". 29 Zhou believed that 
27David Kelly, "Wang Ruoshui and Socialist Alienation", p .168 
"I" "~Wang Ruoshui, "Talks on the Problem of Alienation" . 
.. ,. 
i ~David Kelly, op.cit., p.168 
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the fault lay with particular misapplications of theory, abuses, 
aberrations, or the results of ignorance rather than the fault of 
the socialist system. Neither did Wang challenge the socialist 
system, he aimed only at stopping dictatorial rule. Therefore, 
Wang had to pin his hope on modification and perfection of the 
socialist system. The foregoing analysis shows us there were slgns 
of alienation in all sectors of Chinese commun1sm. The 
"emancipation-of-the-mind" movement had as a primary objective to 
overcome three decades of alienation between Communism and the 
pe'ople. 
Humanism and Emancipation of Man 
Pondering the solution to alienation, Wang made two maJor 
theoretical statements on humanism: "Man is the Point of Departure 
of Marxism" and "A Defense of Humanism", 30 arguing that historical 
materialism does not overturn "man". Wrote Wang, "Marx often used 
the expreSS10n 'human value I 1n an approving sense, and it is 
certainly not exclusively bourgeois jargon". 31 Wang argued 
obliquely that the sense of humanism was not the same as 
individualism, saY1ng "To approve of 'the value of man' lS not 
equivalent to approving of 'individualism', just as affirming that 
'it 1S man who 1S the most precious' 1S not an affirmation of 
30"Ren shi Makesizhuyide chufadian", RRW, kp. 48. First 
appeared as ti tIe essay of RSMC_; tr. in BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, (21 March, 1984); "Wei ren daoshyi bianhu", Wenhui bao, 
(17 January, 1983), p.3 
3 , 
, , 
.I-"A Defence of Humanism", Chinese Studies 1n Philosophy, 
Spring, 1985), p.71. 
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(XVI: 
individualism. ,,32 Thus, Wang attempted to grapple with the "value 
of man", a theme common to humanism in all its manifestations . 
In "Defence 
.' - ., 
of Humanism", Wang made four concrete demands 
which translated the . value of man into political terms. The first 
was to urge the abandonment of dictatorship ln favor of the 
equali ty of every person before the truth and the law and the 
sanctity of personal freedom and dignity; second, to oppose feudal 
ranks and concepts of privilege, demanding that people genuinely be 
seen as people; third, to recognize man as the goal not only of 
socialist production but of all work; fourth, to stress: the human 
elements in socialist construction. 33 Echoing the Marxist view of 
human essence, Wang believed that the Communist society was a 
social formation whose basic principle was the complete and free 
development of the individual. He argued that "Marx from start to 
finish uni ted the proletarian revolution and communlsm together 
with the question of man's value, dignity, liberation, and 
freedom" .34 Wang advocated socialist humanism as the only means 
of achieving the real emancipation of man. 
Wang's advocacy of human value agreed with the view of Ju Hsin 
who suggested that "a man whose value lies in himself has supreme 
purpose in himself". 35 Ju' s cri ticism of Maoist Harxism-Leninism 
32 Ibid , p.75 
33David Kelly, op.cit., p.170 
34"A Defence of Humanism", Chinese Studies ln Philosophy, 
P.S5. 
1" ';~Ju Hs in, "You thful Hege I' s Though t on Labor and Al i ena t ion" I 
St_~~of PhilosoQhy, (August, 1978) 
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for its lack of humanism had a tremendous impact on the developme n t 
of the "emancipation-of-the-mind" movement in the early 80's. 
The ·'foregoing analysis has given us a clearer picture of the 
critical intellectuals' view of human values in the post-Mao era. 
In the past three decades, they completely identified wi th the 
"socialist gospel" and utopian notion of communism, not venturing 
to question the value of man since they were socialised to believe 
that man's ultimate value rests on the success of socialism. The 
disillusionment in the Cultural Revolution unravelled the central 
problem which 1S closely connected wi th the official .. -. _-ideology. 
Growing frustration with Communist ideology has led to vacillation 
1n the people's confidence in orthodox communism. This situation 
1S called the identity crisis. The theory of socialist alienation 
1S propounded by the cri tical w1ng of a utopian movement, a 
movement for values that are held to transcend politics. Thus, the 
"emancipation-of-the-mind" movement has demonstrated the power 
fetishism which poses the greatest threat to the actualization of 
human rights. 
Any way of transcending the predicaments caused by this sense 
of alienation will require coming to terms with the problems of 
faith and self-reconstruction. Madsen maintains that the Chinese 
intellectuals have experienced a sense of desperate crisis. 36 
According to one prominent senior scholar in the Academy of Social 
Sciences, "the problem with intellectuals nowadays is not that they 
have no ideas --- everybody has plenty of ideas --- but that they 
1~ 
.. '. R i ch a r d M ads en, 0 p . c it., p. 2 5 3 
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have no common ideas". 37 It seems that all intellectuals ag r ee 
that there 1S a problem, but they do not agree on a solution. 
FANG LIZHI AND HIS IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHT 
Fang conceives ~hat democracy la a natural right of people. 
He urges that the government should respect human right. Being an 
intellectual, Fang considers that intellectuals should shoulder the 
responsibility to transform society. Fang also believes that the 
future of China lies wi th total reform in all aspects, and by 
learning from the West. 
Natural Right of People 
Fang Lizhi r the most prominent advocate for democracy and 
human right, has reaffirmed the significance of democracy, freedom, 
and especially democratization of the political structure. Orville 
Schell, much impressed by Fang said, 
Fang has given us an instant sense that he is a man not 
only of keen intelligence and conviction, but of 
fearlessness since he seems to lack any kind of self-
consorship· whenever he speaks for social justice and 
protecting the truth. (Fang] spoke so openly about what 
he was thinking and what he believed that one 
instinctively, if ludicrouslYr had to suppfsess the urge 
to warn him of the dangers of such candor. 
In the past, Fang trusted the Communist Party unreservedly. 
But after the confrontation in the Cultural Revolution, he began to 
question Communism. Fang said r 
It was only later (after the Cultural Revolution], 
although my sense of things was still quite unclear, that 
Ji1bid , p.252 
380rville Schell, piscos and Democracy, (New York: Anchor 
Books, Doubleday, 1988), p.122 
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I began feeling that the Party was not telling the truth. 
Then, after the Cultural Revolution started, everything 
became much clearer. I realized that they had in fact 
__ . been decj?-ving people and that I should not believe them 
anymore. 
It is at this point that Fang began to search for resolutions 
and alternatives for the future of China. This search intensified 
Fang's sense of duty, responsibility, and loyalty to the country. 
Fang's readings in poli tics and his travels abroad widened his 
horizons and stimulated his deeper analysis of democracy and human 
rights. These trips abroad were to profoundly influence the way 
Fang -iooked at the Chinese socialist system and the role of 
intellectuals within it. Fang concludes that the crises ln the 
present state are therefore not of dictatorial rule alone, -but of 
the socialist system itself. 
Fang denounced the failure of Communism as a feature of the 
implementation of socialism in the past four decades. 40 He says 
that the fundamental cause of failure and impending castastrophe 
lies in the socialist system itself, especially in the official 
ideology --- Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Fang made a 
series of statements abroad and at home to the effect that Marxism 
is obsolete and that China needs a multi-party system. He outraged 
the top leaders by openly declaring the widespread belief that 
bureaucratic problems and impending crlS1S are caused by the 
11" ~1Ibid, p. 125 
~ n 
'1"Fang Lizhi, Selected Speeches and Wri tings by Fanq Lizhi 
1, (Singapore: World Scientific Chinese Books Series, 1989) , p.1 
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leadership.41 Having renounced their faith ideological 
politics, the people began to seek the alternatives in "democracry 
and sci~;ce". 42 Fang has fought against the monolithic and 
dictatorial rule of the communist party and forthrightly proclaimed 
that socialism has been almost outdated. 43 Fang urged that he had 
been the first one advocating the sense of alienation in Marxism. 
Fang employed a parable to demonstrate that Marxism was outdated, 
"Marxism is like old clothes which should be thrown away because 
Marxism itself belonged to the cultural platform in the past which 
is now old-fashion. ,,44 Joining Wei Jingsheng l.n adv-ocating- a 
some~\Tha t "western liberal" democracy, Fang envisages 
democratization of politics and actualization of human rights as 
the hope of China. However, Fang's view is different from that of 
Wei because Fang no longer trusts the Communist rule and calls for 
a total transformation of the Communist state in China. 
Democracy as a Human Right 
Fang maintained the view that "democracy l.S not something to 
be 'bestowed as a favor' but is the natural right of people. ,,45 
Fang held that since the socialist system claimed to have made the 
people the masters of their own country, the people should have the 
41Nathan, OPe l.°t 111 c ., p. 
42 Ibid , p.2 
°Ibid, pp.53-63 
44 Ibid , p. 55 
45 Fang Lizhi, Selected ' Speeches and Writings by Fano Lizhi 2 , 
(Singapore: World Scientific Chinese book Series, 1989), pp.245-249 
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right to know what their leaders were up to. It is at this p o i nt 
that Fang enunciated the undemocratic and feudalistic workstyle of 
the Comrnu"nist party.46 On November 30, 1986, Fang argued against 
Wan Li's view that d~mocracy was a right be~towed on the people by 
the state and the constitution with his own view that democracy was 
a reflection of a natural right inherent 1n people themselves. 47 
In his speeches, Fang said that "democracy 1S something to be 
gained through persistent efforts, that there is nothing to be 
afraid of, and that criticizing government leaders 1S a symbol of 
democracy. ,,48 He maintained that the future of China c _annot rely 
solely on the resolution of its top leadership since the key factor 
determining the stability of people's lives and whether society can 
develop rests on the successful implementation of democracy at 
whatever cost. He said, "democracy is not something given but 
something won by the people, because what is given can be taken 
back." Believing that there should be a non-Party voice, Fang 
also advocated freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 
In creating the atmosphere for freedom of speech and press, 
Fang and his colleague Guan Weiyan initiated an open academic and 
political environment at Kenan University by allowing students to 
adhere to diversity of views and adopt different stances. It was 
40 yang , "Fang Lizhi Talks About Democratization", pp. 53-54; Hsu 
Yu, "Fang Lizhi Criticizes the Renmin ribao", Zheng Ming, (no. llD, 
Dec. 1986), p.25 
nChin Chung, 
S t uden t Movernen t " , 
1987}, p.93 
"Fang Lizhi: Spiri tual Leader of 
~_i_b_e-,-r-,-a-,-t~i--.;...o--.;...n~~M~o~n=--t:....:h~l....L..-Y I (Hong Kong: 




their conviction that anyone should be able to put up a hand bill 
and hold an event on campus without having to seek prior approval 
from the' ·.superior administrative branch. Fang not only supported 
the freedom of speech among students' activities in the academic 
realm but also espoused the use 'of demonstration for democracy. 
Fang declared that the existing political structure should be 
reformed for the sake of democracy and freedom. 
The Role of Intellectuals 
Fang ' views the intellectuals as the nation's eli te, whose 
efforts are indispensable for building a prospero~s state. 
Believing that the backwardness and disintegration of the present 
Chinese state have their the roots in the lack of respect for 
intellectuals, Fang offered as a theoretical response to the socio-
political reality a strengthening of the intellectuals' 
consciousness, urging them to fulfill their social responsibilities 
toward society. In an era filled wi th impending crlses and 
turmoil, Fang urged the youth to be bold enough to face the crises 
and shoulder their responsibilities to break through and resolve 
the predicamen ts .49 He has repeatedly praised the potential of 
younger intellectuals and students. At Tongchai University, Fang 
said, 
In China, students have always been a force for 
democratic advancement. Students in every epoch have 
goaded society to march forward step by step, and this is 
something which, I believe, has been witnessed by all. 
When this goading 1S increased, certain obsolete and 
A~ 
; JFang, op.cit.2, pp.1-3 
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decadent ideas will be crushed. 50 
Fang pinned his hope on the young intellectuals and students 
: .. ", 
because he saw them as more independent, having a strong wish to 
take their destiny ·into their own hands. Fang observed, "as 
intellectuals, we are obligated to work for the improvement of 
society this requires that we break the bonds of social 
res train t when necessary." 51 Fang's view that the basic flaw 1S 
the social system drove him to seek reform of the system. It 1S 1n 
this context that Fang encouraged the students to hold on to their 
social concern and political activism. 
Fang felt that the failure of intellectuals to exert 
significant influence on society was a s1gn of backwardness because 
intellectuals not only possess information and knowledge but also 
create them, a factor which allows them to become an actively 
productive force 1n society. The intellectuals should utilize 
their knowledge and "intellectual consciousness" to strive for a 
right direction in social reform. Wrote Fang, 
Of course, our goal should be the improvement of society, 
but our goal shouldn't just be some utopian dream that 
can only be realized a million years down the road 
what is much more important is to idnntify problems that 
exist now and to try to solve them.~ 
Intellectuals, to Fang, should have a sense of responsibility 
to society, even to the degree of sacrificing their own lives. 
50 Fang "Intellectuals and Chinese Society", p.8 
510rville Schell, op.cit., p.131 
52 Ibid. , pp.131-132 
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They also have complaints and grievances, but these concern the 
advancement of society, not their own personal interests. 53 In 
reforming'- the closed society, Fang believed the intellectuals 
should speak up to cr~ate a more open society where differences are 
allowed, making room for th~ great varieties of excellence that 
have found expression in human civilization since he holds that 
"democracy 1S not something that is being 'sneaked in the back 
door I here." 54 The future of China lies wi th the success of 
realization of democracy, while the realization of democracy lies 
with the struggle of the people. Fang urged that intellectuals be 
_. 
independent and form a powerful new check against Party power to 
uphold democracy and the sanctity of human rights. 
In early March 1989, an open letter to the CCP leaders by the 
intellectual community depicted the main concerns of intellectuals 
as "the corruption trend, the rampant speculation by bureaucrats, 
price rises, the fact that people become lax in spirit, and the 
serious crisis faced in the educational scientific, and cultural 
fields. ,,55 These concerns reflected the sincere patriotic feelings 
of .the intellectuals, among them Fang Lizhi who advocated political 
democratization, freedom of speech and freedom of the press to 
stimulate economic development and end corruption. Thus, it 1S 
therefore clear that Fang has a consistent theme of struggling for 
53 Dai Qing, "Intellectuals and Intellectuals I Consciousness ---
Interview with Fang Lizhi", Guangming ribao, (September 22, 1986), 
p.2 
540rville Schell, op.cit., p.134 
55~'1ing Bao, (Hong Kong: 7 March, 1989) 
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democracy and respect for human dignity. 
Idea of Total Westernization 
Fang" has declared tha t "the Party 1S inept, · socialism I a 
meaningless term, and Chinese culture petrified, urgently needing 
the life-blood of Western ideas and knowledge, also in the non-
economic fields: culture, politics, ideology, ethics: 
everything" . 56 He advocated openlng-up to the outside world 
because he thinks the transformation of social ideas and elevation 
of spiritual civilization should depend on outside forces. 57 We 
can summarize the central theme of Fang Lizhi as a struggle against 
the monopololistic rule of Communist China and advocacy for 
elimination of the out-dated and inflexible ideology. Differing 
from his forerunners, like Wang Ruoshui and Wei Jingsheng, Fang 
sharply denounced the credibility of Communism. Fang has strived 
to discern the fundamental flaw of the socialist system and has 
called for the total transformation of society in every aspect. He 
has gone so far as to allude to total crisis in socialism and urged 
the intellectuals to bear their responsibili ties in saving the 
Chinese society. 
INTELLECTUALS AND THE IDENTITY CRISIS 
It is our contention that the intellectuals have become more 
radical and critical because of their poor treatment and economic 
56Zhengml"ng (July 1987), p 51 and Zhenq " 
_ _ .m1 g (March 1987), 
pp.38-41 
57 Yen Hsun, "The Intellectuals Are Not Recognized as a Leading 
Force in Social Advancement", World Economic Herald, (Shanghai: 
November 24, 1986), p.J 
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insecurity. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels noted that men of 
letters may become more active in the socialist movement because 
capitali~d: development causes them to be "precipitated into the 
proletaria t" . 58 The elite theroists also argue in the same vein 
that intellectual unrest is closely related to the unavaibility of 
job opportunity. Robert Michels suggests that the formation of 
intellectual dissidence has a close association with the oversupply 
of intellectuals, which makes a keen competition for jobs. Facing 
such a sudden contraction of job opportunities, the intellectuals 
will become dissatified. 59 The aforesaying anal·,ysis has 
demonstrated that there is a close relationship between the unfair 
treatment and disrespectful attitude toward the intellectuals and 
intellectual unrest. The present study revealed the poor treatment 
of the intellectuals ln terms of salary, social status, 
intellectual freedom and job security. Their participation in the 
June Fourth Incident, openly declaring the crisis of the present 
state and directly demanding the improvement of the treatment 
toward the intellectuals are the slgns of their unrest. The 
economic deprivation and the contration of job opportunities have 
forced the intellectuals to become more vocal, critical and hence 
58 K. Marx and F. Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party" I 
R.Tucker (eds), The Marx-Engels Reader, (New York: Norton, 1972), 
pp.331-62 
50 
;Robert Michels, "Intellectuals", Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences Vo.8, (New York: Macillan, 1982), pp.118-26 
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become more political and radical. 60 Apart from that, the 
intellectuals who generally identify with the disciplines of the 
humani ties and social SClences are more radical than those who 
identify with the dis~iplines of natural sciences and professional 
studies. 61 
The critical intellectuals become more politically radical 
especially when their freedom and exercise of power are strictly 
controlled. This political malintegration of intellectuals may 
precipi tate intellectual dissidence. 62 Hoping "to break through 
such an externally-imposed boundary, the intellectuals have acted 
more radically and critically. As Brym observed, 
Ensuring that intellectuals are employed in secure and 
responsible posi tions commensurate wi th the types and 
levels of education they have received, and that they are 
relatively free to think and do as they will, one 
produces intellectual moderates; by not giving 
intellectuals secure and responsible jobs commensurate 
with their training, and by restricting their freedom of 
expression ') and enqulry, one produces political 
extremists. o 
60 For detail of the living conditions of the intellectuals, 
please refer to the chapter on the economic crisis in this study, 
particularly the section on "the differential treatment and the 
economic crisis" and consult Tsou Fanglen, The Economic Policy on 
Intellectuals: Predicaments and Twilight, (Guangming Press Ltd., 
1989) 
61Robert Brym, Intellectuals and Politics, {London: George 
AlIen and Unwin, 1980}, p.14 and S. Lipset and R. Dobson, "The 
Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the 
United States and the Soviet Union", Daedalus, (Vol.101, No.3, 
1972), pp.137-98 
62 Brym , op.cit., p.16 
63Brym , op.cit., p.17 
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Thus we see that one additional reason the intellecftuals in 
post-Mao China become more radical and critical is that the CPC has 
failed to"'provide a satisfactory living condition and intellectual 
environment for them .. Besides, the CPC has restricted their 
freedom of speech and expres$ion and also has failed to integrate 
them politically. They speak not only for the people but also air 
out their grievance since they are also the sufferers. These 
reasons contribute to the growing vehemence of intellectual dissent 
in post-Mao China. 
DEMOCRACY AND THE IDENTITY CRISIS 
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that the recent 
movements for protection of human rights and democracy have been 
the consequence of ideological retrogression and identity crisis in 
' post-Mao China. Clearly, the feeling of ideological and identity 
crisis has been felt not only by the intellectuals but also by the 
Party members. An identity crisis has emerged in the mainland in 
which they have also tried to reinterpret the "ism", concluding 
that Marxism is not dogma but 1S a guideline for actions. 64 The 
leadership in Communist China has also detected in diversified 
indications of a crisis of faith. 65 The reformists have attempted 
to use slogans to redefine the ideological orthodoxy and the 
function of ideology only to find that intense fragmentation among 
~ I 
0 .. Commentator's Article, "More on Theory and Practice", Renmin 
ribao, (Dec. 21, 1984). 
65peter R.Moody, "Spiritual Crisis in Contemporary China: Some 
Preliminary Explorations", Issues & Studies, (June, 1987) , p.J6 
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the people signifies · an ideological problem. 66 We can t h e n 
conclude that the intellectuals have attempted to grapple with 
human rights and democracy because they lost faith in the orthodox 
line of ideology. ThB only way out for them is to reconstruct the 
new faith to resolve their ' impending identity crisis. Through 
democracy, they hope to reconstruct their new identity. 
Wei Jingsheng, Wang Ruoshui and Fang Lizhi represent many 
people and intellectuals who originally trusted Communism but now 
have lost fai th in it. Thinking through their predicaments J.n 
faith"," they have strived for democracy and human '"rights to 
reestablish their own "identity". They intend to construct an 
identity of their own, reflecting their human right and thei~ value 
of existence. They not only find fault with the orthodox ideology 
but also denounce the socialist system. Obviously, the impending 
catastrophe arising from economic and political reforms further 
deepens the rift between the state and the intellectuals. With 
Habermas we can conclude that the crlS1S in the economic realm 
questions the rationality of reforms and undermines the legitimacy 
of the administrative apparatus. Crisis, in this way, extends from 
the economic realm to the institutional realm. Facing such an 
intense sense of crisis, the intellectuals became sharper ln their 
criticisms of ideology and rationality of the state, thus 
exacerbating the identity crisis of the intellectuals. 
56 Ibid , pp.42-43 
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CONCLUSION 
Under this circumstance, some of the intellectuals have not 
only looked into the crisis of the system level but also paid 
attention to identity crlS1S and cultural crisis. Some of the 
intellectuals have tried to look for a new meaning in the socialist 
system. However, they have found that the root of the present 
problems lies in the culture and the feudalistic rule as practised 
by the Communist reglme. In the forthcoming chapter, we are gOlng 
to discuss the cuI tural crlS1S as fel t by the intellectuals ln 
post-Mao China. 
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Chapter Five. On Cultural Crisis 
The dust around the controversial documentary film Hexiang 
(River Elegy) has still not settled. As Nathan observes, "Chinese 
doubt about their own capacity for democracy, however, center not 
on communications facilities or literacy but on political 
culture".1 This is typified by Hexiang, whose central theme is the 
cultural crisis in post-Mao China. By cultural crisis, we meant 
the loss of cultural meaning in terms of both values and party 
ideology as percei ved by the cri tical in tellectuals. As a resul t, 
they have attempted to construct a new cultural meaning for both 
the nation and the people. 
As soon as the film was broadcast in June 1988 by the Central 
Television Station of Beijing, it elicited a warm response which 
was totally unprecedented. Thereafter, the Central Television 
Station of Beijing received thousands of letters from viewers 
asking that the film be rebroadcast and heaping praises on the 
program. In addi tion, many people made requests to buy a 
videotape, among them not only ordinary people but also cadres. 
Zhang Gang, one of the authors of the film who also received many 
letters said, 
After looking at dozens of letters from the general 
public written to the organizers of the series Hexiang I 
was deeply moved. The letter came from retired cadres 
all the way down to primary school students; from leaders 
of the Party, the government and the mili tary all the way 
down to the ordinary workers; everyone of them expressed 
~ AndreT.-1 Nathan. G..l}j.._Q~_.~~ ___ ~_~_t~is, (Ne~-1 York: Columbia Univ ers i ty 
Press, 1990), p.196 
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a strong reaction and not one of those reacti o ns I'tl as 
negative. From reading these letters, I got a feelin g of 
the hope that fills the hearts of our people. 
THE OBJECTIVE OF HEXIANG 
Su Xiaokang, the chief author of the film, argued that the 
belief in cultural crlS1S as propounded in Hexiang, widely shared 
among the Vlewers, had given rlse to what was called "The Hexiang 
Phenomenon" (Hexi ang xi anxi ang) . Su was of the opinion tha t 
Hexiang was "no longer purely a cultural or cinematic or political 
topic --- it had become a complex phenomenon without ~recedent in 
China. ,,3 The purpose of the film, according to Su, was to deal 
with the strong feeling of anxiety which has permeated Chinese 
society in post-Mao China, especially the mentality of crisis which 
has emerged from the stagnation of the reforms. 4 
The discourse on cultural crisis is far from a new 
intellectual agenda, having the intellectual heritage of the 1919 
May Fourth Movement, in which many scholars sought the cause of all 
social problems in the nature of Chinese culture. They adopted the 
stance that the transformation of the underlying system of values 
as handed down by tradition could presumably strengthen China in 
2"Judging the Present by the Past", Cheng Ming Monthly, {Sep. 
1988, pp.62-63; experpts, in Inside China Mainland, (Taipei: 
Institude of Current China Studies, January, 1989), p.3 
, 
"W.L.Chong, "Su Xiaokang on His Film "River Elegy" f China 
Information (The documentation & Research Centre for Contemporary 




the modern world.~ Under the dictatorship of the CPC, authorit ies 
have forbidden the Chinese intellectuals to discuss and criticize 
politid~l and social problems directly. A safer stance for the 
intellectuals has been to project their ideas and express their 
criticisms toward cultural ~atters. 
Early ~n the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese intellectuals 
began to look into the cultural enigma. They cherished the same 
earnestness in exploring such questions as "What is the role of 
traditional Chinese culture ~n the restoration and renewal of 
Chinese civilization amidst the general cr~s~s of ---·a cultural 
failure-of-nerves?", "Should it be simply discarded, or 
persistantly reaffirmed even in the face of formidable 
challenges?,,6 The different stances demonstrate the controversial 
nature of cuI tural crisis. On the one pole, the May-fourth 
positivists and the left-wing scholars totally rejected Chinese 
culture, whereas the National Essence school adopted the stance of 
reaffirming the moral superiority of Chinese tradition. Sitting ~n 
the middle of two poles were the New Confucians who struggled 
against both extremes and maintained their moderate ground. The 
central problem confronting the May Fourth intellectuals involved 
the interplay between the forward-looking, and far-reaching life 
style of modernity as versus a stubbornly sustaining and old-
fashioned, tradition. In other words, the challenge posed to the 
~Lin Yusheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, (1937) 
CChan Hoirnan, The Confucian Theme In Contemporar_y Chine~_~ 
Social Thouaht: A Study in New Confucianism, (A MPhil Theses , Th e 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1980) I p.42 
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intellectuals ln the May Fourth era forced them to disentangl e the 
confrontation between the tradition on the one hand and modernit y 
on the ··other. 
THE HIDDEN AGENDA - THE ATTACK ON THE REGIME 
Unlike the May Fourth forerunners, the present intellectuals 
of Hexiang have not really touched on the cultural crisis as such; 
instead, their endeavour amounts to suggesting that the people 
living in Communist China are still ruled by a feudal system which 
is shadowed by the "cultural legacy". The central theme of Hexiang 
appears not really to find faults with the traditional qulture, but 
rather to attack the rule of the Communist Party by using the 
'parable' of cultural crlS1S 
China's existing crises. In 
to embody their confrontation with 
an age of high disillusionment and 
confronting the difficulties in the reform program, the debate on 
cultural issues really has begun to carry an increasingly overt 
poli tical message, especially for the intellectuals who cannot 
enJoy an open discourse on politics directly. In an open lecture 
in Leiden, Su Xiaokang explained why Hexiang did not attempt to 
examine the political problems, which ln fact most of the 
intellectuals had already identified as the most fundamental 
problem or the root of China's existing predicaments. They focused 
on cultural problems for fear of the CPC. Having fled China after 
the June Fourth Incident, Su explicitly said that "the origin of 
the stagnation of the reforms is not Chinese culture, but the CCP's 
one-Party dictatorship and the socialist system of State-
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ownership. " I The open confrontation between the intellectual s and 
the state has thus become overt. 
Be"cause of social catastrophe and poli tical turmoil, most 
Chinese people have been convinced of the impending downfall of 
modern China. In the earlier reforming phase, the people had begun 
to restore their confidence and pin their hopes on the reformists, 
but the stagnation of the reforms and the corruption and 
inefficiency of the Communist authority have dashed those emerging 
hopes. The general public has been forced ei ther to messianic 
hopes or to anonymous fears. It was this stricture ···· over world 
views which led to the formulation of Hexiang. Su Xiaokang has 
explained that Hexiang has as its principle goal to deal with the 
social and psychological dimensions of life; therefore, it is only 
a work of emotions. As Su conceived, Hexiang is aimed solely at 
"expressing a certain mood prevalent among the Chinese todayll, 
which Su calls a IImood of anxiety". In particular, the stagnation 
of the reforms has posed a complex problem for both the people and 
the intellectuals regarding the nature of China's future. The 
people fear that China's ship is about to sink. Hexiang was 
written against this socio-cultural background. 
Because this central problem cannot be discussed wi thout 
touching on the politics of the Communist Party, Hexiang approached 
the issues in the realm of cultural crisis instead. The writers 
preferred to look at the problems from the viewpoint of the feudal 
tradition In Chinese history to portray myraid ideas. Against this 
·W.L.Chong, op.cit., p.44 
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background of a mood of anxiety, of stalemate, the author s 
conceived the plan to make Hexiang. 8 It is clear then that the 
cultur~l crisis described in Hexiang is different from the stance 
of the May Fourth scholars. The central theme of Hexiang stresses 
modernization of both indiyiduals and the state to urge them to be 
open toward the outside world. 
THE DEEPER SENSE OF HEXIANG 
The title, Hexiang is not chosen simply accidentally; it has 
its historical allusions. 'He' means the Yellow River. 'Xiang' 
means 'to die young or prematurely', but also' someone .·.--sacrificing 
-. 
his life (for his country) r or 'song of lamentation', 'dirge', 
'elegy'. It is clear the title has multi-layered implications. It 
is the opinion of the film's authors that the film merely indicates 
that "Chinese culture as represented by the culture developed on 
the yellow earth, which lies along the course of the Yellow River, 
and is one that has been cut off too soon and has not been allowed 
to achieve healthy development".9 For this reason, people should 
not have praised and overstated the glory of the Yellow River and 
the Chinese culture for their premature death. Su Xiaokang 
explicitly stated 1.n his introduction "Chinese civilization 1.S 
dead, and our task today 1.S to build a new cuI ture a new 
psychology that will be far-reaching and complex a new 
philosophy." Su called for a critical examination of the past 
'J IIIbid, p.46 
9"TV Seri es Runs in to Fl ak", rhe Mi~ror Mon thly, (HK: Augus t 
1988, pp.40-42) in Inside China Mainland, (Taipei: Institude of 
Current China Studies, January 1989), p.1 
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because China can no longer avoid a reappraisal of the ' f ateful 
factors that shaped its civilization. IO To Su, what is needed is 
a reconstruction of the Chinese people's cultural-psychological 
structure .11 There are six episode in this film series. In each 
individual episode, it protrays different ideas. When putting 
together, they constitute a central theme of Hexiang. 
THE FIRST EPISODE 
Cultural Decline of Chinese Tradition 
In the first episode of Hexiang, "Searching for Dreams", Su 
states his position that the Chinese people have shouldered much of 
the burden of history. Chinese civilization began in the Yellow 
River Valley, and like the other great Eastern civilizations that 
grew up along the rivers of the Nile, Indus, Tigris and Euphrates, 
developed all the hallmarks that Marx described as the "Asiatic 
mode of production". In these cuI tures, societies have been 
organized for some overarching, common endeavor; the centralization 
and control of the authoritarian state is especially clear in the 
case of China. To Su, the silt of the Yellow River is just like 
the burden of history since the Chinese still carry the dregs of 
the old civilization in their veins. Su says "every country with 
its old tradition probably does encounter the problem of internal 
contradiction between tradi tion and reali ty", adding, "the older 
10 Su Xiaokang, Wang Luxiang, f{exiang, (HK: Joint Publishing 
Co., Ltd., 1988), pp.1-6 
- ~ Ibid, pp.113,16 and 6 
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the tradi tion, the , deeper the • • II 12 crlS1S . Su says that the 
relationship between yellow water, yellow land and yellow-color e d 
people ~ ~ymbolizes the shaping of the culture of the Yellow River. 
The Yellow River gave birth to the Chinese people and to the 
distinctive civilization of, that people. Su questions whet·her this 
distinctive civilization may have bad influence for the people. Su 
points out the fact that the climatic conditions which naturally 
prevail in the Orient have made the establishment of large scale 
mobilization of manpower the chief preliminary requirement for 
agriculture. Under the standards of the forces of production that 
prevailed at that time, it was necessary to have a high degree of 
-centralized control which constituted the monopoly of political 
power at the centre in order that tens of thousands of people could 
organize and launch water control projects. 
To substantiate his position, Su also refers to the concepts 
which Marx and Engels called Oriental despotism, a typical 
characteristic of Oriental society from the remotest periods and 
closely associated with water control. Su emphasizes his 
conclusion that the predicaments faced by modern China are directly 
related to the 'Asiatic mode of production I. For this reason, 
separating the Chinese people from their land poses great 
difficulties. Because water is the lifeblood of agriculture and it 
is the dragon King who rules over water, the people of this nation 
face their own ambivalence that loves and hates the dragon, lauds 
him and curses him. This complex emotion has made the Chinese a 
!L 1bid, p.10 
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complex people.-- Su argues that the Chinese should attempt to 
grapple with their ambivalence through self-criticism and self-
evaluation. He confesses that "there l.S a blindspot l.n our 
national psyche: it is a vague belief that all of the shame of the 
past century is the result of a break in our glorious history". U 
People have become accustomed to exaggerate their glorious 
past and splendours to conceal their existing feebleness and 
backwardness. Barme writes" [Chinese] seem to find great solace in 
every earthshaking archaeological discovery. Yet the fact remal.ns, 
our ci viliza tion is moribund." 15 
Su proclaims that "the wealth of history and the length of 
civilization have passed away and become the story of yesterday" . 15 
He says that dismay is no longer relevant, instead a look at 
China's future should bring encouragement if we fearlessly look 
outside and extend our horizon outwards". Concluding the episode, 
Su declares that "history has proved time and again that the root 
cause of cultural decline is not the attacks of some outside force , 
but rather because of the degeneration of its internal 
1 .. 
mechanism. 11-' The first episode presents the idea that cultural 
decline l.5 no reason for despondency, but calls for self-
lJGeremie Barme, "TV Requiem for 
Kingdom", (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
14Su Xiaokang, Hexiang, p .19 
1 : 
J. "Barme, op.cit., p.41 
1C . 1 Su, op.Cl.t. , p. 9 
> Ibid, p.22 
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the Myths of the Middle 
1 September,1988) , p.43 
examination, which 1n turn leads to rejection of the old but 
openess to the new. 
THE SEC0ND EPISODE 
Self-imposed Confinement of Chinese People 
The second episode highlights the fact that the Chinese people 
did not have the advantage of living along the shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea like the Europeans; nor did they live between two 
great oceans like the Americans. The author, Wang Luxiang, points 
out that the Chinese have been living in the fertile area of the 
Central Plain facing the Mongolian Plateau; for this ~~ason, much 
of Chinese history is taken up with the struggle for space to live 
between the nomadic herdsmen and settled agriculturalists. This 
struggle motivated the Chinese to build the 'Great Wall' to protect 
themselves. "The Great Wall was like a wall built around the yard 
of one's own house."la The Great Wall for a long time has been 
regarded by Chinese people as a glorious symbol, for it signifies 
a great victory of the ancestors. The Wall, 1n many Chinese minds, 
acts as the shel ter of their land. With a strong 'protective 
gate', Chinese people can live peacefully and restfully in the 
Central Plain. 
Wang sees the Great Wall as a symptom of the Chinese people's 
illness of isolation and detachment. Wri tes Wang, "I f the Grea t 
Wall could speak, surely it would tell the descendants of the 
Yellow Emperor 1n all honesty that it 1S nothing but a maSS1ve 
1 a Ins id e Chi n a Ma i n.l a I1.<i , ( J an u a r y 1 9 8 9), p. 3 
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monument to tragedy, cast ln its present form by historica l 
destiny. ,,19 In the mind of Wang, the Great Wall ln no way 
represents strength, progress or glory; but instead it symbolizes 
a sign of isolation, confinement, conservatism, impotent defence 
and timidity in the face o~ invasion. He proclaimed "Ah, Great 
Wall, why do we still sing your praises?,,20 In this way Wang 
suggests that the Chinese people have never been able to expand 
their minds beyond the confines of the land, even becoming 
infatuated with and most devoted to the worship of the land. 21 In 
this episode, Wang pushes the cause of the Chinese predicament all 
-
the way backward to their self-imposed confinement and isolation. 
The hidden message of this episode is that the Chinese must open 
themselves to the world instead of once again putting up barriers. 
From the second episode, "Destiny", Wang does not confront 
these general cultural problems in abstract terms. Instead, he 
attempts to prove that China should no longer be a closed society 
but rather should open to the outside world. The author employs a 
geographical explanation to demonstrate that the Chinese have been 
pre-determined by their land to a state of self-confinement, which 
has brought forth problems of internal weakness. Wang concludes 
that the fundamental structure of an internal superstable mechanism 
has been at work ln Chinese historical development. 22 This 
19 Su , "t op. Cl ., p.35 
20 Ibid . 
--
21Inside China Mainland, (January 1989), p. 3 
22 S " U, Op.Clt., p.29 
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particular mechanism, in Wang's eye, has operated well ln past 
history, giving a consolidated foundation for dynasty. He 
suggest~ that the development of China has been jeopardized by the 
people's internal reliance on their own land while shut off from 
the outside world. But Wang argues that the maintenance of 
stability has cost China its ability to keep up with other 
countries and created an environment which favored the development 
of Oriental despots, bringing a sense of desolation to the people. 
Wang concluded that the Chinese should develop an open mind to look 
beyond the vast expanses of the oceans in order to find ways of 
self-development. 
THE THIRD EPISODE 
Demand for Intellectual Freedom 
The third episode, "Spiri tual Enlightenment" , stresses 
intellectual freedom and respect for new ideas. Wang claims that 
the price of unification for the empire was ~ts enforced conformity 
and uniformity, and the suppression of the individual. Wang argued 
that the fifth century BC in China was no less than in the rest of 
the "civilised" world a period of tremendous intellectual ferment. 
But the detractor, the Emperor Qin Shi Huang' s "burning of the 
books and persecution of scholars" began a despotic era toward the 
intellectuals. The fate of intellectuals in China has been marked 
by tragedies and vacillations in official behavior. Wang said that 
although China still remained receptive to a variety of new ideas 
and techniques up until the Ming Dynasty and Song Dynasty, the 
general treatment of intellectuals meant the ultimate failure o f 
135 
development in technology and science. The reason for such f ailur e 
was that in the realm of technology the Chinese were basicall y 
interested ln contributing to the monumental problems of a 
centralized empire to the total neglect of 'pure science', since 
the world-view of Chinese had no clear distinction between subject 
and object, cause and effect. 23 This line of reasoning answers the 
question why the intellectuals have not been recognized. Wang 
bemoans the state of intellectuals in China today, stating that 
"economic impoverishment, spiritual repression and manipulation are 
their major problems." To further explore the question, Wang turns 
to the root of the problem, which is "the crisis in education" and 
the ignorance of pure SClence. Barme, presenting Wang's idea, said 
"as pictures .of Cultural Revolution denunciations of university 
professors appear on the screen, the voice-over declares that one 
can only hope that history [should we read this as 'the party?'] 
will not make fools of Chinese intellectuals yet again! ,,24 This 
description of the Cultural Revolution illuminates a system of 
regular purges of intellectuals overseen by Deng during the past 
decade. Given this state of affairs, Wang intends to make the plea 
that the role of intellectuals 1S a vital one for shaping the 
future of China. 
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Burrows, "Death of the Yellow 
"New Epoch", the fourth episode, con tains sequences tha t 
criticize the views of history and society advocated by Lenin, 
Stalin~ ~nd Mao Zedong. The program brings forth the debate between 
Lenin and Plekhanov on the development and transition from 
capitalism to socialism. P~ekhanov firmly held that Marxist theory 
requires full historical development and did not support any 
premature seizure of political power. For Plekhanov, the sudden 
jump to socialism would probably lead to the most serious kind of 
economic disasters. In spite of this argument, Lenin still 
insisted on his own position and would not allow Plekhanov to guide 
Russia from feudalism into socialism. That insistence proved to be 
a failure in economic development that greatly hampered the way 
forward for socialist states. Stalin forced the Soviet Union to 
pay a heavy prlce for its policies. And because China was tied up 
in the "Stalinist model", China met a similar economic and social 
disaster before turning to the more promising path of reform. "New 
Epoch" is devoted to the Third Party Plenum in 1978 at which the 
new reformist policy was initiated, and to the 13th party congress 
in 1987. In this episode Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution 
are given a verbal and pictorial drubbing. In Su's eyes, the 
realities of the historical development in Mao's era served only to 
reveal the astounding destructive force and cruelty that 
characterized his rule. The re-emergence of China as a world power 
relies upon its openness to the outside world and on deepening the 
reforms. This episode also urges continous reforms to correct the 
traditional view of self-containment and self-sufficiency, the vie w 
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of dependency and contentment 1n life. ~j The intention of the 
authors is to improve the "quality of man" ,26 by dealing with the 
root o~ the problem, the cultural mentality of the Chinese people. 
THE FIFTH EPISODE 
Critical Evaluation of the Past 
The fifth episode, "Misery", written by Su Xiaokang, equates 
the repeated flooding of the Yellow River with the cyclical nature 
of Chinese history where periods of stabili ty al ternate wi th 
disintegration. In Su I s eyes, this phenomenon 1S typically a 
symbol of regression: time and again the fruits of Chi~?'s hard-won 
progress have been lost and had to be painfully recovered after 
these destructive purges. Just as the silt deposited in the Yellow 
River dams the very flow of the river, so the Chinese tradition 
contains within itself the seeds of its own corruption: 
bureaucratism, factionalism and privilege. For Su, Communist China 
1S far from free of this legacy, pointing to the periodic upheavals 
as the common experience of the Chinese people in Communist China. 
For this reason, Chinese people have grown tired of revolts just as 
they are afraid of the periodic flooding of the Yellow Ri ver. 27 
Thus, to use Su I swords, the Yellow River does not deserve any 
praise, but it symbolizes the sorrows of the people Slnce it 
resembles excessive bleeding of the central nerve. 23 
25 S11 , ·t 67 0p.C1 ., p. 
2i Ibid, p. 82 
23 Ibid , p.83 
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The concept of "internal super-stable mechanism" as a device 
for analyzing the historical development of the Chinese wa s 
proposed by Jin Guantao. He explains that the cyclical nature of 
Chinese historical development 1S characterized mainly by 
prosperity and stability on the one hand and downfall and 
instability on the other. With this theoretical stance, Jin argues 
his view that China has been under the central control of Confucian 
thought which gradually acquired a position of unique respect in 
his land. He says tha t Confucianism developed the ideals and 
standards of human life that are characteristic of continental 
civiliz-ation, 1.e., an inward-looking culture. It is thus possible 
to conclude that Confucian culture has clearly failed to develop a 
spirit of progressive activism in the people, a system of law and 
order in the country as a whole, or a system of mechanisms for the 
renewal of cuI ture . 29 In the course of its gradual movement 
towards decadence, Confucianism, in sues mind, has developed into 
a "horrible system of self-destruction".)O Following this line of 
argument, Su lists numerous crises and disasters 1n recent years 
which are recognisable warning signals of the decrepi t social 
mechanism of the state. Su further argues that the dictatorial 
nature of autocratic rule must be replaced with the openness and 
consensus that ideally characterise democracy. His distaste for 
the 'internal super-stable mechanism' leads him to alert 
29 Jin Guantao, ~rosperity and Crisis, (Taipei: Fengyuen Shidai 
Press, 1989) and Jin Guanxiu and Liu, New Ten Days' Discourse, (HK: 
Cosmos Book Ltd, 1990) 
JjInside China Mainland, (January, 1989), p. 4 
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painstakingly the people to develop a crisis mentality and 
consciousness, to evaluate their past and to keep their destiny in 
their 'own hands. 31 In other words, the author attempts to discern 
a move towards poli tical accountabili ty and the deepening of 
political reforms. 
THE SIXTH EPISODE 
Seaward Looking Civilization 
The series concludes by contrasting the "azure", seaward-
looking civilization of the West, characterized as outward-looking 
and trade-oriented, with the civilization of Chi~~, with its 
inward-looking land-based culture. In the authors' minds, the deep 
sea-blue oceanic civilization 1S bustling and lively, which 
represents an open, liberal, pluralistic society, while the yellow-
colored continnental civilization just presents us with a closed, 
isolated, conservative and monolithic society. Once again, the 
authors condemn the centralized power base of the continnental 
civilization which relies on Confucian culture, a negative force 1n 
the development of China. The reason that any atttempt to 
modernize China on the basis of the governmental model peculiar to 
continnental civilization would probably fail is because of the 
difficulty in instilling into the people as a whole any sort of 
basically vigorous cultural energy. They metaphorically call for 
open1ng the society, saying, "it is only the wind that blows 1n 
from the deep blue-colored sea that can finally be transformed into 
ra1n to once again bring moisture and nourishment to this parched 
j 1 S . U, Op.C1t., p.92 
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and dry, yellow-colored earth arid it is only when this happens that 
the yellow pleateau will once agal.n spring into new life and 
growth ,~,,32 - Xie Xuanjun and Yuan Zhiming remark that "it's as 
though for so many things in China we have to go back to the May 
Fourth Period and start all over again. ,,33 In the minds of the 
authors, the future of China is in the hands of the people, who 
must develop a democratic mentality, ridding themselves of a 
mentality submissive to authority. In the whole process the 
authors stress the important role of the intellectuals. 
THE CENTRAL THEME OF HEXIANG 
The authors of Hexiang have contrived to explicate the nature 
of the cuI tural CrlSl.S in China. They have revealed that the 
motive behind the film "is an overall cri ticism of the past 
tradition and the present situation of China. It is the self-
cri ticism of an entire people ... 34 Su Xiaokang confesses that "as 
authors, [we] did not dare to confront the CCP system, and 
therefore, we attacked our ancestors instead. ,,35 Su said it was 
. not their intention to inspire discouragement or despair in their 
vlewers; on the contrary, it was their ambi tion to stimulate 
people to think more deeply of the past as well as the present 
conditions.- As Nathan observed, Hexiang has reflected the state of 
32Inside China Mainland, (January, 1989), p.4 
3 ' MS U , op.cit., p.106 
• J 
JIiInside China Mainland, (January, 1989), p.2 
i; -
"MW.L.Chong, op.cit., p.46 
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mind of the intelle~tuals during a decade of increasinly searching 
critiques of the Cultural Revolution itself. In Nathan's words, 
"the ' ::'conclusion drawn from the inquest were nightmarishly 
reminiscent of the. themes that had tormented Chinese intellectuals 
about their civilization since the late 19th century. ,,36 The 
intellectuals fear that the Chinese race is falling behind other 
races, that some vital cultural essence has been exhausted. 
Bes.ides, the film also conveys a message that China has been caught 
in a historical trap wi th no way out. The authors of Hexiang 
pr~claim the cultural crisis in the present state. ~he remainder 
of this chapter will be devoted to the evaluation of Hexiang. 
WAVE OF CRITICISM ON HEXIANG 
Having viewed the film, Vice-President Wang Zhen was furious 
and sharply attacked the film in an article in Ningxia Ribao,saying 
that the film was reactionary . and played into the hands of the 
Guomingdang, 37 cri ticizing that the film "dragged ' China through 
the mire" and was "even worse than Bo Yang". 38 
The Condemnation of Historical Nihilism 
At a seminar organized by the Central Television Station, a 
number of people lodged the complaint that Hexiang was "propaganda 
declaring the futility of nationalism, propaganda for complete 
Westernization, and that 'Premature Death of the Yellow River' had 
36 Na than, op. c it. " p. 112 
37 H Sh· h . e aom1ng, Z engm1ng, (Dec. 1988), pp.12-13 
. /\ 
·"'Huang Ertang, Zhe~g_ming, (August 1988), p.17 
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dared to say things that even Fang Lizhi had never ventured to 
say"; 39 In the eyes of those commentators, Hexiang was anti-Party 
and atiti-socialist. Qiu Tiancao and Wang Xiaodong criticized the 
film saying that it had denied Chinese tradition, evaluating China 
solely by Western criteria. They described Hexiang as "elitist 
grumblings" (gaoji laosao) which stayed on the safe side to play 
down the role of tradition but which lacked a clear vision of the 
present state. 40 The film was most vehemently criti~ized for its 
degradation of Chinese tradition, its so-called "historical 
nihilism". In one of the commentaries of Renmin Ribao, Yi Jiayan 
criticlzed Hexiang, saying that it signified the dying song of 
.chinese nationality. He argued Hex~ang had depicted a grey destiny 
of the Chinese propounding a typical sense of gloom and historical 
fatalism. 41 In the same vein, Wu Huading said that Hexiang had 
promoted a historically fatal attitude, and rejected the view of 
Hexiang that Chinese history has run its own logic-cyclical course, 
which has hindered the growth and self-development of China. 42 Wu 
stated that Hexiang had a fundamental problem since it found fault 
.with the traditional culture and described it as a burden like the 
silt deposits of the Yellow River. He insisted that Chinese 
39Inside China Mainland, (January 1989), p. 2 
40· . Q1U Tlancao and Wang Xiaoddong, in Cui Wenlua (eds.), 
Hexianglun, (Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe, Beijing, 1988), pp.192-196 
41 Hua Kun, Criticisms of Hexiang, (Beijing: Culture & Art 
Press, 1989) I pp.2-3 
A 'l 
HZhong Huaming (eds,), Reanalysis of Hexiang, 
University Press, 1989), pp.60-74 
(Hangzhou 
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culture has many good elements. 
Hexiang was regarded by its critics as a destructive attempt 
to blame the past for the present problems and torments, claiming 
that ancient and honorable Chinese culture had nothing to 
contribute to modern society. Another commentary ln Beijing Ribao 
criticized Hexiang .for its wholesale denial of the past, putting 
the film on a par with the Cultural Revolution. 43 Commentators 
just asked "should our culture be simply discarded or even totally 
abandoned?" They therefore argued that the tone of Hexiang was so 
negative that it was feared that the Chinese would ~9se even the 
last vestige of their confidence. 44 One of the articles from the 
Central Propaganda Department endorsed the Vlew that the film 
Hexiang "could hardly represent the resul ts of an intellectual 
against the whole of Chinese cuI ture on the part of the most 
refined, 'top-notch' members of the Chinese people. ,,45 The author, 
instead, stressed the urgency of fostering a cultural foundation 
. 
rather than evaluating it by Western standards. 46 Yang Zhenning 
argued that "Hexiana negates and writes off with a single stroke of 
the pen the 'old culture'. the 'Great Wall' and the Yellow 
. p Rlver." I Hexiang' s cri ticism of these three symbols "have aroused 
43Beijing Ribao, (26th August, 1989) 
HAlice De Jong, "The Demise of the Dragon: Backgrounds to the 
Chinese Film "River Elegy", China Information, (voIIV, No.3, 1989-
90), p.35 




his anger. In Yang~s mind, "the Chinese cultural tradition is one 
of the oldest cultural traditions in the world. It 1S the only 
cuI tut~ l tradi tion in the world tha t has continued in the same 
place from ancient times until now. The Chinese cultural tradition 
1S something tha t Wes tern people admire and envy." For this 
reason, Yang cannot accept this totally negative view. 48 All the 
aforementioned criticisms share the same view that the film Hexiang 
is "historical nihilism". 
The Condemnation of Total Westernization 
T&e admiration for the West expressed 1n this film was 
regarded by its critics as excessive because Hexiang "has evaluated 
China according to Western cri teria, and it approvingly quotes 
Hegel's Eurocentrist view of social development, which held that 
Asian societies had not broken through the social and ideological 
limitations of the agrarian way of life because they had failed to 
conquer the sea." 49 One of the ·articles in Guangming Ribao also 
declared that Hexiang had even falsified the reality of history to 
.fit its advocacy of total Westerization. 50 Another point of attack 
was the way in which ~exiang used the traditional Chinese symbols, 
the Great Wall, the Yellow River and the Chinese dragon, to 
illustrate the isolation, landlocked peasant society under the yoke 
4S"Yang Zhenning tan chuantong wenhua", Hexianglun 
A " 
;1 Part Two of the series, Hexiang and Hexianglun, pp.17-18 and 
p.25 
j I, 
wGuangming Ribao, (9 th Augus t, 1989) 
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of Oriental despotism. Also, ' it contrasted China wi th the so-
called deep blue sea, a symbol of Western sea-faring nations. 
Succi'n"ctly put, the commentators conceived such an association and 
comparison as far from scientific. Instead, it was seen as 
deliberate destruction of the sanctity of Chinese culture and their 
endeavour to renounce the national glory. 51 Qiushi Zazhi argued 
that the love of soil and the symbols of the Great Wall, the Yellow 
River and the Dragon were not a sin Slnce they symbolize the 
nationalist feelings of people toward their motherland. The article 
argued further that the people should respect theiS own culture 
since -Ita nation that is too . prone to belittle itself, ashamed of 
itself and pathetic, a nation that turns its back on its own 
history, such a nation lS also hopeless. ,,52 The article said 
further that no nation could achieve success by denigrating itself. 
Thus, to use the author's words, "a nation that has five thousand 
years of history and has nothing to show for it except negative 
things that have to be deplored --- what can it depend on to raise 
itself up? ,,53 
The Condemnation of Geographical Determinism 
The authors of Hexiang found themselves facing a general 
cultural disorientation which they believed arose from the 
geographical environment of China. When evaluating this idea, many 
commentators condemned it, saying "if the geographical environment 
51L"b t . 1 era on Army Dally, (13th October, 1989) 
:'Qiushi Zazhl", (N 8 1988) 34 38 _ o. , , pp. -
: , 
.I"'Inside Mainland China, (January, 1989), p. 8 
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has determined the backwardness of Chinese culture, how can it be 
that our efforts to rescue China from its backwardness are not a 
waste - :_~of effort? If we can use Western concepts and Western 
civilization in place of our own national civilization, does this 
fact not show the ineffectiveness of the theory of determinism 
based on geographical environmen t?" 54 Geographical determinism 
which is based on the "theory of CuI tural Eurocentricism", has come 
to be considered as a modern historical example of an "outmoded 
world view". 55 The views of Hexiang, to most Communists, seemingly 
bear very close connections with this European view in demeaning 
the significance of Socialism in China. In China Educational 
Daily, one of the commentaries accused Hexiang of falsification of 
the past as well as advocacy of Westernization. It argued Hexiang 
has not recognized the significance of socialist development after 
1949. The article pointed out that Hexiang intended to criticize 
Communist rule. For this reason, the author believed Hexiang had 
attempted to overthrow the rule of Communism in China. 56 Many 
critics complained that Hexiang was too vague, too general, biased, 
incorrect in its presentation of facts, unscientific or 
insufficiently scientific, emotional rather than logical, and 
without answers to the posed questions. 
IN DEFENCE OF HEXIANG 
Ecountering such a cluster of comments and criticisms, Yuan 
jjGuangming Ribao, (4 th Nov. 1988) 
~' - , 
"eChina Educational Daily, (12th August, 1989) 
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Zhiming, one of the co-workers on the film denied that Hexiang was 
mere "eli tist grumbling". Yuan explained that the film had to deal 
wi th 'the structural problems of the entire society. He claimed 
that the critics failed to understand that the reforms are already 
breaking with Chinese tradition. Yuan adds that these people have 
adopted a more restrictive scope of analysis, In which they failed 
to take into account the present predicaments of China in relation 
to a wider context. Simply put, China faces not only an economic 
problem but also a political and cultural one. 57 
In reaction to the excessively harsh attacks '_:_ ,' Su Xiaokang 
conceded that the arguments presented in Hexiang was sufficiently 
precise and the historical facts were not presented accurately. 
However, Su pointed out that Hexiang was not a scientific and 
academic work as such; but it was made as a work of emotion to 
reflect a social mood and as a warning to motivate people to think 
and evaluate past and present crises. sa For this reason, Su 
explained that exaggerations in Hexiang were used as a device to 
arouse the emotions of people. In the same vein, Yuan Zhiming also 
_ stated "it(Hexiang] would not have been up to standard as a 
J 
scientific article, but you know, Hexiang is just • ~ 9 Hexlang. "'" He 
indicated that the principal intent of the film was not to solve 
all China's problems but only to encourage people to think ~bout 
.. , 
:l'Alice De Jong, op.cit., pp.36-37 
q 
J W.L.Chong, op.cit., pp.44-46 
"0 
:l'Yuan Zhiming, 9uangming_~i~ao, (18 August 1988), p.3 
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, d . t· 60 the historical heri,tage standing in the way of mo ern1za 10n. 
If we evaluate Hexiang against the fundamental objectives of 
the aft~hors, we must conclude that Hexiang certainly succeeded 1n 
making people believe that China is in a deep multi-dimensional 
crisis because of the Hexi~nglun, Hexiang Phenomenon, Hexiangre. 
BEHIND THE CULTURAL CRISIS - THE CRISIS OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME 
More importantly, Hexiang has shown the fact that China is in 
a deep cultural and structural crisis. Like Jin Guantao and Liu 
Qingfeng , Hexiang's authors also maintain that th~~ root of the 
proble~s has to do with the Communist rule. 61 Hexiang revives the 
questions of national identity and national survival which go back 
to the earlier movement in the late 19th century. Su Xiaokang made 
clear that the intellectuals were afraid of the Communist authority 
for they could not openly criticize the government. They chose a 
safe stand to attack the ancestors in order to cri ticize the 
present problems. After Hexiang, Su also planned to produce a 
sequel to Hexiang, Wusi, with the intention to deal with several 
. themes of Chinese history over a much longer time-span of 2000 
years. He would endeavour to suggest that the backwardness of 
modern China lies not in the tradi tional cuI ture but in the 
Communist rule of China. Su maintained ' that "traditional culture 
had been destroyed by many factors, one of which was the impact of 
the West. The new culture which arose after the destruction of the 
60 Ibid 
--
61 Jin Guantao, New Ten Da~ Discourse. 
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old was a disastrous combination of Oriental despotism and 
Stalinism. What we now have in China is Communist culture. ,,62 The 
prime.-:0bject ' Wusi would have been to examine the disastrous system 
of Communism, in particular, to scrutinize the cyclical character 
of the unsuccessful reforms in China and the absence of science and 
democracy, especially ln relation to the already collapsed 
traditional culture which has not been replaced by a new culture. 
Su claimed that this circumstance would cause a cultu~al crisis and 
the loosening bond of state and society which would greatly 
undermine the rule of Communist China. 63 Su therefore concluded 
that tne root of the problem has no direct relation to cultural 
enigma but to Communist rule. We must conclude that the hidden 
message of Hexiang is a proclamation of a total crisis in China 
which certainly undermines and shakes the legitimation of Communist 
rule in China. 
CONCLUSION 
The Cultural Crisis and the Legitimation Crisis 
"Cultural re-examination" or "cultural fever" has taken off 
since the early 80's, where the whole notion of culture is mainly 
concerned with a fresh appraisal. People in mainland China have 
not only reevaluated Chinese tradition but also put Marxism under 
close scrutiny. In orthodox Marxism, culture has been seen as an 
instrument, superstructure, or reflection of the class structure of 
society. In the new interpretation of culture by Neo-Marxism, 
~2 ~ W. L . Chong, op. c it., p. 47 
6J Ibid , pp.47-48 
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culture has been seen as a subsystem of society on an equal footing 
with politics and economics. In the late 80's, many discussions of 
cuI tur,al issues in the mainland have reflected the notion tha t 
cuI ture 1.S an integral part of poli tics as it interacts wi th 
poli tical, econom1.C, moral and other social conceptions. 64 As 
Zhang Yongjie says, 
Problems of the economy are closely connected with the 
ways of behaving and thinking, the conceptual environment 
controlling Chinese society. The most impor'tant of these 
were products of recent Chinese history, and have little 
direct relation to so-called Chinese tradi tional cuI ture. 
If tradi tional cuI ture has been a barrier to 
modernization, it has had to play this role through a 
whole set of cuI tural concepts produced by the era of 
politics [i.e. the Maoist period] .O~ 
It is clear that the relationship between culture and politics 
1.S intimate, especially in mainland China. Lucian pye decribes 
"Leninist Confucianism" as the dominant poli tical cuI ture in 
contemporary China,66 which sets the stage for the socialist order 
in China, qua super-fedual society. In the same vein, Bao Zunxin 
propounded the idea that Mao's dictum was not intrinsically Marxist 
but it showed an internal identity with the ethical totalism of 
Confucian tradi tion. 67 Bao, who has supported the democracy 
64David Kelly, "Chinese Intellectuals in the 1989 Democracy 
Movemen t", George Hicks (eds.), The Broken Mirror, (UK: Longman, 
1990), p.31 
65Zhang Yongjie, "Cong Zhengzhi Shidai, Jingji Shadai Dao 
Wenhua Shidai", Pacific Forum, (no.4 1989), pp.5-8 
6°Lucian Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Poli tical 
Culture, (Michigan Monographs in Chinese Studies, no. 59, Ann Arbor, 
1988) 
67 "The Confucian Tradi tion and Contemporary China ", Zhongquo 
luntan, . (Taipei: 27:1, 1988), pp.27-J1 
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movement and urged for modernization with particular emphasis on 
developing the essence of the May Fourth movement, has suggested 
that .anti-tradi tion was not anti-Chinese culture but intended only 
to modify the culture and to imbue it with new elements from other 
cultures. Such an intent, he says, is not 'historical nihilism'. 
Following this line of reasoning, Bao advocates the liberation and 
emancipation of individuals from the binding constraints of 
tradi tion in order that people can be free to develop the new 
cultural values which enhance modernization. 68 
~eyu Yingzhi and Ba,o Zunxin r et. al., From May Fourth to New 
M~Fou~h, (Taipei: Time Daily Press, 1990), pp.161-180 
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Conclusion 
"Repression and dissidence have been inherent in the 
relationship between the state and the intellectuals since the 
establishment of the PRC. As Chu-yuan Cheng observed, the 
contemporary Chinese intellectuals have upheld both the Confucian 
tradition of literati and the spirit of the May Fourth era. 1 Under 
the Confucian system, Chinese intellectuals performed moral, 
political ·and socioeconomic functions. They were expected to be 
standard-bearers of morality, preserving tradit~onal ethical 
values. 2 As these standard-bearers of morali ty, intellectuals 
often possessed a strong sense of mission. As Fan Zhongyan stated 
"a scholar worries over the world before the world worr1es over 
itself; a scholar 1S happy only after all mankind has achieved 
happiness.,,3 In the traditional culture, the scholar-moralist's 
determined defence of his beliefs has been considered one of his 
most glorious roles. It is against such a background that the 
intellectuals functioned as critics both of government policies and 
of the power holders. The censorial system in pa~ticular was 
designed to check royal caprice. Grieder also concelves that "it 
was Confucian aspiration which enlivened intellectual life and gave 
lC.Y. Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1990), p.68 
" 
'These three functions are adopted from Y. C. 
Intellectuals and the West 1872-1949, (Chapel 
University of North Carolina Press, 1966), part 1 
, 
Yang I Chinese 
Hill, N.C.: 
Vol. 
"'From Fan I s essay in ~ Com.I2.il.ation of Ancient Famous Es~.aY§ 
9, ( Ta i p ei: Co mm ere i alP res s, 1 9 56), p. 1 3 8 
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it the coherence and sense of purpose which is its most remarkable 
aspect. ,,4 Grieder, like Cheng, also argues that contemporary 
intel~ectuals have the Confucian inheritance as they also uphold 
the value of being critical to maladministration and act as moral 
standardbearers. 5 
In this study, we have discovered that the intellectuals have 
become even more cri tical of the government policies. Their 
dissidence and critiques have become more intensified, attacking 
not only the bureaucratic problems but also the socialist system 
itself. The level and intensi ty of crlS1S have become mul ti-
dimensional and deepened. Furthermore, they employ more direct 
means to point out the predicaments and crlses that they are 
facing. Hence, all these reflect the more critical stance of the 
intellectuals in post-Mao China. 
GROWTH OF INTELLECTUAL DISSIDENCE 
The contemporary Chinese intellectuals have been influenced 
by the May Fourth spiri t . As Cheng observed, the May Fourth 
incident set a precedent for future young intellectuals. 6 Its 
impact lay not only in its influence over the notion of democracy 
and science, but more fundamentally on its changing the mentality 
of Chinese intellectuals in responding to their external world. 
They no longer confined their attention and activities to their 
4Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State 
China, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1981), p.3 
:lIbid, pp.1-23 
CCheng, Ope cit" pp.71-77 
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campuses but directed their attention to national affairs. We may 
thus conclude that the Chinese intellectuals have become more 
cri tic"a1 , emancipatory, hermeneutic and hence often more 
l ' , 1 7 po 1t1ca . Vera Schwarcz argues in the same line that the 
contemporary Chinese intellectuals have become more critical, 
reflecting both the Confucian tradition ~f literati and the May 
Fourth spirit. 8 Liu Binyan, who is consciously harking back to the 
Confucian self-definition of intellectuals and playing the role as 
a censor, produces writings which always maintain the values of the 
people. 
~ore importantly, the intellectuals have called for a thorough 
enlightenment movement. There has. been a revival of the May Fourth 
ideal of "qimeng" in the post-Mao era. 9 Contemporary Chinese 
intellectuals, like Fang Lixzhi, Wang Ruoshui and Wang Ruowang, 
continue to question the prejudices and superstitutions of their 
bureaucratic superiors. Though they have been condemned as 
"unpatriotic" by the Communist state, their own notion of cri ticism 
can be designated as critical patriotism or critical loyalty. In 
this sense then, we can conclude that their critical stance 1S 
i , , 
'These characterlst1cs of intellectuals are adopted from 
Alivin w. Gou1dner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the 
Intellectuals, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
8Vera Schwarcz, "Afterword", Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy 
Cheek (eds), China's Establishment Intellectuals, (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc. 1986), pp.247-256 
9Ibid , p. 251, for. a fuller discussion of the historical 
background of the contemporary implications of the May Fourth 
spirit, see Vera Schwarcz , The Chinese Enliahtenment: Intellectuals 
and the Legacy of the · Hay Fourth Movement of 1_919, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985) 
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different from their forerunners' chauvinistic nationalism. They 
try to employ not only a Chinese standard but also a standard based 
upon·-:the historical experiences of non-Chinese people to highlight 
China's backwardness in the modern world and to point out the 
Party's share of responsibility for its predicament. These 
critical patriots refuse to see their homeland as unique 1n the 
world. Rather, they concede that the advancement of the Western 
world and Japan can bring them some treasurable experience and 
teach them good lessons 1n their own moderniza tion. Schwarcz 
argees, "[the contemporary intellectuals] believe t~~t the gain of 
technblogical modernization will not be secured unless and until 
the enlightenment movement 1S allowed finally to challenge the 
tenaci ty of feudal habi ts of mind. ,,10 
The present study indicates that the intellectuals have become 
more independent in their thinking. Unlike their predecessors, 
they boldly criticize the policies of the socialist system itself. 
They point to the culture and the authoritarian rule as the root of 
today's cr1S1S. In the past, they identified wi th the Marxist 
ideals ; but no,;.;adays, they talk only of the myth of Communist 
utopia. They have begun to look for a new identity. Under the 
shadow of traditional values of literati and the May Fourth spirit, 
the contemporary Chinese critical intellectuals have sought 
emancipation. Our study has revealed that such intellectuals as 
Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruoshui, Wang Ruowang and Liu Binyan not only 
point out different types of crisis in post-Mao China but also 
III 
--Vera Schwarcz, "Afterward", p. 253 
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advocate autonomy for intellectuals and freedom for the people. 
Furthermore, the intellectuals have called for authentic 
emati~lpation of mind. They have argued for a thorough 
enlightenment pr~cisely because they believe that a repudiation of 
all outworn ideas 1S recessary before China can proceed to 
establish its modernization program on a firm foundation. Zhou 
Yang and Wang Ruoshui, two highly placed intellectuals 1n the 
Party, have advocated enlightenment of thought. The author 
believes the growth in commi tment to intellectual emancipation 
tremendously influences the intellectual world as .- well as the 
-general public. In spite of their being Party members, Zhou and 
Wang advocated emancipation 6f mind, a position which runs counter 
to the orthodox philosophy of the CPC. This open confrontation has 
far-reaching significance. The critical intellectuals today differ 
from their predecessors in the 60's for they have insisted that 
their critical thought be given a greater role in Chinese political 
life. Schwarcz supports the view that "the willingness of such 
influential Party intellectuals as Zhou and Wang to pose questions 
of the current line enables others outside of the Party to raise 
even stronger objections to the that intellectual 
modernization 1S synonymous wi th the rehabili tation of a few, 
l' frequently deceased, critics of Mao Zedong.,,_l Schwarcz's argument 
has been confirmed by the fact that a greater majority of 
intellectuals in post-Mao China have indeed become more vocal and 
critical in their stance, who would openly question the policies 
llJbid, p.255 
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and even overtly attack the socialist system. 
The intellectuals in post-Mao China reVlve questions of 
national identity and national survival which go back to the 
Westernization Movement and the 1898 Reforms of the late 19th 
century. Their questions no longer deal wi th how to transform 
China technologically, but more significantly, they ralse the 
fundamental question of how to modernize people's minds. 
Furthermore, we also discovered that the critiques and 
dissendence of the contemporary Chinese intellectuals differ from 
those of the tradi tional li terati. Yu Yingsi noted that the 
literati in traditional China assumed the role of uncovering out 
maladministration and social injustice. The gentry (shih), in Vu's 
mind, bore the characteristics of the Western sense of 
intellectuals Slnce "shih" ln traditional China gave their 
pronounced concern for the life of the public and matters within 
the social and political realm .12 Though the literati could 
criticize on various levels, their critiques had to be within the 
boundary that the supreme authority endorsed. As Cheng observed, 
"censors [the literati] were required to criticize the court and 
the officials but had to avoid making unsubstantiated charges, 
which could lead to their own dismissal.,,13 
Therefore, the traditional literati rarely attacked the 
1 " 
-'Vu Yingsi, ~_hill_aIlcL_.th~hi.ll.es~_Cl~_l ture r (Shanghai: Renmin 
Press, 1984), p.3 
.. 
~~Cheng, 00 . t 69 ~. Cl ., p. 
158 
administrative apparatus and poli tical structure .14 Though the 
contemporary Chinese intellectuals have the inheritance of their 
prede-cessors, they have broken wi th the old tradi tion by going 
beyond the allowed boundary. The intellectuals have touched on the 
taboo area by attacking the socialist ideals and system in post-Mao 
China. In post-Mao China, ' leading intellectuals have spoken 
increasingly freely at home and abroad. The new freedom of 
express10n exercised by the intellectuals has meant a renewed 
h ·· h Id 15 challenge to the aut or1tar1an power 0 ers. 
Apart from that, the present study also discovers that the 
form of critiques and dissidences of the critical intellectuals in 
post-Mao China 1S different from their forerunners. In the 
traditional China, as well as 1n the 50's and 60's, most 
intellectuals employed indirect means to point out the impending 
crisis tha t they were encoun tering. Very often they employed 
analogy or parable to reveal the present crises. Their messages 
tended to be general rather than specific 1n order not to 
antagonize the rulers .16 Unlike their forerunners, the critical 
intellectuals in post-Mao China have employed more direct means to 
pinpoint the impending crisis confronting the state. They declare 
. , 
l'Zhang Hao, Grief Mentali ty and Tradi tion of Democracy, 
(Taipei: Lian Jing Press, 1988), chapter 1-3 
1 ~ 
;':)1 share the similar idea of C. Y. Cheng, for greater detail, 
please see Cheng, op.cit., "Intellectual Challenge and Student 
Movements", pp.67-96 
-OM. Goldman, China's Intellectuals Advice and Dissent, pp.3-4 
and please refer to the related information on how Wu Han and Deng 
Tuo's dissidence in the chapter on "Critical Intellectuals" 
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the problems openly and attack the system directly. 
It is argued that the intellectuals become more radical and 
criti~al because of their poor treatment and economic insecurity. 
The aforegoing analysis has demonstrated that there 1S a close 
relationship between the unfair treatment and disrespectful 
attitude toward intellectuals and intellectual unrest. The present 
study has also revealed the poor treatment of the intellectuals in 
terms of salary, social status, intellectual freedom and job 
security. The economic deprivation and the contraction of job 
opportunities have forced the intellectuals to become more vocal, 
critical and hence become more political. The critical 
intellectuals .become more radical politically especially when their 
freedom and exercise of power are strictly controlled. This 
political pressure may further precipitate intellectual 
dissidence .17 Hoping to break through such an externally-imposed 
boundary, the intellectuals have acted more radically and 
critically. It is clear then these reasons contribute to the 
growing vehemence of intellectual dissent in post-Mao China. 
SOCIAL POSITION OF THE CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUALS · 
The present study also reveals a difference ln social 
position between the post-Mao intellectuals and their predecessors 
in Mao's era, with regard to their relation to the state. As 
observed by Timothy Cheek and Carol Hamrin, the earlier 
intellectuals at heart remained loyal to institutional Leninism 
even In their efforts 'to make Leninist norms SU1' t Chl' na b tt e - er . 
... 
~ I Brym, op.cit., p.16 
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Although they attempted to preserve a degree of intellectual and 
professional autonomy from politics, these attitudes were mediated 
by primary loyalty to Party domination. 18 According to Cheek and 
: .. .. .... 
Hamrin, the Chinese intellectuals of the Mao era could operate only 
within a well-defined institutional framework and could circulate 
their opinions only through authorized channels in which one's 
. 1 d d .. 1 19 status and personal connectlons p aye a etermlnlng ro e. Merle 
Goldman also argues ln a similar line that ' the Mao-era 
intellectuals were still constrained by the state, their critiques 
and dissendence allowed only within the state's approved boundary, 
thus ~cting essentially as an appendage of the state. They could 
not develop a relatively independent stance, reflecting their 
autonomous role in the intellectual world, because the c~itical 
intellectuals remained dependent on their political patrons. 
Without the support from their patrons, said Goldman, the 
intellectuals would become vulnerable. 20 Besides, Goldman argues, 
the critical intellectuals could criticize only the misdeeds of the 
leadership in the expectation that the leadership would reform, 
their main purpose being to help the leaders improve the system but 





foreword and Andrew Nathan also argues the 
in post-Mao China still remaln loyal to the state, 
please see Nathan, China's Crisis and Chinese ------------~~~ 
'):j 
""For detailed argument, please see Herle Goldman, China's 
Intellectuals and the State, (London: Havard University Press, 
1987), introduction and conclusion 
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Our observation of the post-Mao intellectuals indicates that 
theY '~ave become relatively independent and critical. This study 
has examined the cri tical intellectuals in social science and 
humanities, unlike the work of Cheek and Hamrin, whose studies 
concentrated on the "establishment intellectuals" who are the 
members of the Party with all its constraints and limitations. The 
present study has focused mainly on those critical intellectuals 
who have assumed the role of socialist scout, social conscience or 
the spokesman of the people. Internalizing the noti~?s of both the 
tradi-tional li tera ti and the May Fourth spiri t, they have become 
more critical and fearless in pointing out the existence of crlS1S. 
To borrow a metaphor from Liu Binyan, the relationship between 
China's political structure and its civil society is like an 
eggshell with a chicken growing inside it. As Nathan described it, 
"the apparatus of totalistic political control still exists, but 
inwardly an independen t society 1S deve loping. ,,22 In spi te of -
continued suppression, the critical intellectuals have taken more 
autonomy in lodging their complaints and raising their questions 
against the present policies and even against the socialist system. 
Nathan has observed a loosening of censorship from the state toward 
literary works. The open support to the student demonstrations by 




~ 'Andrew Nathan, (~.h,iD_~_.§ __ ~_ri_§i~, (New York: Columbia Universi ty 
Press, _. 1990), p.120 
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partial disintegr,ation of control by the Party. Though the state 
could censor the news agency ul tima tely, argued Na than, it was 
incre"asingly costly and ineffective to do so. Nathan also 
contended that the explusions of Liu Binyan, Wang Ruoshui and 
• 
others from the CPC in 19.87 have caused worldwide counter-reaction 
and to some extent have helped the impetus for liberalization of 
the intellectual world and the democracy movement. 23 Therefore, 
we can say that a relatively relaxed environment has emerged in 
post-Mao China, pavlng the way for the rise of the cri tical 
intellectuals. Wang Ruowang said "his hopes for str-engthening the 
-independent role of the intellectuals in China were pinned in part 
on the willingness of private enterprises like the Stone 
Corporation, a Beijing computer company, to support cultural 
activities. Besides, he also mentions the Capital Iron and Steel 
Corpora tion as a source of support too." 24 Wang maintains that 
these private enterprises obviously supply the critical 
intellectuals with financial support. 
These developments have enhanced the critical intellectuals' 
ability to develop as a more independent group to counteract the 
domination of the state. They may well become more critical and 
autonomous. Based upon the findings of the current study, the 
author believes the critical intellectuals have manipulated the 
"cultural symbols" to influence the masses and that they will 
23 Ibid , pp .120-122 
"j 
L'Nan Fangshou, "A ' Look a t the t1ainland Democracy Movemen t 
a Vis i t to Be i j in g", ~h ius h ~N en t ai, ( H K: A pr i 1, 1 9 8 9), p. 3 7 
on 
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continue to play a significant role in influencing public opinion. 
As Nathan observed, "the Party (CPC) no longer seemed to have 
either the ideological authority or the political will to induce 
. f . . f d· . t t" 25 lntellectual con ormlty or to repress expressl0ns 0 lscon en . 
The intellectuals have gone beyond seeking more freedom of thought 
and flexibility within Marxism. In this sense then, the 
independent role of the intellectuals is more clearly asserted. 
With such data in hand we contend that Timothy Cheek, Carol Hamrin 
and Merle Goldman have not offered a comprehensive picture of the 
role of the intellectuals in post-Mao China. Hen~.~, the author 
conclbdes that the critical intellectuals have gone so far as to 
break through the accustomed way of dealing with the state. They 
choose to be more independent in thinking, more critical in outlook 
and more conscious . of the public interest. 
THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMATION IN CHINA 
The present study has illuminated the nature of the 
legi tima tion cris i s ln pos t-Mao China. Throughout the whole 
research, the author has employed the analytic device set forth by 
Habermas for examining the legi timation crisis in the advanced 
capitalist states. He believes that the fundamental flaw of the 
capitalist states lay in motivational crisis. In his analysis, 
Habermas pinpointed the discrepancy betT,-leen the value and the 
system, which inevitably results in 
: 3 t,I a t. h an, . t 11 1 
- - op . Cl., p. .... 
~::For detail, please refer 








Habermas argued that such identity/legitimation crlses arise from 
unresolved "s teering problems" of a social sys tem; tha t 1 s , the 
sociAl structure allows fewer possibilities for problem solving 
than are necessary to maintain the system. The resul t is the 
withdrawal of political support by the people. In short, a crisis 
arises from the growing discrepancy between the need for action and 
h f . . 27 the deart 0 motlvatlon. 
In our present study, the author borrows the concepts of 
Habermas to analyze the case of China, only to find that the 
fundamental flaw of the legitimation crisis in post-Mao China is 
related closely to ideological retrogression. The people living in 
mainland China have ceased to identify with the Communist ideal. 
A crisis of identity has emerged among the public. The disjuncture 
between the promise and the performance of the state begets 
legi timation difficul ties, which has .turned into a legi timation 
crlS1S. Lucian Pye and John Herz support this concept, concluding 
that if the state fails to create an identity for people to give 
them a feeling of "belonging" to the leadership, such failure may 
glve rise to a legitimation crisis. 28 
27Habermas, op.cit., pp.2-4, 48,69,74-75 
28Lucian Pye also sees a close linkage between the problems of 
identi ty and legi timacy. In a similar vein, John Herz defines 
legi timacy in terms of "internal (regime) legi timacy" and "external 
(group) legi timacy" relating. to a basic need that human beings want 
units such as nation-states to satisfy: to give them a feeling of 
belonging of identi ty wi th group". See Lucian Pye, "The 
Legitimation Crisis", Levnard Binder etal. Crises and Sequences in 
Political Development, Princeton , N.J.: Prince ton University 
Press), pp.135, 137, 153 and John Herz, "Legitimacy: Can We 
Retrieve It? ", Co m par ~ t i ve Po 1 i tic s I ( 1 0 no. 3 April 1 9 7 8), p. 3 1 8 
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Having examined the crises perceived by intellectuals, the 
author has constructed a more coherent and analytical framework and 
depiction of the legi timation cr1S1S 1n post-Mao China. The 
contradiction between the system realm and the socio-cultural realm 
has contributed to the legitimation crisis in post-Mao China. The 
post-Mao intellectuals have suggested a whole range of crises 
within the socio-cultural arena, deriving from the value vacuum in 
China. When the people lost their faith in Marxism, Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping reemphasized the Four Cardinal 
Principles to legitimatize his rule; but evidence has proved his 
efforts to regain the hearts of the people to be unsuccessful. The 
internal contradiction and unresolved conflict between the ideology 
and the advocacy of socialist market reforms threaten the rule of 
the CPC. Weber noted that "every poli tical system attempts to 
establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy".29 The 
failure in establishing the belief in its legitimacy has caused 
Communist China to confront its own self-legitimation crisis. The 
gap between value and the system creates adjustment problems, 
~~hich, unresolved, finally constitute a legitimation crlS1S In 
China. 
The foregoing analysis has helped us develop a clearer notion 
that legitimation crlS1S ln China 1S not solely based upon a 
motivational crisis as Habermas alleges to exist in the West. The 
legitimation crisis of post-Mao China, instead, 1S intimately 
')" :'~Guenther Roth & . Claua Wittich (eds), 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 
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?conomy and Soci~, 
1978), vol.1, p.212 
related to ideological retrogression. The realization of failure 
of the people caused them first to question, then to reject, the 
soc~alistsystem. They no longer have any politico-social system 
with which to identify. It is for this reason that the people of 
China have suffered from identity crisis. Wi th the failure ln 
economlc reforms and institutional crlS1S embedded ln the 
authoritarian rule of the Communist Party, the people, especially 
the intellectuals, have been more conscious that the' crises are not 
accidental. They have concluded that the root of the crises has to 
do wi th the internal flaws and weaknesses of the socialist system". 
We can conclude that the legitimation crisis in post-Mao China is 
a crlS1S not only of the eco-poli tical system but also of the 
cultural value system. Thus, the author must consider the 
legitimation crisis in post-Mao China as different from that of 
Habermas' motivational crisis. Rather, the legitimation crisis in 
post-Mao China stems from the ideological and identity crises in 
the socio-cultural realm. 
The present study examined the lssues of the legi timation 
crisis in post-Mao China. It has attempted to construct a coherent 
framework for understanding that crisis. Future studies of Chinese 
intellectuals may investigate the influence of intellectuals on the 
civil society, perhaps questioning whether they can be developed as 
an independent group at an intermediate level to represent the 
interests of the civil society. These are interesting and 
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